



A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment:  














Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 





























All rights reserved 
 
ABSTRACT 
A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment: Evidence from Belgium and Spain 
Anna Zamora-Kapoor 
 
Scholarship argues that anti-immigrant sentiment originates at the individual-level, is evenly 
distributed within countries, and is primarily manifested in a single form as hostility toward the 
out-group. In A Structural Explanation for Anti-immigrant Sentiment, I challenge these three 
claims and propose a novel approach to the sociological understanding of inter-ethnic contention. 
My explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment builds upon prevailing theories within political 
sociology, which center on the role of the state (Evans et al. 1985; Scott 1998; Skocpol 1979). 
While scholars have long acknowledged the role of the state in the regulation of immigration flows 
and their incorporation (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; Lahav 2004; 
Massey et al. 2002; Messina 2007; Money 1999; Sassen 1996; 1999; Zolberg 2006), only limited 
research has examined the extent to which the state, through its regulations and institutions, may 
also affect public attitudes toward immigration. I argue that, as states establish the parameters for 
native-foreigner interaction, they play an active role in the establishment of inter-ethnic relations.  
I use a mixed methods research design that combines surveys, interviews, ethnographic 
fieldwork, and socio-demographic and policy estimates to examine the distribution of anti-
immigrant sentiment across three Belgian and three Spanish regions. Using regions as units of 
analysis facilitates isolating the role of structural conditions in the manifestation of citizens’ 
hostility. Three empirical chapters show that distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant 
sentiment emerge in geographical enclaves with specific demographic, economic, political, and 
cultural characteristics. Findings from this research contribute to prevailing theories of anti-
immigrant sentiment, and its relation to state regulation of immigration and integration. Moreover, 
I consider how current policies might be revised in light of these findings and I suggest new 
approaches to the regulation of multi-ethnic environments, as well as to the strengthening of social 
cohesion in these environments.  
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ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AND SOCIAL COHESION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
International migration has traditionally been seen as a challenge to social cohesion. In Economy 
and Society, for example, Weber described natives’ opposition to a foreign ethnic group as a 
“primary and normal reaction” (1978: 385). In the last fifty years, increasing geographical mobility 
has laid the ground for natives’ hostility towards immigrants. Contention emerges when an 
originally temporary migration becomes permanent. In Europe, most countries have witnessed the 
increasing mobilization of the radical right, which has in some cases achieved Parliamentary 
representation (Rydgren 2007). As anti-immigrant sentiment calls into question the extent to which 
cultural diversity is compatible with the modern nation-state, examining the elements that underlie 
its manifestation represents a sociological priority.  
 Sociologists have long been interested in anti-immigrant sentiment because it reveals the 
nature and strength of group boundaries (Bail 2008; Lamont and Mólnar 2002; Tilly 2004). 
Citizens’ hostility towards the out-group exposes the mechanisms of exclusion that some scholars 
consider intrinsic to the establishment of the nation-state and national citizenry (Wimmer 2002). 
Modern nation-states use multiple labels to categorize otherness: aliens, foreigners, guest-worker, 
immigrants, refugees, or tourists, among others. Although each of these out-groups has a different 
set of rights and obligations (Benhabib 2004), they introduce states’ active function in the 
establishment of inter-ethnic relations. Yet, most scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment views 
the state as a passive actor. In this research, I attempt to provide a structural explanation for anti-
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immigrant sentiment, which assumes the state as an active regulator of immigrants’ inclusion and 
exclusion.  
Scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment relies upon three assumptions: a) it originates at 
the individual-level; b) it is evenly distributed within countries; and c) it is homogeneous in nature. 
First, previous studies approach anti-immigrant sentiment with formulations centered on the 
individual. They argue that citizens who are unemployed, hold conservative values, did not attend 
college, or do not have an immigrant cultural background are more likely to perceive immigration 
negatively than their employed, liberal, college-educated, and immigrant-descended peers 
(Rustenbach 2010). While these studies inform us about what types of individuals are more likely 
to view immigration negatively, they do not explain where anti-immigrant sentiment comes from. 
Cross-national comparative studies provide evidence of the interaction effects between micro- and 
macro-level variables, but exhibit similar limitations. Citizens in countries with increasing 
immigration, low economic growth, or substantial electoral support for the radical right exhibit 
stronger anti-immigrant sentiment than countries without such demographic, economic, and 
political characteristics (Fetzer 2000; Semyonov et al. 2006)1. Previous studies’ emphasis on 
statistically significant coefficients has omitted a theoretical discussion about the processes and 
mechanisms that underlie anti-immigrant sentiment. This dissertation argues that extant studies 
have only accounted for one part of the anti-immigrant sentiment story, and attempts to contribute 
to this literature with an inductive analysis centered on the state.  
Second, extant scholarship assumes that anti-immigrant sentiment is evenly distributed 
within countries (see the review by Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). Comparative studies usually 
                                                          
1 Another question is whether the relationship between the success of the radical right and anti-immigrant sentiment 
is endogenous or bi-directional. 
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employ countries as units of analysis, even though survey data indicate that within-country 
attitudinal differences are larger than cross-national ones (see Chapter 3). I argue that the lack of 
studies examining the cross-regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment has hindered the field 
and limited its theoretical and empirical contribution. In this study, I seek to address this gap with 
a research design based on six research sites from two different countries. My research shows that 
distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment emerge in geographical enclaves with 
specific demographic, economic, political, and cultural characteristics.  
Third, most research assumes that anti-immigrant sentiment is a homogeneous 
phenomenon: hostility toward the out-group. I distinguish between the manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment as a threat to natives’ living standards (material threat) from its manifestation 
as a threat to natives’ language, religion, and other symbolic practices (cultural threat), in order to 
examine the type of structural conditions most likely to engender these two different patterns of 
hostility. I do not imply that anti-immigrant sentiment will be exclusively manifested in one form 
or another; quite to the contrary, natives who view immigrants as a material threat are likely to 
view them as a cultural threat as well. Yet, by determining whether the primary source of anti-
immigrant sentiment is material or cultural, this study gains analytical leverage to better assess the 
object of analysis.     
With these considerations in mind, the question I seek to answer is: What underlies the 
geographical distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its manifestation as a material or a 
cultural threat?  
I build upon prevailing theories within political sociology, centered on the role of the state 
(Evans et al. 1985; Scott 1998; Skocpol 1979). In Seeing like a State, James Scott (1998) identifies 
the power of the nation-state with a sequence of institutional efforts aimed at standardizing its 
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subjects. The transformation of people into abstract citizens was an essential exercise of statecraft, 
in order to allow the state to control, plan, and rule. For Scott, standardized citizens are “uniform 
in their needs and even interchangeable” (1998: 346). Immigration and cultural diversity 
challenges this standardization process, and forces the state to come up with new strategies to 
maintain the social order. As states engage in this practice, I argue that they do not only shape the 
living conditions of the immigrant population, but also how citizens perceive them.    
Immigration scholars have long examined the role of the state in the regulation of 
immigration (Brubaker 1992; Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; Lahav 2004; Massey et al. 
2002; Messina 2007; Money 1999; Sainsbury 2012; Sassen 1988; 1996; 1999; 2006; Soysal 1994; 
Vertovec and Wessendorf 2010; Zolberg 2006), but there is little evidence of the relationship 
between these regulations and public opinion. This research attempts to fill in this void with an 
inductive analytical approach. I argue that states’ efforts to regulate native-immigrant boundaries 
shape the structural conditions in which natives and immigrants interact and generate perceptions 
of one another. As states regulate immigrants’ incorporation in cultural, economic, or political 
terms, I claim that they influence the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.   
My main claim is that state institutions and regulations are the epicenter of contemporary 
manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment. I explain anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of the 
relations between the state, political parties, and the native citizenry (see Figure 1.1: The origin of 
anti-immigrant sentiment), and account for its geographical variability with evidence of the 
relations between state regulations, political parties, and native citizens.   





Following Messina and Lahav (2006), I use the term ‘immigrant’ to refer to persons who have 
migrated to another country on a long term basis, and ‘migrant’ to describe those who intend to 
live and work in a foreign country for a short term, such as seasonal guest-workers. By contrast, I 
use the term “native citizen” to refer to a member of the national citizenry that does not have an 
immigrant background. Since citizens with an immigrant background have a logic pre-disposition 
to perceive immigration positively (Fetzer 2000), my focus consists of explaining the cross-
regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment among native citizens only. With the term “anti-
immigrant sentiment”, I reference native citizens’ hostility towards immigrants. Later, I will show 
that such hostility can be manifested in reaction to either a material and as a cultural threat (or 
both). By “state” I refer to the governmental institutions at the local, regional, and national levels 
with the legitimacy to design and implement policy, and the term “political parties” refers to 
organized interest groups that seek to control government.  
 
1.3. Sociological significance 
Why is anti-immigrant sentiment a subject of sociological interest? The institutionalization of the 
nation-state has historically relied on ethnically homogeneous populations. As Wimmer argues:  
“Belonging to a specific national or ethnic group determines access to the rights and 
services the modern state is supposed to guarantee. The main promise of modernity – 
political participation, equal treatment before the law and protection from the arbitrariness 
of state power, dignity for the weak and poor, and social justice and security – were fully 
realized only for those who came to be regarded as true members of the nation. The modern 
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principles of inclusion are intimately tied to ethnic and national forms of exclusion.” 
(2002:1).  
The main problem with contemporary immigration regulations is that they rely on two conflicting 
principles: a) a functional understanding of the immigrant individual as labor; and b) a notion of 
the immigrant as a subject entitled to inalienable rights. Economic interests have historically 
motivated states to manage international migration in utilitarian terms. Piore (1979) argues that 
the prime engine of geographical mobility is destination countries’ structural demand of labor. 
This utilitarian rationale has led to the implementation of many guest-worker programs in Europe, 
North America, and Oceania throughout the last century (Castles and Miller 1993; Geddes 2003; 
Messina 2007; Sassen 1999), and still encourages seasonal migration today. Yet, the functional 
management of international migration, per se, is insufficient to maintain a multi-ethnic social 
order. For this reason, destination countries have required and generated institutional assemblages 
to incorporate immigrants in socio-economic and cultural terms (see Chapter 2).     
The second imperative for states’ regulation of immigration comes from the transnational 
human rights regime. Nation-states are expected to guarantee immigrants’ inalienable rights 
(Benhabib 2004; Lahav 2004; Sassen 1996; 1999; 2006; Soysal 1994). In Europe, EU institutions 
have facilitated this transition by allowing its member states to maintain sovereignty in the 
immigration field, while abiding by international human rights covenants (Lahav 2004; Sassen 
1996; 2006). Although the goal of this study is not to assess states’ implementation of the human 
rights regime, it borrows elements from this framework to examine the extent to which immigrants 
are conceived of as subjects entitled to rights. Due to space constraints, I concentrate on state 




In addition to national- and regional-level regulations, I analyze the role of political parties. 
Previous studies offer two main explanations for the relationship between political parties and 
public opinion. Some studies argue that citizens’ negative attitudes toward immigration encourage 
political parties to embrace a restrictive immigration agenda (Burstein 2003; Stimson 2004). 
Others believe that this causal relationship is reversed, viewing political parties’ position on 
immigration as the main explanation for public opinion outcomes (Chong and Druckman 2007). 
Cross-national comparative research indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment is likely to emerge in 
places where mainstream political parties view immigration as a major issue (Karapin 2002), and 
far-right parties have strong electoral support (Semyonov et al. 2006). In this study, I analyze the 
extent to which political parties mediate the relationship between the state and the citizenry and, 
in this process, influence anti-immigrant sentiment. As the last two decades have witnessed an 
exceptional politicization of immigration in Europe (Perlmutter 1996), I dig into the political field 
to examine the role of political parties in citizens’ perception of immigration.  
In sum, this research seeks to reveal the role of the state in multi-ethnic social cohesion. I 
argue that states’ regulations of immigration are a central element to understand anti-immigrant 
sentiment because they are based on two conflicting imperatives, which define the immigrant as: 
a) a resource for economic growth; and b) a subject of alienable rights. I use three empirical 
chapters to analyze the significance of policies regulating immigrants’ enfranchisement and 
naturalization (Chapter 4), access to welfare state benefits and labor market participation (Chapter 
5), and cultural integration (Chapter 6). The next section introduces the analytical advantages of 






Belgium and Spain are suitable cases for this study, due to the cross-regional variability of 
structural conditions. Since its independence from the Netherlands, in 1839, Belgium has sought 
to manage the civil coexistence of three linguistic communities through a federal government and 
a strong decentralization of competences. Immigration in Belgium became problematic in the late 
1970s, after the conclusion of the guest-worker period (Suárez-Orozco 1994). Since the early 
1980s, governmental efforts to regulate native-immigrant boundaries have structured inter-ethnic 
relations in all three regions. Immigrants’ integration, for example, is regulated by the two 
country’s two main communities, the Flemish (in Flanders) and the Francophone (in Wallonia). 
This institutional division has led to two parallel pathways of integration: Flanders has traditionally 
followed the multicultural reference of the Netherlands while Wallonia has implemented the 
Republican French model (Ireland 2004). The coexistence of two parallel understandings of 
immigrants’ integration, among other structural conditions, offers an exceptional opportunity to 
compare and contrast the relationship between policies and attitudes.   
Spain was one of the first European countries to witness the political organization of a 
multi-ethnic society; in the medieval Al-Andalus, Christians, Jews, and Muslims coexisted under 
the same political government (Kennedy 1996). It was also one of the first countries to experience 
an institutional backlash against cultural diversity, as a result of the Catholic Church’s process of 
“re-conquest”, La Reconquista (Encarnación 2004). For the last five centuries, Spain has primarily 
been a country of out-migration, mostly to Latin America and Europe. International migration 
began in the 1980s, and in only three decades, it reached similar percentages to its Northern 
European neighbors, around 14%. Similar to Belgium, the state has transferred a large number of 
competences to regional governments. In the management of immigrants’ integration, for example, 
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Catalonia’s emphasis on language contrasts to the centrality of civic principles in Andalusia and 
Madrid (Aja et al. 2006). I examine three regions with different structural conditions and 
manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment in order to explain anti-immigrant sentiment from a 
macro-level perspective.     
Regional differences in the structure of the political field have led to distinctive party 
alignments on the immigration issue within the same country. Two key features are the regional 
nationalist parties and the political mobilization of the radical right. The case of Belgium is 
especially useful, due to the longstanding success of the Vlaams Belang in Flanders and the limited 
support of its Walloon counterpart, Front National (Hossay 2002). In Spain, Catalonia is the only 
region where the radical right exists—this is Plataforma per Catalunya, which has received 
increasing electoral support since its foundation. Examining the conditions that explain the success 
of the radical right is expected to shed light on the regional elements underlying inter-ethnic 
contention in Catalonia and Flanders. I am interested in evaluating the extent to which political 
parties modify their immigration discourse according to immigrants’ access to political rights. My 
historical-comparative analysis using six research sites indicates how political parties respond to 
regulations facilitating immigrants’ enfranchisement and the extent to which political parties’ 
alignment on the immigration issue responds to a competition for the far-right space, 
organizational leadership, or efforts to chase the immigrant vote.    
Moreover, this research presents the interaction effects between policies and regionally-
specific socio-economic and cultural conditions. I stress the significance of native-immigrant 
relations in the context of the labor market, the welfare state, and nation-building projects. For 
example, national-level regulations concerning immigrants’ access to welfare benefits are 
expected to affect attitudinal outcomes differently in regions with low or high unemployment. As 
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I seek to provide a structural explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment, my goal is to reveal the 
ways in which state regulations and institutions shape anti-immigrant sentiment and explain its 
variability.  
 Overall, cross-regional differences in the structural conditions of Belgian and Spanish 
regions offer sociologists a unique opportunity to evaluate the role of state regulations, institutions, 
and political parties in the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment today.  
 
1.5. Structure of this dissertation 
Chapter 2 frames this research within extant scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment and state 
regulations of immigration and integration. The analytical review of previous studies emphasizes 
their contributions and limitations, and the importance of conducting an inductive analysis of 
attitudes to address prevailing gaps. Chapter 3 elaborates the historical-comparative research 
design based on six research sites and mixed methods of data collection. I present the cross-
regional variability of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material and as a cultural threat, and the 
structural conditions of the six regions under consideration: Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia for 
Belgium, and Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid for Spain. Next, I describe the four main types of 
data I combine; surveys, in-depth interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and 
policy indicators, to examine three different manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
Chapter 4 accounts for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels and 
Madrid by focusing on the role of demographic and political processes. In Spain, I observe that 
immigrants’ enfranchisement encourages political parties to abandon restrictive immigration 
discourses and embrace pro-cultural diversity rhetoric. I claim that, in regions with a high 
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percentage of enfranchised immigrants, political parties contain anti-immigrant sentiment with a 
pro-cultural diversity discourse, while in regions where immigrants cannot vote, they motivate 
anti-immigrant sentiment with discourses that reinforce immigrants’ otherness. In Belgium, I show 
that decades of high immigration have motivated internal migration flows and polarized public 
opinion across the country. Brussels has remained the city where all pro-cultural diversity Belgians 
want to live, while the country-side has become increasingly attractive to the most conservative 
segments of the population.    
Chapter 5 explains the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of 
the scarcity of labor market opportunities and welfare state benefits. Andalusia and Wallonia 
illustrate the extent to which the material manifestation of citizens’ hostility is concentrated in 
economically-disadvantaged areas that have historically demanded low-skilled labor but have been 
unable to maintain immigrant employment over time. I complement prevailing theories of inter-
ethnic economic competition by arguing that anti-immigrant sentiment emerges from the scarcity 
of not only jobs, but also welfare benefits. These two patterns of inter-ethnic contention are 
unlikely to decline in the near future.   
Chapter 6 accounts for the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with an 
examination of Catalonia and Flanders. I contextualize public attitudes in two historical nation-
building projects and explain anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process. On the 
demand-side, I show that citizens in regions with nation-building projects have higher expectations 
about immigrants’ integration than their peers in other regions of the country. On the supply-side, 
immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders are the most active in trying to integrate into the cultural 
mainstream. However, in spite of their efforts, they do not meet natives’ expectations. I provide 
evidence of the role of the radical right, which has been particularly successful in both regions, 
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and explain the extent to which today’s anti-immigrant sentiment responds to a material threat. 
Finally, I anticipate that anti-immigrant sentiment in these regions will decline in coming years, as 
second and third generations grow up as active members of the Catalan and the Flemish cultural 
mainstream.     
Chapter 7 concludes this study with a synthesis of its findings, theoretical implications, and 
policy insights. I use its limitations to stress the need of further research and propose next steps in 








This chapter frames the object of study with the literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment and state 
regulations of immigration. I present the contributions and limitations of extant scholarship, and 
provide a rationale for a historical-comparative analysis based on regions. Previous studies on anti-
immigrant sentiment have long measured the significance of micro- and macro-level variables, but 
they have paid limited attention to the role of the institutional environment. By developing claims 
around statistically-significant variables, most studies have hindered this literature’s theoretical 
development and policy insights. In parallel, scholarship on state regulations of immigration has 
revealed the role of the state in immigrants’ living conditions, but it has not paid attention to how 
these policies affect the national citizenry. I attempt to address these gaps in the literature with an 
examination of the relationship between state regulations and anti-immigrant sentiment in three 
Belgian and three Spanish regions.  
 
2.1. Anti-immigrant Sentiment 
Extant reviews of the anti-immigrant sentiment literature have emphasized the explanatory power 
of individual- and contextual-level variables (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010; Rustenbach 2010). 
They present six different explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment: a) economic competition 
(Brenner and Fertig 2006; Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Hjerm 2009; O'Rourke and Sinnott 
                                                          
2 This chapter is based on Zamora-Kapoor et al. (2013) ‘Anti-foreigner Sentiment: State of the Art’, Sociology 
Compass, 7 (4): 303-314.  
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2006; Quillian 1995; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006); b) 
human capital (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001; Mayda 
2006); c) cultural affinity (Brubaker 2009; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; Coenders and Scheepers 
2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Fetzer 2000; Hayes and Dowds 2006; Hjerm 1998; Perhson 
et al. 2009; Shulman 2002); d) social capital (Citrin and Sides 2008; Côté and Erickson 2009; Eller 
and Abrams 2004; Herreros and Criado 2009; Kesler and Bloemraad 2010; McLaren 2003; 
Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; Putnam 2000; 2007; Wagner et al. 2007); e) political values (Bohman 
2011; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Karapin 2002; Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006; 
2007; 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008); and f) institutional environment (Bail 2008; Brooks and Manza 
2009; Coenders and Castelli-Gattinara 2011; Dancygier 2010; Pardos-Prado 2010). I explain each 
of these different approaches to anti-immigrant sentiment and then synthesize their most important 
theoretical and methodological limitations, in order to offer solutions and strengthen this research 
program.  
 
2.1.1. Economic competition 
When citizens conceive of the distribution of resources as a zero-sum game, anti-immigrant 
sentiment appears to be an inevitable outcome of increasing international labor flows. Scholars 
have examined the role of economic competition from the micro-level perspective of individuals’ 
self-interest, as well as from the macro-level approach of the interests of the dominant group. 
Individual self-interest arguments claim that anti-immigrant sentiment is the product of the direct 
competition for jobs or residential space. Hence, natives who are low-skilled and/or unemployed 
are those most likely to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment (Mayda 2006; O'Rourke and Sinnott 
2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Yet, conflicting findings question the extent to which economic 
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competition is driven by individual self-interest alone. Alternative approaches have examined 
economic competition based on citizens’ labor market status (Brenner and Fertig 2006; Hayes and 
Dowds 2006; Wilkes et al. 2008), or income (Chandler and Tsai 2001; Sides and Citrin 2007), but 
did not find an association with attitudinal outcomes. Due to mixed findings, scholars have 
complemented these theories with formulations that combine micro- and macro-level variables.  
In parallel to individuals’ immediate interests, citizens’ perception of how immigration 
affects the national economy impacts anti-immigrant sentiment as well. Economic conditions, 
operationalized as the gross domestic product (Gorodzeisky and Semyonov 2009; Quillian 1995; 
Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2006) or unemployment rates (Coenders and Scheepers 2008), 
influence citizens’ perception of immigration. Prosperous economies with low unemployment 
rates offer the most suitable environment for maintaining positive attitudes towards immigration. 
Within countries, poor municipalities with high percentages of immigration exhibit the strongest 
anti-immigrant sentiment (Hjerm 2009). Yet, it is important to note that distinctive measurements 
of economic contextual variables have led to conflicting findings. For example, Sides and Citrin 
(2007) indicate that there is an association between a country’s GDP per capita and anti-immigrant 
sentiment, but not between unemployment rates and attitudinal outcomes. Extant findings appear 
to depend heavily upon the operationalization of these complex mechanisms; a lack of agreement 
upon what variables better represent macro-level economic conditions, and at which level of 
analysis, country or regional, is the most appropriate, has generated contradictory findings. 
Moving forward, I encourage scholars to consider the ways in which the variables they 
operationalize could be driving their results.   
The current context of economic instability anticipates an increasing salience of anti-
immigrant sentiment based on economic factors. Further research is required to better understand 
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the variability of these micro- and macro-level effects. The extensive use of individual- and 
national-level data in multi-level models has obscured geographical differences and the potential 
interaction between economic competition and other explanatory factors. I propose to complement 
prevailing theories with evidence from case studies, in order to better understand the extent to 
which economic competition underlies attitudinal outcomes. 
 
2.1.2. Human capital theory  
Citizens’ education has traditionally been conceived of as an element that reduces anti-immigrant 
sentiment. Previous studies explain the role of education from the perspective of native-foreigner 
labor market competition (Mayda 2006), and citizens’ interpretation of cultural diversity and 
stereotypes (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001). From 
either perspective, citizens with higher education in immigrant-receiving countries are expected to 
exhibit low anti-immigrant sentiment.  
Mayda (2006) argues that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the distribution of 
human capital across the immigrant populations, relative to the native one. Since most immigrant-
receiving nations have a structural demand for low-skilled labor (Favell and Hansen 2002; 
Waldinger and Lichter 2003), immigration maintains competitive salaries at the bottom and an 
income structure that rewards education. Mayda (2006) argues that in countries with low GDP per 
capita, citizens’ education has a stronger association with pro-immigration attitudes than in 
countries with high GDP per capita. These findings are important because they de-couple citizens’ 
perception of immigration from traditional macro-economic and educational contextual variables, 
and explain anti-immigrant sentiment in relative terms.  
17 
 
A second group of scholars posits that education improves citizens’ perception of 
immigration by transmitting norms and values that encourage citizens to recognize the benefits of 
cultural diversity and question prevailing stereotypes (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller 
and Hiscox 2007; Hjerm 2001). Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) find that, in contrast to Mayda 
(2006), education is associated with higher levels of support for immigration, regardless of their 
level of skill. Yet, it is still unclear what specific set of norms and values are most favorable to 
encourage citizens’ positive perception of foreign-born populations. Some studies have sought to 
dig into this puzzle, by comparing the values of the educational system in long-standing 
democracies versus former communist dictatorships. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) found that 
education is associated with positive attitudes toward immigration in prolonged democracies of 
Western Europe, but not in the most recent ones of Eastern Europe. A similar cross-national study 
indicates that education increases tolerance in all countries, regardless of their political trajectory 
(Hjerm 2001). 
Although previous studies agree that education increases citizens’ positive perception of 
immigration, scholars do not conclude what is the mechanisms underlying this effect. I encourage 
human capital theorists to compare and contrast the arguments presented above systematically, in 
order to evaluate the extent to which the role of education is tied to the distribution of skill amongst 
the native and the foreigner population, or, by contrast, it is related to a specific set of norms and 
values that can improve attitudes, regardless of citizens’ level of skill. A systematic evaluation of 
prevailing arguments for the role of human capital is expected to help sociologists strengthen a 





2.1.3. Cultural Affinity 
Cultural affinity theory states that citizens’ perceptions of immigration depend on their individual 
similarities with the members of the out-group, and their collective degree of inclusion/exclusion 
in the dominant group. Fetzer (2000) found that citizens whose parents immigrated exhibit less 
anti-immigrant sentiment than those who do not have an immigrant background. Elements 
facilitating citizens’ identification with immigrant populations, such as having an immigrant 
parent, can explain why some citizens view immigration much more positively than others. 
Beyond individual characteristics, citizens empathize with immigrants as a result of their similar 
structural position vis-à-vis the dominant group (Hayes and Dowds 2006), and prevailing 
understandings of national identity in the destination country (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008; 
Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010; Hjerm 1998; Perhson et al. 2009; 
Shulman 2002). 
Previous studies have revealed that citizens who belong to religious minorities tend to view 
immigrants much more favorably than those who belong to the dominant group. Hayes and Dowds 
(2006) provide evidence to support this claim by comparing public attitudes toward immigration 
amongst Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. Although immigrants are not necessarily 
Catholics or Protestants, citizens who belong to the Catholic minority are more likely to view 
immigration much more positively than their Protestant peers, because they are outnumbered. 
Evidence from Northern Ireland suggests that cross-national differences in anti-immigrant 
sentiment could be associated with the uneven distribution of minorities across countries. Further 
research is required to evaluate the extent to which countries that are culturally homogeneous 




Prevailing understandings of national identity are expected to affect inter-ethnic relations 
as well. Studies analyzing anti-immigrant sentiment across countries have approached this 
phenomenon by contrasting immigrant-receiving nations with a notion of identity based on descent 
(jus sanguini) versus birth (jus soli). Countries with ethnic-based notions of identity exhibit 
stronger anti-immigrant sentiments than those that have a civic understanding of national 
membership (Hjerm 1998; Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Perhson et al. 2009). Other studies have 
reported that there is no such association (Shulman 2002; Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). Similar 
to what has been observed in the economic competition section, scholars’ selection of variables 
and operationalization of concepts could be underlying these conflicting results. 
Countries with strong regional boundaries have offered an exceptional opportunity to 
examine the role of distinctive understandings of national identity. Previous studies examining the 
cases of Belgium and Spain indicate that citizens in regions with nation-building projects, such as 
Flanders in Belgium or the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia in Spain, exhibit stronger anti-
immigrant sentiments than their peers in other regions of the country (Billiet et al. 2003; Escandell 
and Ceobanu 2010). While these findings offer a valuable theoretical contribution, they call into 
question the extent to which policy intervention can palliate anti-immigrant sentiment. If anti-
immigrant sentiment is a product of the historical development of national identity, how can new 
policy change attitudinal outcomes? This study examines this problem in Chapter 6. 
In sum, while citizens’ opportunities to identify themselves with foreign-born populations 
affect their attitudes, further research is needed to develop a parsimonious explanation of the role 
of national identity on attitudes. Again, an increased focus on the specification of causal 




2.1.4. Social capital 
There is a long-standing assumption that cultural diversity reduces trust (Putnam 2007). Yet, 
scholars have found that citizens’ degree of social capital affects the likelihood of manifesting anti-
immigrant sentiment (McLaren 2003; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011; Wagner et al. 2007). Previous 
studies find that contact with immigrants dispels negative stereotypes (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011), 
especially in the context of friendship, rather than superficial relationships (McLaren 2003; 
Wagner et al. 2007). Citizens who have foreign-born friends are likely to view cultural diversity 
much more positively than those who do not have them. Albeit it is plausible that citizens’ social 
capital improves attitudes toward immigration, the causal relationship might be in the opposite 
direction: citizens with positive attitudes toward foreigners might be more likely to have foreign-
born friends.  
Beyond the study of social capital from its traditional micro-level approach, scholars have 
analyzed anti-immigrant sentiment in relation to citizens’ generalized level of trust. Putnam (2007) 
argues that international migration reduces social trust by decreasing citizens’ identification with 
one another, or collective-mindedness. Yet, cross-national comparative studies provide evidence 
that contradicts this claim (Kesler and Bloemraad 2010). A different group of studies argue that 
citizens exhibiting high degrees of trust, also called “social trusters”, are more prone to view 
immigrants as trustworthy and therefore more likely to cooperate with them (Citrin and Sides 
2008; Herreros and Criado 2008).  
Durlauf (1999) presents the most important critique to social capital research. He claims 
that social capital scholarship still needs to disentangle what are the elements driving its 
emergence, presence, or absence (Durlauf 1999). I agree with Durlauf (1999) and see that, at least 
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in the context of anti-immigrant sentiment research, future studies need to: a) define the meaning 
and boundaries of social capital; and b) clarify the elements accounting for its rise and decline.    
Due to the potential endogeneity and feedback processes in social capital explanations, I 
encourage scholars to reformulate their analytical approach using longitudinal data, as a minority 
of scholars have already done (see for instance Eller and Abrams 2004). The development of new 
panel studies is expected to facilitate the assessment of this phenomenon as well as its variation 
across countries and over time. Additionally, I encourage scholars to focus on assessing the limits, 
net effects, and significance of social capital, and examine whether its relationship with public 
attitudes is as straightforward as prevailing theories suggest. 
 
2.1.5. Political Affiliation 
Citizens’ interaction with the political field offers an alternative perspective to explain anti-
immigrant sentiment. Anti-immigrant sentiment is conceived of as a product of individuals’ 
political values (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996; Wilkes et al. 2008), as well as the mobilization 
of anti-immigrant political parties (Bohman 2011; Karapin 2002; Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 
2006; 2007). Micro-level perspectives claim that citizens’ values drive anti-immigrant sentiment: 
conservative citizens are much more likely to hold negative attitudes toward immigration than 
their liberal peers (Semyonov et al. 2008; Wilkes et al. 2008). The significance of citizens’ self-
placement in the left-right axis prevails, even after controlling for respondents’ socio-economic 
and educational differences (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Nevertheless, as it has been 
observed in other explanations, conservative values could be encouraging anti-immigrant 
sentiment to the same extent that anti-immigrant sentiment could be motivating conservatism. In 
order to strengthen this claim, previous studies require further evidence indicating the direction of 
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causality between political values and attitudes. Case study research offers a useful analytical 
strategy to overcome this problem, by offering insight into the feedback processes between 
immigrants’ political participation and public opinion outcomes.  
At the macro level, the degree of anti-immigrant mobilization by either mainstream parties 
or the radical right appears to explain attitudinal differences across countries. While citizens may 
not necessarily have an opinion about immigration, their exposure to political organizations that 
present immigration as a problem has been found to raise anti-immigrant sentiment. Anti-
immigrant sentiment is especially concentrated in countries where mainstream political parties 
view immigration as a priority (Bohman 2011; Karapin 2002), or there is a strong mobilization of 
the radical right (Rydgren 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006; 2007; 2008). 
Research revealing the explanatory power of political variables at the micro and macro 
levels has contributed to the sociological understanding of multi-ethnic democracies significantly. 
Citizens’ values, the mobilization of radical right-wing political parties, and mainstream political 
parties’ discussion of immigration as a priority affect anti-immigrant sentiment. At the same time, 
it is still unclear the extent to which contextual political processes explain or are explained by 
citizens’ attitudes. Case study research combining quantitative and qualitative data is likely to help 
scholars evaluate the extent to which constituent demands and political parties’ stance on 
immigration influence one another. This study takes one step in this direction.  
 
2.1.6. Institutional Environment 
Governmental regulations are likely to affect attitudinal outcomes by establishing the institutional 
environment in which natives and foreigners coexist. Recent reviews of the literature (Ceobanu 
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and Escandell 2010) have pointed out the lack of studies examining the role of the institutional 
environment: 
“Research has yet to provide a clear picture of the institutional and socio-political macro-
level factors that affect the emergence and manifestation of attitudes toward immigrants 
and immigration” (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010: 310). 
For decades, the lack of cross-national standardized estimates has limited researchers’ 
opportunities to compare and contrast immigration policies. Analytical formulations of anti-
immigrant sentiment have traditionally ignored the role of governmental regulations, due to the 
limited possibilities of establishing causality between policies and attitudes. As democratic 
societies are expected to represent the interests of the citizenry (Brooks and Manza 2009), it would 
be unreasonable to conceive governmental regulations of immigration as an independent element 
from citizens’ perception of their multi-ethnic environment. 
The Migrant Integration Policy Index is one of the first datasets permitting to address this 
gap, with integration policy data on seven different dimensions: a) labor market mobility; b) family 
reunion; c) education; d) political participation; e) long-term residence; f) access to nationality; 
and g) anti-discrimination, for thirty-three nations. The current availability of data has led to an 
emerging literature with promising findings. Restrictive integration policies have been found to 
encourage anti-immigrant sentiment (Coenders and Castelli-Gattinara 2011), while policies 
facilitating immigrants’ political participation appear to favor positive attitudes toward foreign-
born populations (Pardos-Prado 2010). Both papers indicate that restrictive institutional 
environments encourage citizens to view immigration as a problem, while less restrictive policies 
reduce the salience of immigration as an issue. 
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The most compelling explanations for the role of the institutional environment in the public 
opinion have used innovative methodological strategies. Dancygier (2010) combines quantitative 
and qualitative evidence to decipher within-country differences in the type of inter-ethnic conflict 
in two British municipalities. This study reveals that the variability of immigrants’ access to 
economic and political rights has generated immigrant-native conflict (or anti-immigrant 
sentiment) in areas where immigrants have economic but not political rights, and immigrant-state 
conflict in places where immigrants enjoy both economic and political privileges. As structural 
conditions affect inter-ethnic relations, they are also expected to influence citizens’ perception of 
the out-group. This study is very important for my research because it provides evidence of the 
significance of immigrants’ rights in the structure of inter-ethnic contention.  
From a cross-national comparative perspective, Bail (2008) uses fuzzy-set qualitative 
comparative analysis to identify the distinctive structure of social boundaries across Europe, and 
the extent to which they differ from prevailing philosophies of integration. It offers a typology of 
destination countries, based on the strength of their racial, religious, educational, linguistic, 
occupational, and cultural symbolic boundaries. Evidence of the distinctive type and structure of 
symbolic boundaries benefits the theorization of inter-ethnic relations by revealing the extent to 
which destination countries vary from one another. 
Due to the dynamic relationship between policies and attitudes, it would be ideal if scholars 
could use methodologies allowing them to determine the direction of causality between these 
variables. MIPEX’s cross-national comparative estimates are expected to contribute to this line of 
inquiry by allowing sociologists to approach the role of policies on attitudes. In this study, I use 
MIPEX data to introduce national policy frameworks regulating immigrants’ access to political 
rights and labor market participation in Belgium and Spain.   
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2.2. State Regulations of Immigration and Integration  
I continue an intellectual tradition centered on the significance of state institutions in the 
management of international migration (see the reviews by Cornelius and Rosenblum 2005; 
Givens 2007). This literature can be subdivided into two main lines of inquiry. First, there are 
studies focused on the institutional models that states use to regulate immigration. The goal of 
these studies is to explain the rationale motivating institutional frameworks, and the extent to 
which these models differ from one country to another (Banting and Kymlicka 2007; Bertossi 
2011; Bloemraad 2000; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Brubaker 1992; 2009; Carrera 2006; Castles and 
Miller 1993; Favell 1998; Geddes 2003; Joppke 2007a; 2007b; Koopmans et al. 2005; Sainsbury 
2012; Sassen 1999; Wimmer 2002; Zolberg 2006). Second, there are studies measuring the impact 
of state policies on immigrants’ living conditions (Alba and Nee 1997; Cohen and Kogan 2007; 
Ersanelli and Koopmans 2010; Kesler 2006; Kogan 2006; Koopmans 2010; Koopmans et al. 2012; 
Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Reitz 1998; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Due to space constraints, I 
will not attempt to conduct a comprehensive review of all research in these two analytical 
perspectives. Instead, I present their main contributions using a few representative pieces. The 
analytical review of both perspectives sheds light on an important gap in the literature: the limited 
study of how state regulations may influence anti-immigrant sentiment.   
 
2.2.1. Institutional models  
Institutional models establish pathways for immigrants’ naturalization and cultural integration; 
they determine how to cross the citizen-immigrant boundary. A subset of these models regulates 
immigrants’ access to citizenship, which varies across countries according to national 
understandings of membership. Brubaker (1992) uses a path-dependent explanation to account for 
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France and Germany’s implementation of jus soli and jus sanguine models respectively. 
Germany’s ethnic-based notion of the nation originated from the political goal of bringing together 
an ethnically-homogeneous population, ruled under different systems. The state’s motivation to 
identify citizens with one another on the basis of based on a common ethnic descent encouraged a 
definition of citizenship based on lineage. In contrast to Germany, France’s implementation of a 
jus soli model was a product of the country’s demographic shortage during the decades proceeding 
its foundation. A jus soli policy aimed to facilitate access to citizenship and increase the country’s 
population. In this study, I build upon Brubaker’s (1992) work by analyzing Belgium and Spain’s 
naturalization regulations, and the extent to which they can contribute to a sociological explanation 
of citizens’ hostility.   
Most of the literature on institutional models has focused on cross-national differences in 
the patterning of immigrants’ integration around the ideal types of ‘assimilation’ and 
‘multiculturalism’ (Bertossi 2011; Bloemraad 2000; Bloemraad et al. 2008; Brubaker 1992; 2009; 
Carrera 2006; Castles and Miller 1993; Favell 1998; Geddes 2003; Joppke 2007a; 2007b; 
Koopmans et al. 2005). By assimilation, scholars refer to:  
“A process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the 
memories, sentiment, and attitudes of other persons and groups, and, by sharing their 
experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.” (Park and 
Burgess 1969: 735, cited in Alba and Nee 1997: 828).  
Countries with assimilationist policies, such as France or the United States, assume that 
immigrants’ integration will be most successful when they incorporate the destination country’s 
culture in their everyday life. At odds, multiculturalism views the recognition of cultural rights as 
a central part of immigrants’ incorporation. Countries that have traditionally implemented the 
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multiculturalist model, such as Canada or the Netherlands, view immigrants’ cultural group rights 
as a key element for their successful integration. This model reflects the understanding of 
immigrants as subjects entitled to inalienable rights that I have introduced in Chapter 1. Yet, as 
previous studies argue (Bloemraad et al. 2008), the implementation of multicultural policies is 
especially tricky because they can occasionally emphasize the rights of the group versus those of 
the individual:  
“Multiculturalism challenges a liberal philosophy of universalism that views humans as 
freely choosing agents who deserve identical, individual protection.” (2008: 159).  
As destination countries attempt to integrate immigrant populations with different group rights, 
multiculturalism can potentially fall into cultural relativism and discourage the evaluation of 
cultural practices that may not be compatible with modern democracy.  
The scholarly discussion of integration policies has evolved far beyond the narrow scope 
of the assimilation-versus-multiculturalism debate. Some scholars (Carrera 2006; Koopmans et al. 
2005) argue that there is a third institutional model, ‘segregationism’, and describe it as a policy 
framework “characterized by restrictive and rigid immigration legislation (…) aimed at artificially 
maintaining the temporary character of an immigrant’s settlement” (Carrera 2006: 2). Other 
scholars question whether these models are useful to explain the extent to which immigrants are 
integrated (Bertossi 2011; Koopmans et al. 2012). They argue that the heterogeneity of policies 
and national trajectories in the management of international migration questions the explanatory 
power of these two institutional ideal types.  
Recent studies address some of these limitations by examining the extent to which 
institutional models have converged or diverged over time (Joppke 2007). Joppke (2007) argues 
that the increasing role of civic integration policies is driving institutional convergence, and 
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illustrates his claim with evidence from the Netherlands, France, and Germany. Civic integration 
policies require immigrants to demonstrate their integration through standardized language and 
culture tests, which have been increasingly popular in many European countries since the early 
2000s. Depending on the country, immigrants’ performance in these tests can affect their residence 
permits, access to citizenship, and other rights. Joppke interprets the increasing implementation of 
civic integration policies as “a statist project” (2007: 19), which, in turn, is reducing the 
institutional cross-national variation among destination countries. In this study, I discuss the role 
of civic integration policies in Chapter 6 (Anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat).  
An innovative approach to institutional models associates types of integration policies with 
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) welfare state typology. Sainsbury (2012) uses the cases of Germany, 
the United States, and Sweden as models of the conservative, liberal, and socio-democratic welfare 
states. She argues that these models correspond to institutional frameworks regulating immigrants’ 
naturalization on the basis of: jus sanguine, jus soli, and jus domicili respectively. Although the 
correspondence between institutional models for immigrants’ integration and welfare state types 
beyond these three cases is unclear, this research offers a novel twist to this research program. By 
bringing together insights from the literatures on welfare states and the integration models, 
Sainsbury informs the economic and the human rights’ premises of state regulations for 
immigration and integration.   
Research on state regulations of immigrants’ integration has led some scholars to examine 
institutional approaches based on state’s active or passive implementation of such policies (Adams 
2011). This approach permits distinguishing between regions that share a similar philosophy of 
integration, depending on the regional government’s interest in regulating immigrants’ cultural 
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incorporation. I use this framework to differentiate regions with laissez-faire integration policies 
from those with an active regulation of integration.    
In sum, scholarship on institutional models has offered an exceptional contribution to the 
theorization of immigration policy. Moving forward, I encourage scholars to assess to what extent 
ideal types fit empirical cases and can contribute to the explanation of inter-ethnic relations today. 
In this research, I use institutional models to describe and clarify the variability of integration 
policies across Belgian and Spanish regions (see section 3.2, in Chapter 3).   
 
2.2.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic and integration outcomes 
The second approach to state regulations of immigration and integration consists of measuring 
immigrants’ living conditions. Previous studies show the significance of the institutional 
environment in estimating immigrants’ education and labor market outcomes (Cohen and Kogan 
2007; Kesler 2006; Kogan 2003; Lewin-Epstein et al. 2003; Reitz 1998), as well as the extent of 
immigrants’ cultural integration (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 2010; Heath 
2007; Koopmans 2010; Kymlicka and Banting 2007; Wright and Bloemraad 2012). Lewin-Epstein 
et al. (2003) evaluate the effects of point-based and ethnic-based immigration policies by 
comparing the socio-economic standards and education attainment of Former Soviet Union 
immigrants in Canada and Israel. Despite Canada’s point-based and labor-market oriented 
immigration policy, immigrants’ employment rates were higher in Israel, due to the country’s 
efforts in integrating immigrants into the labor market. This methodological approach; examining 
the living conditions of an immigrant community in two different countries, offers one of the most 
successful strategies to isolate the role of institutional effects. Evidence of former Soviet Union 
Jewish immigrants in Israel and Germany (Cohen and Kogan 2007) and Yugoslavs in Austria and 
30 
 
Sweden (Kogan 2006) indicates that countries with low levels of labor market regulation and 
limited welfare state expenditure exhibit higher immigrant employment rates than those with 
highly regulated economies and/or generous welfare states.  
Research examining institutional effects on the whole immigrant population has led to 
much more generalizable findings (Reitz 1998; Kesler 2006). Kesler (2006) analyzes immigrants’ 
labor market participation in three countries representing Esping-Andersen’s welfare state types: 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Sweden exhibits the largest native-immigrant 
employment gap, partly because of its generous welfare state system. Yet, Swedish labor market 
integration policies appear to be especially beneficial for immigrant women, who exhibit higher 
employment rates than their counterparts in Germany and in the United Kingdom. Kesler’s 
research (2006) indicates not only the sociological significance of the institutional environment, 
but also its uneven effects across gender groups. My research builds upon this literature in order 
to examine the role of state regulations in immigrants’ labor market participation, access to 
welfare, and citizens’ perception of immigration as a material threat.     
Another group of studies examine immigrants’ incorporation outcomes across countries 
with different integration and citizenship policies. Most scholars conclude the positive effect of 
policies facilitating immigrants’ naturalization (Bloemraad et al. 2008; Ersanilli and Koopmans 
2010; Heath 2007). Immigrants’ access to citizenship accelerates their socio-economic integration 
and motivates them to invest more in the destination country (Heath 2007). Naturalized immigrants 
also tend to exhibit higher cultural integration than non-naturalized ones (Ersanilli and Koopmans 
2010). In this study, I analyze the significance of naturalization policies in the relationship between 
political parties and anti-immigrant sentiment. In Chapter 4, I provide evidence of the positive 
effect of extending immigrants’ political rights for the containment of citizens’ hostility. Evidence 
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of how political parties respond to these regulations is expected to generate valuable contributions 
to this field.   
A much more disputed line of inquiry concerns the relationship between integration models 
and welfare state policies (Koopmans 2010; Kymlicka and Banting 2007; Wright and Bloemraad 
2012). Koopmans (2010) argues that there is an inherent trade-off between immigrants’ integration 
and equality: countries with multicultural integration models and generous welfare states exhibit 
worse integration outcomes than conservative or liberal welfare states with assimilationist 
integration policies. He argues that welfare state generosity operates as a negative selection 
mechanism, or as Borjas (1994) describes it, as a welfare magnet. In contrast to Koopmans (2010), 
Wright and Bloemraad’s (2012) show that multiculturalist countries exhibit similar degrees of 
political integration than assimilationist ones, and claim that there is no trade-off between 
immigrants’ cultural rights and their integration, measured in terms of political participation. In 
this case, conflicting findings appear to be a product of the different operationalization of the 
dependent variable: immigrants’ integration. But the goal of this study is not to measure what 
institutional model works best. Instead, I use this literature as a point of departure to dig into the 
role of state regulations in citizens’ manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.   
Overall, this analytical review has introduced the key ideas of an exceptionally vast field. 
Extant studies explain the rationale of integration policy frameworks and the extent to which these 
policies influence immigrants’ living conditions. An important limitation of this literature consists 
of examining the relationship between states and immigrants, without taking into consideration the 





2.3. Prevailing weaknesses and possible solutions 
The review of the anti-immigrant sentiment literature indicates that citizens’ economic 
competition, human capital, cultural affinity, social capital, political values, and the institutional 
environment are expected to affect impact public attitudes toward immigration. While this 
scholarship has contributed to the sociological understanding of inter-ethnic relations, theoretical 
and methodological weaknesses limit the development of this line of inquiry. I propose to solve 
these problems by synthesizing this literature’s theoretical program, and improving its 
methodological tools. In this research, I contribute to this line of inquiry with an inductive 
exploration of structural conditions.  
Scholarship could benefit from synthesizing prevailing explanations around causal 
mechanisms that can be empirically tested. The goal is not only to say that a specific variable, e.g. 
employment status, generates anti-immigrant sentiment, but to provide a theoretical explanation 
for this relationship. As massive immigration from the developing countries to Western and 
Northern Europe enters its fourth decade, and many descendants of immigrants are being given 
citizenship, the question of attitudes towards immigrants or “foreigners” is becoming inseparable 
from the question of attitudes towards ethnic minorities. The cognitive turn in studies on ethnicity, 
with its emphasis on “culturally specific ways in which persons, institutions, organizations, and 
discourses make sense of experience and interpret the social world” (Brubaker 2009), represents a 
promising perspective to integrate situational and dispositional variables in the explanation of anti-
immigrant sentiment.  
Toward the end of developing a theory of anti-immigrant sentiment, I recommend that 
scholars focus on establishing the most important mechanisms driving the variability of attitudes. 
Theoretical models should be robust to multiple empirical specifications. If an explanatory 
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mechanism is economic competition, I would expect to observe statistical significance when 
measuring the effect of different variables representing native-foreigner economic competition, 
such as: a) unemployment; b) low income; or c) low education, as well as confirmation from 
qualitative data. If scholars hypothesize that the unemployed are those most likely to experience 
native-foreigner competition, I would expect them [the unemployed] to mention it in interviews. 
Wimmer's (2008) work is an exemplar of this approach, although its focus is on the construction 
of ethnic boundaries rather than the sources of anti-immigrant sentiment. The inclusion of 
cognitive micro-foundations as well as supra- individual factors such as political context provides 
a sophisticated approach to theorizing ethnicity that may serve as a model for future work. 
Theorizing the mechanisms that link micro and macro as well as making explicit the empirical 
implications of these mechanisms provides a synthetic approach to advancing this broad research 
program. 
Common methodological problems include operationalization, determining causality, and 
endogeneity. Distinctive strategies to operationalize anti-immigrant sentiment have allowed 
scholars to contribute to the literature on exclusionism, tolerance, or prejudice, but it has limited 
the scholarly dialogue. Extant reviews acknowledge the diverse strategies for operationalizing the 
dependent variable (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010), but do not offer concrete solutions. I propose 
that scholars test their analytical formulations on multiple dependent variables, and, if possible, 
use different independent variables to evaluate the extent to which results vary according to the 
selection of indicators. For instance, human capital may reduce prejudice, but perhaps does not 
necessarily affect exclusionism. Evidence of how the selection and operationalization of variables 
affects results is expected to improve analytical formulations, not only by reducing their sources 
of bias, but also by improving the scholarly understanding of what specific types of measures 
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influence attitudes. Theoretical models that are robust to multiple empirical specifications provide 
additional confidence in the proposed explanatory mechanisms; conversely, theoretical models 
that rely on questionably identified models undermine the advance of this research program. 
The problem of determining causality emerges when there is a bi-directional association 
between independent and dependent variables. Research examining the effects of far-right 
mobilization or governmental regulations has the potential to run into this problem, due to the 
dynamic relationship between these contextual variables and attitudes. I suggest using case study 
research to evaluate the elements underlying political shifts, attitudinal outcomes, and their 
feedback processes. Evidence from new immigration countries, where governmental regulations 
preceded the arrival and settlement of international migrants, has the potential to contribute to this 
literature, and overcome traditional problems of causality. As I explain in the conclusion, this is 
one of this study’s limitations that I will not be able to fully address until longitudinal data is 
available.  
Finally, endogeneity encompasses the inability to establish causality as a result of the 
inclusion of the dependent into the independent variable. It is potentially present in many of the 
studies above, such as those examining the role of social capital or political values. Due to the 
nature of endogeneity, I encourage scholars to reformulate predictive models according to the 
structure of the causal mechanism that they seek to test. For example, if X is causing Y, then we 
would observe A, but if Y is causing X, then we would observe B. It is important to keep in mind 
the prevalence of feedback processes that might be at work in this type of research. For this reason, 
I propose complementing quantitative models with qualitative evidence to confirm the 
independence and direction of causality between variables.  
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Overall, anti-immigrant sentiment scholarship has led to outstanding contributions. I would 
like to strengthen its research program by motivating scholars to synthesize theoretical 
propositions and use analytical approaches that attenuate issues of operationalization, determining 
causality, and endogeneity. This study attempts to contribute to this literature with an inductive 
examination of how state regulations and political parties influence anti-immigrant sentiment in 
six different research sites.  
 
2.4. Analytical framework 
I approach anti-immigrant framework with an inductive analytical framework grounded in three 
main assumptions. First of all, I assume that citizens’ perceptions of immigration are not fixed, but 
a product of both individual and contextual variables. I view macro-level variables as factors that 
regulate the intensity of attitudes (Ceobanu and Escandell 2010). What I try to decipher is the role 
of the institutional environment; how states’ regulations of immigration and integration could be 
influencing anti-immigrant sentiment.   
Second, I conceive state regulations of immigration and integration as a product of 
historical definitions of the nation, with path-dependent implications on citizens’ understandings 
of membership. The comparison of Belgian and Spanish regions is particularly useful, due to the 
within-country variability in the notions of membership. I seek to examine whether the prevalence 
of a specific notion of membership, for instance, in ethnic or civic terms, is more likely to 
encourage anti-immigrant sentiment than others, and, if yes, what is the relationship between 
concrete forms of membership and distinctive manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment.   
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Third, I assume that political parties are rational actors (Downs 1957; Norris 2004; Rosenof 
2003). They optimize their means, such as: political discourses, to control government. As 
immigrants access political rights, political parties are expected to chase their vote (Carmines and 
Wagner 2006; Inglehart 1990; Norris 2004; Rohrschneider 2002). In this direction, my research 
examines to what extent citizens’ exposure to pro-cultural diversity discourses discourages them 
from perceiving immigration as a threat. At the same time, I anticipate that restrictive approaches 
to immigration or the presence of the radical right will motivate anti-immigrant sentiment.  
 With these three assumptions in mind, I claim that there are three key processes explaining 
the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in the Brussels and the Madrid regions, its high 
manifestations as a material threat in Andalusia and Wallonia, and as a cultural threat in Catalonia 
and Flanders.   
 
1. Immigrants’ demographic and political power: I account for the low manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment as a product of immigrants’ demographic distribution and access to 
political rights. In Brussels, I observe that the high concentration of both EU and non-EU 
immigrants has turned cultural diversity into a defining characteristic of the urban space, 
encouraged internal migration flows between the capital and the country-side, and shifted 
the political correlation of power on behalf of parties that represent immigrants’ socio-
economic interests; traditionally, those of the left. In Madrid, I show that citizens’ low 
skepticism towards immigration is tied to the political power of Europeans and Latin 
Americans, which represent a new and growing percentage of the electorate. I argue that 
regulations facilitating immigrants’ enfranchisement have contained anti-immigrant 
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sentiment by encouraging political parties to use pro-cultural diversity discourses targeted 
to the immigrant and the native voter.    
 
2. Immigrants’ access to scarce economic resources: I explain the material manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment as a product of two types of economic scarcity: jobs and welfare. 
Andalusia and Wallonia are the most economically-deprived regions in each country, 
where both types of resource scarcity is most salient. In addition to the longstanding claim 
that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the immigrant-native competition for jobs, I 
observe that a significant percentage of the citizenry perceives immigrants as undeserving 
recipients of welfare. With this insight, I contribute to prevailing theories on economic 
competition, which have not examined inter-ethnic contention outside labor market 
boundaries.  
 
3. Immigrants’ integration in the cultural mainstream: I present the cultural manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment as the outcome of a demand-supply problem. I complement 
previous studies, which have emphasized the significance of nation-building projects, with 
evidence of citizens’ uneven expectations of immigrants’ integration. I show that citizens 
in Catalonia and Flanders have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than their 
peers in other regions of the country. Immigrants in these regions exhibit stronger interest 
in attending language and integration classes than their peers elsewhere, but they do not 
meet the high expectations of the Catalan and the Flemish. Evidence from these two regions 
encourages a theoretical discussion about the extent to which cultural integration is 
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attainable, and how can state regulations contribute to the establishment of such 
expectations.   
* * * 
With this research, I attempt to contribute to the literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment and state 
regulations of immigration and integration. In the conclusion, I assess the extent to which my 








This chapter elaborates the methodological strategy to examine anti-immigrant sentiment across 
three Belgian and three Spanish regions. I divide it into four main parts: 1. Cross-regional 
attitudinal differences; 2. Six regions; 3. Data; and 4. Outline of analytical chapters. I begin by 
presenting the uneven geographical distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material and as 
a cultural threat. The statistical significance of cross-regional attitudinal differences encourages 
me to use regions as units of analysis. Second, I introduce the reader to the structural characteristics 
of the six research sites. Evidence from Brussels, Flanders, and Wallonia allows me to dig into the 
case of Belgium; while Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid permit examining anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Spain. I use one region per country to analyze the low manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment (Brussels and Madrid), its manifestation as a material threat (Andalusia and Wallonia), 
and its manifestation as a cultural threat (Catalonia and Flanders). Next, I describe the mixed 
methods of data collection that facilitate assessing the role of state regulations in citizens’ attitudes. 
I combine data from: a) surveys; b) semi-structured interviews; c) ethnographic fieldwork; and d) 
socio-demographic, policy, and macro-economic indicators. I conclude with a brief description of 




3.1. Cross-regional attitudinal differences  
Recent studies emphasize the advantages of comparative research to the study of immigration 
(Bloemraad 2013; Dancygier 2010). According to Bloemraad, a comparative approach allows 
scholars to reveal: “that social phenomena are not fixed or ‘natural’” (2013: 3). A within-country 
comparison is especially useful, because as Dancygier argues: “Studying within-country variation 
in immigrant conflict outcomes allows us to better isolate the variables that cause these clashes.” 
(2010: 11). In this study, I compare and contrast regions of two different countries in order to 
identify attitudinal patterns (Gerring 2007). I determine patterns using pairs of regions as 
‘analogous’ (Stinchcombe 2005: 153), and rule out alternative explanations based on country-
specific factors (Table 1: Structure of the historical-comparative method).  
< Table 3.1 about here > 
The selection of regions is straightforward. The three Belgian comprise the whole country 
(Figure 2: Map of Belgium). In Spain, I select Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid, based on their: 
a) high percentage of immigrant population; and b) size of the regional European Social Survey 
(ESS) sample (Figure 3: Map of Spain). This selection already implies one of this study’s 
limitations: the generability of findings. Evidence from Andalusia, Catalonia, and Madrid may not 
capture some of the processes underlying citizens’ hostility in other parts of Spain.  
< Figures 3.1 and 3.2 about here > 
I view my six research sites as ‘empirical units’ (Ragin and Becker 1992), and attempt to 
approach their manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment from a Weberian verstehende Soziologie 
perspective, with the goal of: “understanding the full dimensions of social life in social and 
historical research” (Harper 1992: 139). Due to the probabilistic nature of the dependent variable, 
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I do not have a traditional negative case (Skocpol 1979). It would be practically impossible to find 
a region with an absolute lack of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
With this framework in mind, I introduce cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant 
sentiment using two survey questions from the European Social Survey (waves I-V, 2002-2010):     
1. Is immigration bad or good for the country’s economy?   
2. Is your country’s cultural life undermined or enriched by immigration?   
Both questions code respondents’ answers using a 0-10 scale, in which low scores represent 
negative attitudes toward immigration, and high scores, positive ones. The original scale is 
problematic, due to the large number of categories (Schaeffer and Presser 2003). The number of 
categories impedes a clear attribution of meaning; for example, what is the difference between an 
8 and a 9?. Moreover, cross-national studies are especially sensitive to response biases. There are 
important cultural differences in citizens’ evaluation criteria, but only limited tools to estimate the 
scope of error. Hence, I break down the original 0-10 scale into an ordinal variable with three main 
categories: scores 0-3 are labeled as ‘bad’ perceptions of immigration, scores between 4 and 6 are 
‘neutral’, and scores of 7 and above represent ‘good’ attitudes.  
I introduce the variability of the dependent variable by tracing each region’s negative (bad) 
and positive (good) perceptions of immigration between 2002 and 2010. Figures 3.3 to 3.10 
illustrate the fluctuation of cross-regional attitudinal differences during the last decade. Figure 3.3 
(Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-2010) presents 
the regional percentage of Belgian citizens perceiving immigration as a material threat. Walloon 
citizens exhibit the most negative attitudes every year of the survey. 30% of Walloons 
systematically perceive immigration as a material threat throughout the 2002-2010 period. In 2004, 
this percentage increased to more than 40%. Flanders presents the second most negative attitudes 
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towards immigrants’ economic impact, while Brussels shows the least anti-immigrant sentiment. 
The persistence of cross-regional attitudinal differences over time suggests that they respond to a 
pattern that requires a sociological explanation. Figure 3.4 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ 
economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-2010) provides complementary evidence of these 
attitudinal differences; in agreement with Figure 2, Brussels stands out as the region with the most 
favorable attitudes towards immigrants’ economic impact, followed by Flanders, and eventually, 
Wallonia.  
< Figures 3.3 and 3.4 about here > 
 Figure 3.5 (Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-
2010) introduces a similar pattern in the Spanish case. Andalusia exhibits a stronger material 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment than Catalonia and Madrid in four of the five survey 
waves. Anti-immigrant sentiment is especially prominent in the 2008 and 2010 waves, probably 
as a result of the current economic crisis. Catalonia follows, and exhibits strong hostile attitudes 
toward immigrants’ economic contribution, while citizens in Madrid present the least negative 
attitudes. Figure 3.6 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution, Spain, 2002-
2010) complements these cross-regional attitudinal trends. The Madrid region systematically 
maintains the most positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic impact. In four of the five ESS 
waves, 40% of the population in Madrid holds positive attitudes toward immigration. At odds, 
Andalusia exhibits the least favorable attitudes. The correspondence between positive and negative 
attitudes indicates that the percentage of ‘neutral’ responses is low, and most respondents have an 
opinion on this subject.  
< Figures 3.5 and 3.6 about here > 
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Respondents’ perceptions of immigration as a cultural threat exhibit distinctive cross-
regional differences. Figure 3.7 (Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in 
Belgium, 2002-2010) indicates that Flanders is the most hostile region, followed by Wallonia. 
Brussels, again, exhibits the less skeptical attitudes toward cultural diversity. The manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat has increased over time, ranging from 15 to 20% of 
the Flemish population. Understanding what underlies citizens’ increasing hostility in Flanders 
represents an analytical priority, and it is the object of study in Chapter 6. Brussels stands out as 
the region with the most favorable attitudes toward cultural diversity (Figure 3.8: Positive attitudes 
toward immigrants’ cultural impact, Belgium, 2002-2010). More than 50% of the population in 
Brussels think that immigration enriches the country’s cultural life. In parallel, both the Walloons 
and the Flemish exhibit significantly less enthusiastic views, with only 40% and 30% of positive 
attitudes respectively.     
< Figures 3.7 and 3.8 about here > 
Spain shows cross-regional differences in the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment as well, even though they are slightly less consistent than those in Belgium (Figure 3.9: 
Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact, Spain, 2002-2010). Catalonia exhibits the 
strongest manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat in three of the five survey 
waves (2004, 2008, and 2010). Andalusia follows, while the Madrid region presents the most 
favorable views of cultural diversity. Figure 3.10 (Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural 
impact in Spain, 2002-2010) illustrates Madrid region’s increasingly favorable attitudes toward 
immigrants’ cultural impact over time. Andalusia shows relatively positive attitudes, while 
Catalonia, on average, exhibits the strongest hostility toward immigrants’ cultural background. 
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Yet, it is important to note that this pattern is less systematic than those observed and discussed in 
previous figures.   
< Figures 3.9 and 3.10 about here > 
Figure 3.3-3.10 illustrate the cross-regional attitudinal variability within Belgium and 
Spain, but these differences could be a product of the uneven distribution of socio-demographic 
variables, such as respondents’ age, gender, level of education, and household income. I pool data 
from the five waves of the European Social Survey excluding citizens with an immigrant 
background, in order to test these hypotheses with ordered logit models. Based on previous studies 
(Winship and Mare 1984), this analytical formulation is the best fit to the dependent variable. 
Table 3.2 (Descriptive statistics) summarizes the dependent and independent variables. For a list 
of survey questions, see Appendix A (Questions of the European Social Survey). Next, I show 
statistically significant cross-regional attitudinal differences in both countries, even after 
controlling for respondents’ socio-demographic and economic characteristics. I use the category 
‘good’ as the reference, so that positive coefficients show favorable effects on citizens’ perception 
of immigration and negative ones indicate anti-immigrant sentiment.   
< Table 3.2 about here > 
Table 3.3 (Regional differences in the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 2002-
2010) shows that citizens in Wallonia and Flanders are significantly more like to manifest anti-
immigrant sentiment as a material threat than those in Brussels. Moreover, citizens in Flanders and 
Wallonia are significantly more likely to perceive immigrants’ cultural impact negatively, 
compared to their peers in Brussels. These results agree with Figures 3.7 and 3.8 and highlight the 
geographical overlap of material and cultural manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Andalusians exhibit the greatest degree of hostility towards immigrants’ socio-economic 
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contribution. Catalans follow, with slightly less hostile attitudes, but still statistically significant 
compared to their peers in Madrid. Catalans are significantly more likely to hold negative attitudes 
towards immigrants’ cultural impact their peers in the Madrid region. I have measured the effects 
of socio-demographic and economic variables, and observed that coefficients are consistent with 
extant studies3.  
< Table 3.3 about here > 
In sum, this section has introduced the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment in its 
material and cultural forms across three Belgian and three Spanish regions. The lack of systematic 
yearly effects across these four tables suggests that cross-regional attitudinal patterns respond to 
stable patterns with limited mutability over time. Eight figures and two tables provide evidence of 
robust cross-regional attitudinal differences. The next section presents the most important 
structural characteristics of the six research sites under consideration.       
 
3.2.  Six regions  
This section presents the distinctive structural characteristics of this study’s units of analysis (see 
Table 3.4: Structural characteristics of the six research sites). With the term ‘structural 
characteristics’, I refer to the demographic, economic, cultural, and political contextual variables 
that define the environment in which native citizens and immigrants interact and generate 
perceptions of each other. I introduce the six research sites by presenting regional percentages of 
immigrant population, citizenship acquisitions, unemployment rates, integration models, 
prevailing notions of membership, the existence of nation-building projects, and the radical-right. 
                                                          
3 Statistical analysis available upon request.  
46 
 
I argue that these structural characteristics, in interaction with state regulations and institutions, 
represent key processes underlying the strength and manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.   
< Table 3.4 about here > 
The Brussels’ region has the highest percentage of immigrants in the country. Already in 
2000, non-Belgian residents represented 28% of its population (Deboosere et al. 2009; Jacobs and 
Swyngedouw 2002). An exceptionally high immigrant stock turned cultural diversity into a 
defining characteristic of Brussels (Favell 2001). Brussels also exhibits the highest unemployment 
rates in the country, about 15%, and the second-highest number of naturalizations after Flanders, 
a little over 200,000 (European Union Democracy Observatory 2010). As part of the Francophone 
community, immigrants’ integration in Brussels is characterized by a laissez-faire Republican 
integration model, a civic notion of membership, and a lacking nation-building project. Moreover, 
Brussels is the only Belgian region that has not witnessed the rise of an ethno-nationalist party, 
probably due to its high immigration. In this study, I use the case of Brussels to examine the low 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
Flanders is the Northern region of the country, historically characterized by its low 
immigration, and low unemployment. Between 1979 and 2008, Flanders was the region with the 
highest number of citizenship acquisitions, slightly above 215,000. It has an active integration 
policy, which requires non-EU immigrants to attend integration and language classes (Adams 
2011). At the same time, the Flemish integration policy seeks to protect cultural group rights, for 
example, by allowing females to wear headscarves in some public institutions (Ireland 2004). Its 
historical nation-building project contrasts to the rest of the country, and relies on an understanding 
of membership in ethnic terms. Additionally, Flanders stands out for the strength of its ethno-
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nationalist party: the Vlaams Belang. The Vlaams Belang was relatively successful throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, and managed to receive 24% of the vote in Antwerp in 2004 (Jacobs and 
Swyngedouw 2002). I use the case of Flanders to dig into the significance of nationalism, an active 
integration policy centered on immigrants’ cultural acquisition, and the political mobilization of 
the radical right.  
Wallonia is the Southern area of Belgium, and the most economically-disadvantaged. A 
blooming industrial sector attracted international labor flows throughout the guest-worker period 
(1950-1974), but the transformation of the economy during the late 1970s and 1980s left 
unemployed a significant percentage of its population. Since then, Wallonia has maintained 
structurally high unemployment rates. It is the region in the country with the lowest number of 
recent naturalizations, perhaps due to its limited economic opportunities. Along with Brussels, the 
regulation of immigrants’ integration in Wallonia follows a laissez-faire Republican model that 
conceives regional membership in civic terms (Ireland 2004). In contrast to Flanders, Wallonia 
has never had political aspirations independent from Belgium. Although it has witnessed the rise 
of the radical right, with the Front National, this party has never received a degree of electoral 
support comparable to the Vlaams Belang. In this study, I use the Walloon case to better understand 
the manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat.  
Andalusia is one of Spain’s most economically underprivileged regions, with a percentage 
of immigrant population around 8 percent. Its unemployment rate is structurally high, and it has 
skyrocketed since the beginning of the current economic recession. In 2011, it was 27.8 (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadística 2012). Between 2004 and 2008, it has naturalized over 21,000 immigrants, 
which is significantly less than Catalonia and Madrid. Similar to Wallonia, Andalusia counts with 
a laissez-faire Republican integration model that relies on civic principles (Aja et al. 2006; 
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Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008), and it does not have a nation-building project outside of Spain. 
Also, it has not witnessed the rise of the radical right thus far. Along with Wallonia, I use the case 
of Andalusia to examine the role of structural conditions in the material manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment.  
 Catalonia is one of Spain’s wealthiest regions, with a longstanding structural demand of 
labor and low unemployment rates. This is one of the reasons of its high percentage of immigration, 
around 15%, and 67,000 citizenship acquisitions throughout the 2004-2008 period. Yet, a segment 
of the citizenry perceives immigration as a controversial subject, due to its apparent 
incompatibility with Catalonia’s nation-building project (Solé and Parella 2003). The region’s 
assimilationist model embraces an understanding of membership based on cultural terms, and 
aligned with a historical nation-building project. Moreover, Catalonia exhibits today the only 
radical right party in the country; Plataforma per Catalunya, which has received increasing 
electoral support throughout the 2000s, but it has not managed to obtain regional Parliamentary 
representation. Evidence from Catalonia, along with Flanders, allows me to examine the sources 
of contention underlying the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment.    
 Similar to Catalonia, Madrid has one of the largest percentages of immigrant population in 
the country, 14 %, and it has witnessed the naturalization of almost 100,000 immigrants between 
2004 and 2008. The Madrid region has historically had a structural demand of labor and relatively 
low unemployment rates, even though these conditions may change in the near future, as the 
economic crisis continues. Similar to Andalusia, Madrid has an integration model characterized 
by an understanding of membership in civic terms. In the political spectrum, and as the capital of 
Spain, Madrid does not have a regional political project. Moreover, it has not witnessed the 
political mobilization of the radical right. One explanation for this void could be the political 
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stigma of Franco’s Fascist regime, which governed the country between 1939 and 1975, and 
tainted the meaning of extreme right-wing parties at the national level (Encarnación 2004). The 
case of Madrid contributes to this research’s examination of the low manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment.    
 Overall, I use three Belgian and three Spanish regions to approach the role of demographic, 
economic, political and cultural conditions in the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
 
3.3. Data 
This study uses mixed methods of data analysis to generate robust results (Small 2011). It 
combines data from: a) surveys; b) interviews; c) ethnographic fieldwork; and d) socio-economic 
and policy indicators. Most of my public opinion data comes from the European Social Survey 
(ESS); a biannual survey containing public opinion data for over thirty European countries, 
including Belgium and Spain, with samples of approximately two thousand respondents for every 
country and year. All five waves: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, and 2010 include the two survey 
questions I have used to present the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment.  
I also include public opinion data from the Eurobarometer (2011), the European Values 
Study (2008), and the Immigrant Citizen Survey (2012). The Eurobarometer and the European 
Values Study are large cross-national surveys comparable to the European Social Survey. A recent 
Eurobarometer (2011) provides public opinion data on cross-cultural relations, and how citizens 
expect them to evolve in the near future, and the European Values Study (2008) contains a survey 
question on citizens’ attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration. The Immigrant Citizen 
Survey (2012) is a novel pilot study with data on immigrants’ integration in fifteen European cities, 
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including five capitals of my six research sites; Antwerp (Flanders), Barcelona (Catalonia), 
Brussels (Brussels), Liege (Wallonia), and Madrid (Madrid). The most innovative element of this 
study is that it approaches integration from the immigrants’ perspective. I have used these four 
surveys to compare and contrast anti-immigrant sentiment across regions.   
National-level datasets provide complementary evidence to better capture cross-regional 
differences. In the analysis of Belgian regions, I have used data from: a) the General Election Study 
(1991, 1999, and 2003); and b) Discrimination Survey, Enquête discrimination (2004). For the 
study of Spanish regions, I have used: a) Survey on public attitudes toward immigration, Actitudes 
de los españoles frente a la inmigración (1995, 1996, 2008, and 2009); b) Opinions and Attitudes 
of the Andalusian Population toward Immigration, Opiniones y actitudes de la población andaluza 
ante la inmigración (2005, 2008, 2010); and c) Catalans’ perceptions of immigration, Percepció 
dels catalans sobre la immigració (2010).     
I interpret survey data with evidence from forty-five semi-structured interviews with 
immigration experts. These experts include university professors conducting immigration research 
across the social sciences; Sociology, Political Science, Economics, and Law; politicians, and 
representatives of immigrant associations (see Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees). 
I have conducted interviews in three different languages: Catalan, English, and Spanish, and their 
length ranged from forty five minutes to one hour. I quote segments of interviews and, when they 
were not conducted in English, I include the original quote in a footnote.  
In both countries, I select immigration experts using a snow-ball sample strategy. In Spain, 
the selection of experts was based on an independent research foundation for international affairs 
in Barcelona, CIDOB (Centre d’Estudis i Documentació Internationals de Barcelona [Center for 
International Studies and Documentation of Barcelona]). As CIDOB works with experts who have 
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external appointments in research universities and public administrations, I think that they 
represent unbiased intellectual and professional elite4. This list has been the point of departure of 
my selection of experts in Spain. In Belgium, I have selected experts based on the research 
foundation King Baudouin, in Brussels, as well as peer-reviewed publications in the most 
important journals on international migration. In both countries, I have encouraged my 
interviewees to propose additional experts in the field, in order to expand the size of my experts’ 
sample. My interview protocol begins by presenting cross-regional attitudinal differences in the 
expert’s country, and proceeds with the discussion of demographic, economic, political and 
cultural processes that could be potentially underlying these attitudes (see Table 3.5: Interview 
protocol).  
< Table 3.5 about here > 
 In order to evaluate the role of state policies regulating immigrants’ enfranchisement, I 
conducted ethnographic fieldwork during the two months preceding Spain’s 2011 local elections 
in two localities: Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) and Badalona (Barcelona). I selected these two 
localities because of their similar size; about 200,000 inhabitants, above-average percentages of 
immigration; 21.6% in Alcalá and 14.8% in Badalona, and their proximity to the two largest cities 
in the country. Most immigrants in Alcalá de Henares come from other member states of the 
European Union or Latin America, and about 87% of them are eligible to vote in local elections. 
By contrast, most immigrants in Badalona come from Africa or Asia, and only 42% are likely to 
be enfranchised (Table 3.6: Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010). The 
three largest nationalities in Alcalá de Henares are Romanians, Poles, and Bulgarians, while in 
Badalona, they are: Pakistanis, Moroccans, and Chinese (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). 
                                                          
4 List of immigration experts: http://www.cidob.org/ca/temes_regions/migracions/equip_de_treball 
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Ethnographic fieldwork in these two communities has facilitated the sociological understanding 
of how political parties respond to immigrants’ access to political power.   
< Table 3.6 about here > 
To optimize the comparison, I focus on the performance of a single political party: Partido 
Popular. In Spain’s bi-party system, Partido Popular represents the most important conservative 
party in the country. It has been in office between 1996 and 2004, under the presidency of José 
María Aznar, and from November 2011 onwards, under Mariano Rajoy. Immigration became a 
top priority during Aznar’s government (Arango and Martin 2005), but in the current legislature 
the salience of immigration has decreased vis-à-vis the reforms to address an unprecedented 
economic crisis. In May 2011, Partido Popular won local elections in both Alcalá de Henares and 
Badalona. The examination of this party’s immigration discourse and its mutability according to 
immigrants’ access to political power helps explain cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant 
sentiment.      
Finally, I use socio-economic and policy indicators to contextualize within-country 
attitudinal differences. Most of my socio-demographic estimates come from Eurostat, OECD – 
International Migration Outlook, Belgium’s Directorate-General Statistics and Economic 
Information, and Spain’s Instituto Nacional de Estadística [National Statistics Institute]. 
Additionally, I rely upon the Migrant Integration Policy Index to illustrate national institutional 
frameworks for immigrants’ integration in the labor market and access to political rights. I use data 
from the European Union Democracy Observatory to present citizenship statistics across regions 
and the largest nationalities naturalized.   
 In sum, this study combines data from existing public opinion surveys, semi-structured 
interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, and socio-economic and policy indicators to explain the 
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uneven distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment, and its manifestation as a material and as a 
cultural threat.  
 
3.4. Outline of empirical chapters 
The following three chapters reveal the sociological significance of demographic, political, 
economic, and cultural processes in the distribution of anti-immigration sentiment.    
 Chapter 4 accounts for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with an 
examination of cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values and the demographic 
composition of immigrant populations. Extant theories offer an explanation for the case of 
Brussels, but not for Madrid. In Madrid, I account for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment as a product of the large percentage of enfranchised immigrants. Citizens in regions with 
a high percentage of enfranchised immigrants are expected to perceive immigration much more 
favorably than those in regions where immigrants cannot vote, due to the mediating effect of 
political parties. I show that when the immigrant vote is conceived as a resource, political parties 
shift their position on the immigration issue; they abandon restrictive border control ideas and 
incorporate cultural diversity claims.  
 Chapter 5 accounts for the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with 
evidence from Andalusia and Wallonia. I explain citizens’ hostility as a result of three key 
historical processes: a) a historical demand of low-skilled labor to complement the native labor 
force; b) a macro-level transformation of the national economy increasing unemployment rates 
among natives and immigrants; and c) an increasingly scarce welfare state. I complement 
prevailing explanations on economic competition by indicating the significance of policies of 
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economic redistribution. In contrast to prevailing theories on economic competition, which are 
focused on the labor market, I argue that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 
emerges from the economic scarcity in both the labor market and the welfare state.    
Chapter 6 explains the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-
supply process, between the expectations of the native citizenry and immigrants’ efforts to become 
part of the cultural mainstream. Survey data illustrate that most citizens in regions with 
longstanding nation-building projects, Catalonia and Flanders, have higher expectations of 
immigrants’ integration than their peers in the rest of Spain and Belgium. I argue that these 
expectations come from regional integration policies that aspire to turn immigrants into active 
members of the regional culture. I argue that the implementation of these policies establishes a 
hierarchical relationship between natives’ and immigrants’ cultures, and encourages native citizens 
to expect a degree of cultural integration that may be unattainable. Additionally, I discuss the effect 
of the political mobilization of the radical right. I argue that it has contributed to the cultural 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment by strengthening boundaries against Muslims, to a 




LOW MANIFESTATION OF ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT5 
 
Previous studies account for citizens’ positive attitudes toward immigration with explanations 
centered on political and demographic variables. They argue, for example, that liberal citizens will 
be more likely to view immigration positively than their conservative peers (see section 2.1.5, in 
Chapter 2). I use this hypothesis as the starting point to explain the low manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment in Brussels and Madrid. Then, I introduce a second explanation, which claims 
that anti-immigrant sentiment depends on the demographic composition of the immigrant 
population. These studies argue that its immigrants’ visibility, and not necessarily the percentage 
of immigrant population, what drives the variability of anti-immigrant sentiment (Blalock 1967; 
Schneider 2008). This chapter begins by evaluating whether either of these two explanations can 
account for the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels and Madrid. I show that 
cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values and the demographic composition of 
immigrant population provide an explanation for the case of Brussels, but not for Madrid. For the 
latter, I provide an alternative account, based on the geographical distribution of immigrants’ 
enfranchisement and political parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote.  
 
 
                                                          
5 This chapter is based on the manuscript “Why Aren’t Spaniards Xenophobic? An Ethnography of Spain’s Local 
Elections”, co-authored with Saskia Sassen.  
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4.1. Political values and immigration flows  
I begin by examining whether cross-regional attitudinal differences in Belgium and Spain respond 
to the uneven distribution of citizens’ political values with data from the European Social Survey 
(2002-10). I re-code the original 10-point left-right scale into an ordinal variable that categorizes 
political values on the left (0-4), undecided (5), and right (6-10). Tables 4.1 (Cross-regional 
differences in citizens’ political values in Belgium, 2010) and 4.2 (Cross-regional differences in 
citizens’ political values in Spain, 2010) indicate that there are statistically significant differences 
in political values across Belgian and Spanish regions. I illustrate these differences with data from 
the most recent ESS wave (2010)6. In Belgium, Flanders stands out as the most conservative region 
in the country, while most respondents in Wallonia and Brussels are slightly more liberal. The 
prevalence of liberal values in Brussels can explain its low anti-immigrant sentiment. As I have 
explained above (see section 2.1.5, in Chapter 2), liberal citizens are less likely to view 
immigration as a problem than conservative ones.   
< Figure 4.1 about here > 
In Spain, I find counter-intuitive results; respondents in the most anti-immigrant regions of 
the country, Andalusia and Catalonia, lean towards the left, while those in Madrid, lean right 
(Table 4.2: Cross-regional differences in political values in Spain, 2010). Previous studies indicate 
that the alignment of Andalusians and Catalans with liberal values responds to two political 
trajectories independent from international migration (Linz and Montero 1999). Social inequality 
in Andalusia has encouraged the majority to vote parties representing the traditional left (Kitschelt 
1994), while in Catalonia, the oppression of Catalan culture during Franco’s dictatorship (1939-
                                                          
6 Crosstabs and chi tests for all other survey years are available upon request.  
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75) has questioned the legitimacy of the right at the national level. The puzzling case here is 
Madrid, where the coexistence of positive attitudes towards immigration and conservative political 
values requires a new explanation.    
< Figure 4.2 about here > 
Tables 4.3 (Demographic characteristics of immigrants in Belgium, 2012) and 4.4 
(Demographic characteristics of immigrants in Spain, 2012) illustrate cross-regional differences 
in the composition of the immigrant population. The case of Belgium fits extant theories to a 
greater extent than the case of Spain. 20% of the total population in Brussels comes from the EU, 
and 12% comes from other countries. These percentages are three times the size of those in 
Wallonia, and four times those in Flanders. They suggest that immigration and cultural diversity 
in Brussels is an essential part of the city’s identity, which can explain the low salience of anti-
immigrant sentiment today.   
< Table 4.3 about here > 
Immigration in Spain is overall much lower than in Belgium, and exhibits a different 
composition of regional flows. Citizens from the European Union are concentrated in Andalusia 
(45%), Madrid (31%), and Catalonia (22%). We would expect the high percentage of Europeans 
in Andalusia to discourage anti-immigrant sentiment, but this is not the case. Madrid has a high 
percentage of Latin Americans (44%), significantly above Andalusia (21%) and Catalonia (32%). 
Due to the cultural similarities between Latin Americans and Spaniards, I expect that Latin 
Americans are expected to integrate in the cultural mainstream much faster than immigrants from 
other continents. However, going back to the concept of immigrant visibility (Blalock 1967; 
Schneider 2008), Latin Americans in Spain are not necessarily invisible. Their high concentration 
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in Madrid is expected to motivate citizens’ hostility. Africans are another visible community, with 
a low concentration in Madrid (11%), and higher in Andalusia (20%), and Catalonia (24%).  
< Table 4.4 about here > 
Data from the regional composition of immigrant population and citizens’ political values 
indicate that prevailing theories fit the case of Belgium to a greater extent than the case of Spain. 
The low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels appears to be a product of the high 
concentration of liberal residents, high immigration, and high percentage of Europeans. In Madrid, 
the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment contrasts to the salience of conservative values 
and the relatively high percentage of non-European immigrants. I explain the case of Madrid with 
an argument based on state regulations of immigrants’ access to political rights.   
 
4.2. Immigrants’ Access to Political Rights 
I use the Migrant Integration Policy Index to introduce national regulations for immigrants’ 
political participation. This dataset evaluates state regulations in four main dimensions: a) electoral 
rights; b) political liberties; c) consultative bodies; and d) implementation policies (Table 4.5: 
Immigrants’ political participation in Belgium and Spain, 2010). Electoral rights represent the 
most important boundary to immigrants’ political power. In both countries, immigrants have no 
right to vote at national or regional elections. The only exception concerns local elections, in which 
both countries allow citizens from other member states of the European Union to vote. In the case 
of Spain, citizens from countries with bilateral agreements can exercise their political rights as 
well. All other immigrants have to become Spanish citizens in order to vote. I use the reminder of 
59 
 
this section to compare and contrast immigrants’ access to political rights via citizenship 
acquisition in Belgium and Spain.  
< Table 4.5 about here > 
Access to citizenship in Belgium used to rely on an ius sanguine model exclusively. In 
1992, the state included a parallel pathway, based on ius soli, with the goal of integrating the 
offspring of the guest-worker generation (Corluy et al. 2011). In the early 2000s, the government 
added a third pathway based on immigrants’ declaration, which benefited those that had been 
living in the country for at least three consecutive years (Foblets and Yamasmayan 2010). This 
policy facilitated the naturalization of long-term residents that could not adhere to either of the two 
pathways outlined above. As a result of Belgium’s multiple naturalization pathways, 30,000 
immigrants have acquired Belgian citizenship every year between 1988 and 2007 (Figure 4.1: 
Total citizenship acquisitions in Belgium, 1988-2007). Historical data point out two exceptional 
peaks in 1992 and the early 2000s, which reflect the impact of the two legislative changes 
explained above.   
< Figure 4.1 about here > 
Figure 4.2 (Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Belgium, 2003-2007) indicates 
that most new Belgians come from Morocco. In only five years, almost forty four thousand 
Moroccans acquired Belgian citizenship. Turkey and Italy represent the second and third largest 
countries of origin, with 19,498 and 11,380 new Belgian nationals each. The large number of 
naturalized citizens from these three countries implies the demographic significance of the guest-
worker period. The remaining countries among the top 10 nationalities stresses the role of 
Belgium’s ex-colonies (Democratic Republic of Congo); guest-worker agreements (Ex-
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Yugoslavia and Algeria), and immigration flows from neighbor countries (France and the 
Netherlands).  
< Figure 4.2 about here > 
Spain counts with lesser pathways to citizenship than Belgium, but transnational 
regulations, bilateral agreements, and naturalization policies have granted political 
enfranchisement at the local level to most immigrants in the country (Aja and Moya 2008). The 
most important transnational regulation is the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which guarantees political 
enfranchisement at the local level to citizens from all member states of the European Union. 
Outside of this framework, bilateral agreements grant political rights to citizens from Chile, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New Zealand, Paraguay, Peru, Republic of Cape Verde, and Trinidad 
and Tobago, and the 1889 Civil Code provides the general framework to access citizenship (Díez-
Medrano 2005).  
According to the 1889 Civil Code, citizenship acquisition depends on the applicant’s 
country of origin. Citizens from any Central and Latin American country, Andorra, Portugal, or 
Sephardic Jews require only two years of residence to be eligible, while all other immigrants 
require ten years minimum (Díez-Medrano 2005). Given these different timelines and the fact that 
two thirds of Spain’s immigrants arrived after 2000 (OECD 2010), most Europeans and Latin 
Americans living in Spain are likely to be enfranchised today, while most Africans and Asians are 
excluded from the political field. Figure 4.3 (Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Spain, 
1995-2008) reveals the significance of Spain’s colonial history. Among the top ten countries of 
origin, there are eight ex-colonies: Argentina, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Peru, Philippines, and Venezuela; and two neighbor countries: Morocco and Portugal.  
< Figure 4.3 about here > 
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I evaluate the extent to which immigrants’ access to political rights can help account for 
cross-regional attitudinal differences. Due to the chronological gap between Spain’s regulations 
and the country’s exposure to international migration, the Spanish case permits tackling the 
problem of causality to a greater extent than the Belgian one (Abbott 1995; Hedström and Ylikoski 
2010). In European countries that have been receiving immigrants for longer periods of time, such 
as; Belgium, policies regulating immigrants’ naturalization have changed in a context of 
continuous immigration. This chronological overlap has made it difficult to determine whether the 
nature of international migration flows affected legislative decisions or the other way around.  
In Spain, I use both recent and historical evidence to reveal the relationship between 
immigrants’ political power and political parties’ immigration discourse. I conduct ethnographic 
fieldworks in two localities; Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) and Badalona (Barcelona) during the 
2011 local election campaign, to gain insight into a regional phenomenon. I have described the 
characteristics of these two localities in Chapter 3 (see Table 3.9). Their explanatory value comes 
from the fact that they are extreme cases (Stinchcombe 2005). I combine my findings with data 
from the electoral campaign in Catalonia in 1980. Evidence from Catalonia in the 1980s is useful 
because this region had a high percentage of immigrants from the rest of Spain, representing 14% 
of the total population. By contrasting how mainstream political parties used to approach internal 
immigrants three decades ago and approach international ones today, I shed light on the 
significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement in the alignment of political parties on the 






4.3. Accounting for Madrid 
Spain’s uneven distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement has motivated political parties to 
engage in two simultaneous and opposite processes: the de-nationalization and the nationalization 
of membership. In localities where most immigrants are European or Latin American, I observe 
that political parties de-nationalize membership with pro-cultural diversity rhetoric. Immigrants’ 
enfranchisement motivates political parties to weaken the native-foreigner boundary, and 
emphasize the perks of cultural diversity. In places where most immigrants are African and Asian, 
and thus, excluded from the political field, I observe that political parties nationalize membership 
to chase the native vote across the left-right political spectrum. I evaluate the significance of 
immigrants’ enfranchisement using interviews with immigration experts. Next, I discuss two 
counter-factual explanations for the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia, based on 
the political mobilization of nationalism and the increasing electoral support of the radical right, 
Plataforma per Catalunya [Platform for Catalonia].   
 
De-nationalizing Membership 
On April 28th, three weeks before the municipal elections, a representative of Partido Popular 
gave the following speech in Alcalá de Henares (Madrid):  
"We want a stable and well-ordered migration based on the law. We will always be against 
illegal immigration networks and bet for integration. The Partido Popular (PP) makes 
policy for everyone, for those born in Spain and for those born abroad. Most foreigners 
coming here end up feeling that Spain is their own. I am Galician and every Galician has 
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relatives abroad, so I know what that is. Therefore, the PP advocates for a policy that 
creates jobs. In today’s 4.7 million unemployed, there are one million foreigners.” 7   
This speech exemplifies Partido Popular’s pro-immigration discourse. It approaches immigrants 
as a part of the polity and stresses the similarities between those arriving to Spain today and 
Spanish immigrants in the past, in this case, using Galicians as an example. It emphasizes the 
importance of immigrants’ labor market participation, and expresses a shared commitment to re-
activate economic growth.   
The selection of Alcalá de Henares (Madrid) was not coincidental. Immigrants represent 
21% of its population, primarily from Eastern Europe. Since 2007, the enlargement of the 
European Union granted political rights to two of the three largest immigrant communities in this 
municipality: Bulgarians and Romanians. In addition to the speech above, the mayor (Partido 
Popular) organized a soccer tournament with the motto: Por la integración [For integration] two 
months before the 2011 local elections (Figure 4.4: Partido Popular’ electoral campaign in Alcalá 
de Henares, 2011). Both incidents provide evidence of Partido Popular’s interest in de-
nationalizing membership.   
< Figure 4.4 about here > 
A Law Professor explains the positive contribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement to their 
integration:   
                                                          
7 Original quote in Spanish: “Queremos una inmigración ordenada y estable basada en la ley. Siempre estaremos 
contra las mafias y apostaremos por la integración. El PP hace política para todos, para los que han nacido en 
España y para los que no. La inmensa mayoría de los extranjeros que vienen aquí acaban sintiendo España como 
algo propio. Yo soy gallego, y todo gallego tiene algún pariente fuera, sé lo que es eso. Por eso el PP defiende una 





“Since they [immigrants] have political rights, they are much more locked in the 
community, they have a greater capacity to influence, make their voice heard, and be 
respected.”8 
This interpretation is consistent with previous studies stressing the importance of political rights 
for immigrants’ incorporation (Bloemraad 2006; Marrow 2009). In regions with a high percentage 
of immigrant voters, it is rational for mainstream political parties, such as; Partido Popular, to 
deliver pro-cultural diversity discourses that permit chasing the immigrant vote. However, in 
regions where most immigrants are excluded from the political field, there is no incentive to change 
a restrictive immigration discourse that can potentially attract voters across the political spectrum 
(Norris 2005).   
Partido Popular’s pro-immigration rhetoric was not entirely new. One year before the 2011 
election, also in Alcalá de Henares, a party’s top representative gave the following speech:    
“The regional government appreciates, holds in high esteem, and makes everything 
possible to make the new Madrileños (residents of Madrid) feel at home. You will always 
find me supporting immigrants, who are the bravest, the most entrepreneurial, and 
ambitious, who leave everything behind without fear to look for better opportunities.” 9 
To conclude, she claimed:  
                                                          
8 Original quote in Catalan : “Perquè com que tenen plenitut de drets, inclosos els drets polítics, estàn més trabats a 
la comunitat, tenen més capacitat d’influència i d’incidència, i de ser respectats”.  
9 Original quote in Spanish: “El Gobierno regional aprecia, estima y hace todo lo posible para que los nuevos 
madrileños se sientan aquí como en casa. A mí nunca me van a encontrar nada más que apoyando y respaldando a 
los inmigrantes, que son los más valientes, emprendedores y ambiciosos, los que dejan atrás sin miedo todo para 
buscar mejores oportunidades.” Source: http://www.ppdealcala.es/pag/areas/100209.pdf, accessed in May 2012.  
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“For Madrid, it is a source of pride that they pick Madrid above any other nation or 
citizenry.” 10  
The performance of Partido Popular is consistent with previous research examining how political 
parties target their discourse to the electorate (Rohrschneider 2002). By labeling immigrants ‘new 
madrileños’ the party attempts to blur the native-immigrant boundary (Bail 2008; Lamont and 
Molnár 2002) and attract the immigrant vote.   
 Similarly, Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Madrid used the motto: “Coexistence 
and Trust in the City” [Convivencia y Confianza en la Ciudad] (Figure 4.5: Partido Popular’s 
Electoral Campaign in Madrid, 2011). With the concepts ‘coexistence’ and ‘trust’, the Partido 
Popular attempted to discourage citizens’ hostility. ‘Coexistence’ alludes to the recognition of 
ethnic and cultural diversity, which contrasts to Spain’s integration policy framework thus far 
(Bruquetas-Callejo et al. 2008). At the same time, the emphasis on ‘trust’ is expected to improve 
citizens’ perception of immigration as well. According to Rustenbach:     
“Higher trust should also be related to not blaming immigrants unless one has had a 
personal negative experience with them. That is, some natives blame many societal 
problems on immigrants, such as high crime rates or unemployment, and this should occur 
less for individuals with high trust levels.” (2010: 57).  
< Figure 4.5 about here > 
Beyond the scope of the political party’s discourse, immigration scholars argue that Partido 
Popular has approached immigrants’ associations to incorporate their interests into the political 
                                                          




agenda. By aligning the party’s interests to those of immigrants’ associations, the party has reduced 
the salience of immigration as an issue. According to a Law Professor:  
“Partido Popular has made an effort to attract the immigrant vote via immigrants’ 
associations. Some representatives in small localities depended on the number of 
[registered] Romanians.” 11 
As more immigrant communities access political rights, I expect to observe an increasing de-
nationalization of membership. In 2011, this process characterized the electoral campaign in 
localities with a strong presence of Europeans and Latin Americans, such as Alcalá de Henares 
(Madrid). In places like Badalona (Barcelona), the same political party used a discourse focused 
on the association between immigration and crime.  
 
Nationalizing Membership:  
Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona used the motto: Tu barrio es seguro? [Is your 
neighborhood secure?], juxtaposed to: “More Security” [+ Seguridad] to “Dirt”, “Delinquency”, 
“Incivility”, and “Insecurity” (Figure 4.6: Partido Popular’s electoral campaign in Badalona, 
2011). Partido Popular’s immigration discourse in Badalona re-nationalized membership by 
identifying immigrants with a threat to the citizenry, the state, and the social order. By attributing 
immigrants the opposite qualities of citizens, it legitimized their exclusion (Tilly 1998).   
< Figure 4.6 about here > 
                                                          
11 Original quote in Catalan: “El Partit Popular ha fet un esforç de captació del vot via les associacions 
d’immigrants. En alguns municipis petits hi havia regidors que ballaven en funció del número de romanesos.”  
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I ask immigration scholars the extent to which immigrants’ enfranchisement could affect 
political parties’ discourse. In a nutshell: if all immigrants could vote, would we observe a different 
electoral campaign? According to a Sociology Professor:    
“I am sure. They [political parties] would need to moderate what they say. Immediately it 
would turn them [immigrants] into their targets. Now they are not.” 12 
In agreement with this idea, a representative of an immigrant association claims:  
“Immigrants do not have political rights and do not affect the electoral results. At the same 
time, some politicians are interested in capturing the vote of the autochthonous population 
that has suffered the most during the economic crisis and it is very easy, you say that “they 
take all your benefits” and that’s it.” 13 
When immigrants are excluded from the political field, an anti-immigrant discourse helps political 
parties attract votes across the left-right spectrum, which is especially important in a bi-party 
system such as the Spanish one. Another question is: What is the relationship between political 
parties discourse and cross-regional differences in anti-immigrant sentiment? A vast literature in 
Political Science shows the significance of political parties’ framing of an issue on public opinion 
outcomes (see the review by Chong and Druckman 2007). Although I do not have longitudinal 
public opinion data at the local level to test this claim, my interviewees emphasize the negative 
impact of anti-immigration rhetoric on public opinion. A Sociology Professor explains: 
                                                          
12 Original quote in Catalan: “N’estic segura. Haurien de moderar el que diuen. Immediatament els convertirien en 
els seus targets. Ara no ho són.” 
13 Original quote in Catalan: “Els immigrants no tenen drets politics i per tant no afecten als resultats electorals. Per 
contra, hi han polítics interessats en captar el vote de la poblacio autòctona que ha patit mes durant la crisis, i clar, es 
molt fàcil, tu dius “que et treuen les prestacions” i ja està”.  
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“The fact that there are parties increasingly focused on this question indicates that they 
know they have an important role in the generation of perceptions and discourses.” 14 
A former politician explains:  
“When I was Secretary [of Immigration], a sociologist told me once that more than 
managing immigrants’ integration, I had to manage perceptions” 15 
Evidence from ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews encourages scholars to 
approach anti-immigrant sentiment by taking into consideration immigrants’ attributes, such as, 
their rights, and how these rights could be affecting prevailing correlations of power and public 
opinion. I provide additional evidence of the role of immigrants’ enfranchisement by comparing 
Partido Popular’s immigration discourse in Badalona in 2011 to how a nationalist political party 
in Catalonia, Convergència i Unió, used to approach Spanish migrants in Catalonia during the 
regional elections campaign in 1980. By contrasting political parties’ discourse vis-à-vis national 
and international migrants, I emphasize the positive effect of political enfranchisement.     
 
De-regionalizing Membership 
Throughout the 1960 and 1970s, thousands of Spaniards left the countryside in search for better 
opportunities. Most of them ended up in Barcelona or Madrid (Lopez de Lera 1995). Catalonia 
received over 840,000 migrants between 1960 and 1980, most of them from Andalusia, 
Extremadura, and Galicia (Romero-González and Albertos-Puebla 1993). In 1981, Spaniards from 
                                                          
14 Original quote in Catalan: “El fet que hi hagi partits cada vegada més centrats en aquesta qüestió significa que 
saben que tenen un rol important en la generació de percepcions i discursos.”  
15 Origional quote in Catalan: “Quan jo estava a la Secretaria, un sociòleg un dia em va dir que més que gestionar la 
integració dels immigrants, havia de gestionar percepcions”.  
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outside of Catalonia represented 14 percent of the regional population, similar to the percentage 
of international migrants today (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). After Franco’s death 
(1975), and the reestablishment of the Catalan Parliament (1979), the first regional elections took 
place in 1980. Since most of my interviewees were present at the time, I have asked them how 
political parties in Catalonia addressed internal migrants during the electoral campaign.  
With the motto: “To be Catalan means to live and work in Catalonia”, the leader of the 
nationalist party Convergència i Unió, Jordi Pujol, took the regional office in 1980 (Boada 2010). 
Similar to Partido Popular’s discourse in localities with a high percentage of enfranchised 
immigrants, such as Alcalá de Henares, Catalan political parties (even a nationalist one) shifted 
the boundaries of membership to chase both the Catalan and the non-Catalan vote. An immigrants’ 
association representative describes this phenomenon with her own immigration experience:  
“When Convergència i Unió (CIU) won the elections, their motto was: “We are six million 
people”. They integrated all of us immediately, because we had voting rights and they 
wanted our vote. I remember that, even though I had been living in Barcelona for over ten 
years, when I heard this motto, I felt Catalan for the first time. Today, we are nine million 
people, but nobody has come up with a similar motto.”16  
Catalan political parties never made Spanish (non-Catalan) migrants feel unwelcomed. Indeed, 
they responded to them with a discourse that emphasized their sense of belonging to Catalonia’s 
civil society. 
                                                          
16 Original quote in Catalan: “Quan Jordi Pujol va guanyar les eleccions, va fer un discurs de ‘Som sis millions’. Ens 
va integrar a tots immediatament, perquè teniem dret a vot i perquè volia el nostre vot. Jo recordo que tot i que 
portava vivint a Barcelona deu anys, quan vaig sentir aquest discurs, va ser la primera vegada que em vaig sentir 
catalana. Avui som nou milions i ningú ha fet cap discurs semblant.” 
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The de-regionalization of membership, as much as the de-nationalization of membership, 
motivates political parties to deliver immigration rhetoric that emphasizes the perks of inclusion 
and diversity. The comparison between how political parties in Catalonia used to address non-
Catalans in the past and treat immigrants today reveals a missing narrative. According to a Political 
Science Professor:  
“Politicians have treated everyone equally, but they have not made public a discourse on 
behalf of foreigners’ recognition of rights.”17  
Similar to what I have observed in Alcalá de Henares, the inclusive discourse of Convergència i 
Unió allowed this party to chase the vote of national immigrants and win the regional office in 
1980. Although this study does not have public opinion data to analyze how Catalans perceived 
national migrants at the time, political parties’ approach to internal population flows appears to 
respond to immigrants’ access to political rights. Evidence from past and present political 
campaigns suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia will decrease, as immigrants 
become increasingly enfranchised. Next, I evaluate two counter-factual explanations for the 
salience of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia today.   
 
Alternative explanations 
This section discusses three alternative explanations for Spain’s within-country attitudinal 
differences, based on: a) Catalan nationalism; b) the political mobilization of the radical right in 
Catalonia, Plataforma per Catalunya; and c) the demographic composition of the immigrant 
population. The first explanation questions whether Catalonia’s anti-immigrant sentiment could 
                                                          
17 Original quote in Catalan: “Els polítics han tractat a tothom igual, pero no han fet un discurs a favor del 
reconeixement de drets de la població nouvinguda”. 
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be a product of the region’s nation-building project. Previous studies show that nationalist regions 
tend to exhibit stronger anti-immigrant sentiment than regions without such political goals (see 
section 2.1.3 in Chapter 2). If Catalans were more hostile toward immigrants than their peers in 
other regions of the country, it would be rational for political parties to use restrictive immigration 
discourses during electoral campaigns, such as Partido Popular in Badalona. In this case, Partido 
Popular’s discourse would be a response to the preferences of the electorate (Fiorina 2002).  
Evidence from political parties’ response to internal migrants in the 1980s suggests that 
even if nationalism may lay the ground for anti-immigrant sentiment, it cannot explain Partido 
Popular’s dual immigration discourse. Convergència i Unió’s rhetoric vis-à-vis internal migrants 
reveals the extent to which Catalan nationalism is compatible with immigration. When Catalonia 
received immigrants from other regions of the country with political rights, nationalist political 
parties de-regionalized membership in order to chase the non-Catalan vote. This experience 
indicates that the political mobilization of Catalan nationalism, per se, does not necessarily 
encourage hostility toward the out-group.   
The second explanation suggests the potential impact of the radical right. Plataforma per 
Catalunya, an ethno-nationalist political party that has received increasing electoral support since 
its foundation in 2001, could be competing for the right-wing vote with mainstream parties such 
as Partido Popular, and, in this process, motivate them to embrace a restrictive approach to 
immigration. In this case, Partido Popular’s anti-immigration discourse could be interpreted as a 
strategy to compete for the far-right space. Some of my interviewees agree with this idea. 
According to a Law Professor:  
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“Partido Popular tries to maintain a balance between the center and the far-right, even 
though it does not have a far-right vote in Parliament, to get some of the votes from 
Plataforma.”18  
While this hypothesis may be plausible to explain Partido Popular’s performance in Badalona, I 
find it insufficient to account for the pro-cultural diversity rhetoric that the same political party 
delivered in Madrid. The same political party changed its immigration discourse across regions, 
even though no other party in Madrid used immigration as an issue. Hence, I think that a party 
competition hypothesis alone does not offer a compelling explanation for Partido Popular’s dual 
immigration discourse.  
The data available suggest that Partido Popular’s dual immigration discourse responded to 
the geographical concentration of immigrants’ enfranchisement, rather than political parties’ 
alignment on the immigration issue. Indeed, I interpret the emergence of an ethno-nationalist 
political party in Catalonia, and not in other regions of Spain, as a result of the limited 
enfranchisement of its immigrant population. Another question is whether the presence of a radical 
right party can impact citizens’ perception of immigration negatively (see section 6.4 in Chapter 
6).  
Third, the demographic composition of the immigrant population could also be explaining 
part of today’s cross-regional attitudinal differences. Immigrants’ visibility can encourage citizens 
in some regions to perceive immigration as a greater problem than those in other parts of the 
country. Catalonia is the region with the largest communities of Africans and Asians, which are 
the most visible, while Madrid has primarily Europeans and South Americans, which are, arguably, 
                                                          
18 Original quote in Catalan: “El Partit Popular intent mantenir l’equilibri entre el centre i l’ultra dreta, tot i que a les 
votacions al Parlament no son d’ultra-dreta, per segar part dels vots de Plataforma.”  
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less visible. Hence, today’s uneven attitudes could be a response of immigrants’ different degree 
of visibility.  
This hypothesis is not possible to test, but it is useful to open up a novel discussion about 
the scholarly understanding of foreign-ness. Prevailing theories assume that the relationship 
between immigrants and citizens is a categorical one. However, for most citizens, foreign-ness is 
conceived as a continuous variable. For Spaniards, a Canadian is much less foreign than a Nigerian. 
For a Belgian, a British is less foreign than a Chinese. Although it would be unrealistic for me to 
attempt to come up with a comprehensive scale of foreign-ness, theoretical contributions ignoring 
the uneven nature of immigrants’ foreign-ness have the potential to oversimplify the nature of 
inter-ethnic relations.   
Overall, this section has discussed three alternative explanations for today’s uneven 
distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment. I have challenged the role of nationalism and the Catalan 
radical right, and used a third counter-argument to open up a discussion about immigrants’ degree 
of foreign-ness, and its impact on multi-ethnic social cohesion. Evidence from Spain reveals that 
the uneven distribution of immigrants’ enfranchisement motivates political parties to approach 
immigration with two distinctive discourses. I argue that the low manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Madrid is a product of its highly enfranchised immigrant population, and political 
parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote. With these results in mind, I turn my attention to 





4.4. Accounting for Brussels 
The significance of immigrants’ enfranchisement in Spain motivate me to come back to the case 
of Brussels and evaluate how immigrants’ access to political rights has shaped inter-ethnic 
relations. Albeit citizens’ political values and the composition of immigration flows provide a 
compelling explanation for Brussels’ low anti-immigrant sentiment, I am interested in examining 
state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement to gain insight into patterns of exclusion and 
inclusion. To accomplish this goal, I discuss Belgium’s two-decade debate over immigrants’ 
enfranchisement, the relationship between immigrants’ enfranchisement and the geographical 
polarization of attitudes, and its theoretical implications vis-à-vis the Madrid case.  
 
The Debate over Immigrants’ Enfranchisement 
Belgian scholars have long identified immigrants’ enfranchisement with “one of the hottest topics 
in Belgian politics” (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002: 329). This discussion has been traditionally 
tied to the performance of the radical right, particularly, Vlaams Belang. As previous studies 
explain:   
“It is of crucial importance to understand that policy-making in the field of immigrant 
incorporation has been a result of reactions to the electoral success of an anti-immigrant 
political party” (Jacobs and Swyngedouw 2002: 332).  
Non-EU immigrants were not allowed to vote at the local level until 2004. In order to explain why 
Belgium did not enfranchise non-EU immigrants earlier, we need to take into consideration the 
structure of the national political system, and the relevance of compromise (Lijphart 1977). 
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Compromise is especially important in the discussion over immigrants’ enfranchisement, since its 
approval required modifying the Constitution. According to Jacobs (1999: 651):  
“The Belgian constitution stipulates that in principle possession of state citizenship is a 
prerequisite for enjoying voting rights. Enfranchisement of foreign residents hence 
necessitates both a simple legislative change and a more complex constitutional change 
and thus becomes a very time-consuming process.”  
The most important challenge of this procedure consists in acquiring a two-third Parliamentary 
majority, which implies reaching an agreement among all major parties in the country (Jacobs 
1999).  
The debate over immigrants’ political incorporation became an issue in the 1970s, 
following the conclusion of the guest-worker period (Martiniello and Rea 2003). The 1980s 
witnessed an increasing governmental interest in extending immigrants’ political rights, originally 
viewed as a mechanism to facilitate their integration, and strengthen social cohesion (Jacobs and 
Swyngedouw 2002). Opposition to immigrants’ enfranchisement came from the right, which 
anticipated that immigrants’ votes would wither its political power (Jacobs 1999). Instead of 
extending political rights to immigrants, the government decided to facilitate immigrants’ 
naturalization with a new pathway to citizenship: ius soli. This policy facilitated the naturalization 
of immigrants’ offspring, but it postponed the enfranchisement of non-EU immigrants until 2004 
(Bauböck 2005).  
The increasing success of the Vlaams Belang (then, Vlaams Blok) throughout the 1980s, 
going from 1 to 6% of the Belgian Chamber of Representatives, encouraged the government to 
take further measures against the strengthening of ethnic boundaries (Art 2008). In 1989, the 
government appointed a Royal Commissioner to facilitate inter-ethnic relations and de-legitimize 
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the radical right in the public space (Martiniello and Rea 2003). Additionally, multiple parties 
signed an agreement; cordon sanitaire, to isolate the Vlaams Blok at the national Parliament (Erk 
2005). The cordon sanitaire challenged the legitimacy of the radical right at the institutional level, 
but the party’s increasing electoral support showed that these regulations were insufficient. In 
2004, the enfranchisement of non-EU immigrants was set to change the political landscape.     
 
Immigrants’ Enfranchisement and the Polarization of Attitudes 
In 2006, Belgium celebrated the first local elections where non-European immigrants were allowed 
to vote. Immigrants’ enfranchisement transformed the correlation of political power in the 
direction that politicians and scholars had previously anticipated: on behalf of the left (Belien 
2006; Teney et al. 2010). The traditional left; the Socialist Party, witnessed a sharp increment of 
their electoral support. In the city of Antwerp, for example, the Socialist vote increased from 19.5 
to 35.3% (Belien 2006).  
Yet, immigrants’ enfranchisement unearthed a parallel process: the polarization of attitudes 
across the country. In Antwerp, where the Socialist vote had increased so significantly, the Vlaams 
Belang received over 33% of the vote (Belien 2006). Belgium’s attitudinal polarization did not 
begin with immigrants’ enfranchisement, but responded to the settlement of immigrant 
communities and internal migration flows; as immigrants concentrated in the urban areas, native 
Belgians were increasingly moving to the countryside. Belien (2006) illustrates this process with 
the case of Antwerp:  
“Every year 4,000 indigeneous Antwerpians move out and 5,000 [immigrants] move in” 
77 
 
Brussels represented an extreme case in this respect. Data of neighborhood residents between 1988 
and 2005 illustrates the size of these demographic flows (Deboseere et al. 2009). Table (4.5: 
Demographic composition of neighborhood in Brussels, 1988-2005) indicates the in- and out-
migration flows of Belgians; citizens from the EU-15; Turkish and Moroccans; and Other 
immigrant groups. In all neighborhoods of Brussels, Belgians show negative flows, while citizens 
from other EU member states, Turks, and Moroccans, exhibit positive in-flows. It is interesting to 
observe the fragmentation of the urban space by ethnic groups; EU citizens have moved to the 
neighborhoods in the second crown of the city, while Turks and Moroccans have settled in the 
inner city and the neighborhoods of the first crown.  
< Table 4.5 about here > 
Where do Belgians from Brussels go? to Flanders and Wallonia. Deboseere et al. (2009) 
provide evidence of inter-regional flows (see Figure 4.7: Internal migration flows in Belgium, 
2006). Brussels also receives important in-flows from Flanders and Wallonia, but they are slightly 
smaller than those going out (Deboseere et al. 2009). I argue that this demographic process is a 
key mechanism exacerbating Brussels’ low anti-immigrant sentiment.  
< Figure 4.7 about here > 
A Sociology Professor explains individuals’ motivations to move to Brussels:    
“A big part of the inhabitants [in Brussels] know what they opted for when they decided to 
move there or remain there”.  
Then, he elaborates:  
“The residents of Brussels who do not have an immigrant background know that this is 
how the city is.” 
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Due to Brussels’ high immigration, Belgians living in the city are those interested in living in a 
culturally-diverse environment. This observation supports the data of the geographical distribution 
of citizens with liberal political values (see Table 4.1). At the same time, it is important to keep in 
mind that immigration flows in Brussels represent a source of demographic instability for the 
Francophone-Flemish relations (Jacobs 2000; Mielants 2006). As most immigrants are French-
speakers, their settlement is conceived as a threat to the Dutch-speaking community (Billiet et al. 
2012). Yet, as immigrants increment cultural diversity and pursue cultural group rights, they 
contribute to the long-standing interest of the Flemish in protecting ethnic minorities (Jacobs 
2000).  
An immigration scholar explains how the Francophone and the Dutch communities view 
Brussels:  
“For the Flemish, Brussels is a city where nobody is a majority, and they conceive 
themselves as protectors of cultural group rights. For the Francophones, Brussels is a 
Francophone city because they are the demographic majority”.   
In sum, today’s low anti-immigrant sentiment in Brussels appears to be driven by the large 
percentage of immigrant population as well as the liberal political values of its residents. Brussels’ 
high immigration has become a defining element of the city, and motivated conservative native 
citizens to move out and liberal ones to move in. State regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement 
have not directly affected how citizens in Brussels view immigrants, but they have highlighted an 





Lessons from Brussels 
These findings have three main implications. First, the association between citizens’ hostility and 
internal geographical mobility questions the extent to which institutions have resources to prevent 
anti-immigrant sentiment. In Belgium, the within-country distribution of anti-immigrant sentiment 
appears to be a product of both international and national migration. Brussels’ high immigration 
has motivated the most conservative natives to leave, and the most liberal to stay or move in. A 
geographically polarized public opinion requires new policies to strengthen multi-ethnic social 
cohesion, such as those aimed at preventing clusters of native citizens in the form of ghettos. 
Second, the case of Brussels suggests that immigration does not necessarily increase anti-
immigrant sentiment. The rise of anti-immigrant sentiment outside of Brussels appears to be a 
product of the internal migration of native citizens, not immigrants. These findings offer a novel 
perspective to previous studies claiming that citizens’ perception of threat is a product of the size 
of the out-group (for instance, Coenders and Scheepers 1998; 2008; Kaya and Karakoç 2012; 
Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008). As immigrants increase their numbers in other large and medium-
size cities, citizens with strong anti-immigrant sentiments are expected to move into increasingly 
small localities.  
Third, in contrast to the case of Madrid, evidence from Brussels suggests that immigrants’ 
enfranchisement has impacted the distribution of political power without necessarily changing 
public attitudes toward immigration. Further research needs to examine how political parties in 
Brussels have responded to immigrants’ access to political rights and the extent to which they have 





This chapter clarifies the role of political and demographic processes in the low manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment. Evidence from Madrid allows me to explain the limited salience of anti-
immigrant sentiment as a product of immigrants’ enfranchisement. Ethnographic fieldwork in two 
localities with different percentages of enfranchised immigrants indicates that political parties’ 
approach immigration with a dual discourse. In order to chase the immigrant vote, political parties 
de-nationalize membership by drawing parallels between native and immigrant communities; they 
de-problematize immigration by aligning their interests with those of the enfranchised immigrant 
community. I argue that natives’ exposure to political parties’ pro-immigration discourse is 
expected to contain anti-immigrant sentiment.    
 Immigrants’ lack of political rights motivates the opposite form of organizational behavior. 
In Badalona, where most immigrants do not have political rights, Partido Popular’s electoral 
campaign focused on the association between immigration and crime. As political parties respond 
to immigrants’ lack of political power with restrictive immigration rhetoric, I argue that they 
encourage native citizens to view immigration as a threat to the citizenry, the nation-state, and the 
social order. 
 I provide additional evidence of the significance of immigrants’ political rights by 
comparing Partido Popular’s 2011 discourse in Badalona to the 1980 electoral campaign of  
Convèrgencia i Unió in Catalonia. In the 1980s, immigrants from other Spanish regions 
represented 14% of the population in Catalonia, but as Spanish citizens, they all had voting rights. 
The Partido Popular’s renationalization of membership in Badalona contrasts to Convèrgencia i 
Unió’s inclusive discourse three decades earlier. Although it is critical to note the differences 
between internal and international migrants in terms of their visibility, cultural background, etc. 
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the distinctive alignment of both parties on the immigration issue stresses the significance of 
immigrants’ enfranchisement.  
 Evidence from Belgium presents a different relationship between immigrants’ political 
inclusion and the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment. A preliminary approach to the 
object of study suggests that Brussels’ high immigration and liberal values drive its low anti-
immigrant sentiment. A closer examination of inter-regional processes indicates that Brussels’ 
high immigration has motivated internal flows to other regions in the country and polarized public 
attitudes. Since the late 1980s, Brussels exhibits a positive in-flow of foreign-born nationals, and 
an out-migration flow of Belgian citizens (Deboseere et al. 2009). I argue that these population 
flows explain the prevalence of liberal political values and the low manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  
Future research is required to examine the extent to which the mechanisms I have observed 
in Brussels and Madrid are generalizable to other immigrant destinations. In Spain, I have focused 
my analysis on the performance of two political parties, but other parties may not necessarily 
respond to immigrants’ enfranchisement in the same manner. I am not able to control for cross-
regional differences in the demographic composition of the immigrant population, which could 
also explain part of the attitudinal gap. Moreover, as much as the immigration issue was salient in 
the 2011 local elections, it might not be as important in the future. In Belgium, I have focused my 
analysis on macro-level demographic processes, but I have not examined the alignment of political 
parties on the immigration issue before and after immigrants had access to political rights. As 
immigrants and ethnic minorities represent an increasing percentage of the population and the 
electorate, knowledge of how demographic and political processes affect public opinion and inter-




ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AS A MATERIAL THREAT19 
 
The economic competition literature accounts for anti-immigrant sentiment as a result of labor 
market scarcity (see section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2). This chapter uses evidence from Andalusia and 
Wallonia to evaluate the significance of labor market competition in regions exhibiting strong 
manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat. My analysis shows the extent to 
which the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is tied to citizens’ perception of 
immigrants as: a) labor market competitors; and b) greater recipients than contributors to the 
welfare state. I contribute to prevailing theories by providing evidence of inter-ethnic competition 




Scholars have long conceived the labor market as one of the main epicenters for inter-ethnic 
contention (Allport 1954). Already in The Nature of Prejudice, Allport argued:  
It is often said that Negroes constitute a realistic threat to the lower classes of white people, 
since both are competing for lower class jobs. (…) To say that the conflict is ‘realistic’ in 
this case means nothing more than that the contestants view the rivalry as an ethnic matter. 
                                                          
19 This chapter is based on Zamora-Kapoor, A. (2013) ‘Competing for Jobs or Welfare? Patterns of Inter-ethnic 
Contention in Belgium and Spain’, currently under review at Migration Studies. This has been invited to the 
conferences How Global Migration Changes the Workforce Diversity Equation, at the University of California – 
Los Angeles, May 2013, and the 25th Annual Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, 
University of Milan, June 2013.  
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When immigrant or Negro strikebreakers are brought into a plant the hostility toward these 
‘job snatchers’ becomes structured as ethnic, although the color or national origin of the 
offenders is merely incidental to the economic clash involved. (1954: 230).  
A part of the native population perceives that immigrants’ participation in the labor market takes 
away jobs that would otherwise be available to their native unemployed or underemployed peers 
(Citrin et al. 1997). Although many studies have shown that native citizens and immigrants do not 
really compete for the same jobs (Piore 1979; Sassen 1988), the ethnic competition hypothesis has 
generated a literature of its own (section 2.1.1 in Chapter 2). This chapter builds upon this literature 
in order to examine the extent to which labor market competition underlies the material 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia.  
 The question I seek to answer is: What drives the material manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia? I begin by contextualizing international migration in 
Andalusia and Wallonia from a historical perspective. The regional demand of labor legitimized 
international migration flows during the 1990s-early 2000s in Andalusia and between the 1950s 
and the early 1970s in Wallonia. Two different economic recessions left unemployed an important 
percentage of the native and the immigrant population, and have exposed a structural shift in the 
regional economy: its post-industrialization.   
I examine the extent to which the scarcity of labor market opportunities has laid the ground 
for citizens’ identification of international migration with a material threat. I combine survey data 
and semi-structured interviews to reveal that, in addition to the native-immigrant labor market 
competition, anti-immigrant sentiment in these two regions is tied to immigrants’ receipt of 
welfare benefits. In both cases, I observe that citizens view immigrants as greater recipients than 
contributors to the welfare state, and perceive welfare state generosity as an element encouraging 
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international migration. Next, I outline parallel processes contributing to the containment of anti-
immigrant sentiment. In Wallonia, I stress the significance of guest-workers’ employment in 
sectors that facilitated their identification with native citizens, such as; mining, as well as the low 
mobilization of the radical right. In Andalusia, I emphasize the significance of current out-
migration flows of both native citizens and immigrants, as a result of Spain’s stagnant economy.  
Following the discussion of findings, I evaluate an alternative explanation based on 
citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat. In both cases, I observe that regional 
understandings of membership based on civic terms are compatible with cultural diversity. 
International migration does not appear to challenge, per se, the Andalusian or the Walloon 
identity and culture. To conclude, I synthesize the main contribution and limitations of my 
analysis, and suggest new policy to strengthen multi-ethnic social cohesion in socio-economic 
terms.     
 
5.2. Immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation in Andalusia and Wallonia 
Andalusia and Wallonia are economically-deprived regions with below-average incomes and 
above-average immigration rates. Historically, Andalusia has been one of Spain’s poorest and 
most unequal regions in the country. As Calavita and Suárez-Navaz (2003: 106) put it:  
it [Andalusia] has been dominated by a few quasi-feudal landowners (latifundistas), with 
the mass of the population impoverished peasants who have been described as ‘the most 
wretched class in Europe’ (Carr and Fusi Aizpurua 1979: 8)  
Andalusia and Wallonia’s exposure to immigration and cultural diversity took place in a Zeitgeist 
characterized by a structural demand of low-skilled labor (Piore 1979). In Andalusia, immigration 
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became a Durkhemian social fact in the 1990s, when its growing agricultural and tourist industries 
demanded seasonal low-skilled labor. Initially, labor market integration policies were not deemed 
necessary, because as an Economics Professor argues: “Everyone who arrived to Spain found a 
job”. Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, immigration contributed to the national economy by 
complementing the native labor force with low-skilled labor, which, in turn, allowed the economic 
growth and infrastructural development of one of the largest regions in the country (Olivier-Alonso 
2008).  
Andalusia was, however, one of the first regions in Spain to witness inter-ethnic conflict. 
It took place in El Ejido (Almería), a locality specialized in the industrial production of fruits and 
vegetables, and structurally dependent on low-skilled immigrant labor (Zapata-Barrero 2003b). In 
February of 2000, a Moroccan citizen slayed an Andalusian woman, triggering an unprecedented 
manifestation of anti-immigrant violence. In a matter of hours, native citizens attacked the 
dwellings hosting seasonal migrant laborers in the town’s outskirts, leaving injured 20 Moroccan 
migrants (Nash 2000). A micro-level incident turned into a collective exercise of boundary-making 
(Lamont and Molnár 2002; Tilly 2004). The salience of this event, first in its kind, signaled that 
the economic perks of immigration were evolving, hand in hand, with novel forms of inter-ethnic 
contention.    
The main different between Andalusia and Wallonia is chronological: Wallonia received 
international migration throughout the 1950s and 1960s, while Andalusia did not witness a 
comparable inflow until the 1990s. In Wallonia, immigration arrived through guest-worker 
programs. The concept of ‘guest-worker’ transmitted an understanding of immigration in strictly 
utilitarian terms. Belgian scholars (for instance, Caestecker 2000) argue that the guest-worker 
model established a hierarchical relationship between natives and immigrants in the labor market:  
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“This so-called guest-worker system (…) attempted to funnel immigrants into undervalued 
segments of the labor market by means of work permits” (Caestecker 2000: x).  
Wallonia’s guest-worker program lasted more than two decades, and brought thousands of workers 
from Southern Europe, Northern Africa, ex-Yugoslavia, and Turkey (Lesthargue 2000; Suárez-
Orozco 1994). Table 5.1 (Foreign-born populations in Belgium, in thousands, 1947-1991) shows 
that the largest in-flows came from Southern Europe (Italy and Spain), Northern Africa and the 
Middle East (Morocco and Turkey), and neighbor countries (France and the Netherlands). The 
effects of the early 1970s international oil crisis motivated the conclusion of the guest-worker 
program in 1974 (Castles 1986).  
< Table 5.1 about here > 
Since then, the Walloon industry has been unable to maintain employed a large percentage 
of its native and immigrant populations. According to Suárez-Orozco:  
“Industries such as coal, textiles, and metalwork, which once recruited large numbers of 
legal foreign workers from Southern Europe and North Africa, have suffered severely since 
the 1970s” (1994: 238).  
A macro-economic transformation limited immigrants’ opportunities to work, and brought to the 
fore a novel discussion about immigrants’ role in the region. A critical element of this discussion 
concerned immigrants’ entitlement to welfare benefits (Ireland 2004). This situation illustrates the 
conflicting premises of state regulations I presented in Chapter 1, between the functional 
understanding of the immigrant as labor, and the immigrant as a subject entitled to rights. The 
parameters determining immigrants’ access to economic rights have become increasingly 
contentious over time, especially as the second and third generations of ethnic minorities are as 
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eligible to welfare as the descendants of native citizens (Sainsbury 2012). In some countries, like 
the United States, access to welfare is tied to citizenship, and immigrants are, per se, excluded 
from such resources (Zolberg 2006). In most European countries immigrants are eligible to receive 
welfare benefits, but a segment of the native citizenry does not deem it fair. In corporatist welfare 
states like Belgium and Spain, all workers in the formal economy are eligible to receive 
unemployment benefits, and by law, they are entitled to holidays, illness and family leaves, and 
disability compensations (Esping-Anderson 1990). Additionally, all residents, regardless of their 
employment or legal status20, are potential recipients of welfare from the means-tested safety net 
(Rodríguez-Planas 2012).  
Based on previous studies (Coenders and Scheepers 1998; Coenders et al. 2008; Kaya and 
Karakoç 2012; Scheepers et al. 2002; Scheve and Slaughter 2001), Andalusians’ and Walloons’ 
perception of immigration as a material threat could be based on native-immigrant labor market 
competition. Table 5.2 (Unemployment rates by region and citizenship status, 2011) illustrates that 
Andalusia and Wallonia stand out for their above-average unemployment rates among the national, 
EU, and non-EU immigrants. In Andalusia, for instance, the current unemployment rate among 
national citizens is close to 30 percent, and about 40 percent among its non-EU citizens. In 
Wallonia, unemployment is about 9 percent among nationals and 29 percent among non-EU 
citizens. Albeit these two labor markets are not directly comparable, their high unemployment 
rates suggests that citizens in these two regions are especially likely to view immigrants as labor 
market competitors.    
< Table 5.2 about here > 
                                                          
20 Undocumented immigrants cannot benefit from public healthcare, education, and welfare state benefits to the 
same extent than documented immigrants.  
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Cross-regional differences in labor market participation have a direct effect on household 
income. Figure 5.1 (Percentage of low-income households by region in Belgium and Spain, 2002-
2010) indicates that Andalusia and Wallonia have the highest regional percentages of low-income 
households. Cross-regional differences in the distribution of low-income households anticipates 
that, independent of international migration flows, welfare benefits will be scarcer in Andalusia 
and Wallonia, than in other Spanish and Belgian regions. The most successful strategy to reduce 
welfare scarcity consists of increasing employment rates.  
< Figure 5.1 about here > 
Governments seek to increase immigrants’ employment rates through the implementation 
of labor market integration policies21. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (2011) provides 
country-level estimates to compare state efforts in four different dimensions: a) access to 
employment and self-employment in the public and private sectors; b) general support to 
education programs and vocational training; c) targeted support to reduce unemployment amongst 
the immigrant population, with especial emphasis on women and young adults; and d) rights to 
unionize, receive social security benefits, and prevent discrimination at work22. Table 5.3 (Labor 
market integration policies in Belgium and Spain, 2007) shows that Spain has implemented 
stronger policies than Belgium in most of these dimension. Yet, the problem of today’s labor 
market integration policies is that they use a common national-level framework to tackle an 
unevenly distributed problem. I believe that, due to cross-regional differences in the structure of 
                                                          
21 This paragraph is based on Zamora-Kapoor, Anna and Escandell, Xavier (2012) “The Role of Labor Market 
Integration Policies on Public Attitudes toward Immigration” (R&R - International Journal of Comparative 
Sociology). For more details on MIPEX methodology, see: http://www.mipex.eu/methodology 
22 The scores for each dimension come from indexes that combine multiple indicators. 
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the labor market, it would be beneficial to transfer part of these competences to regional 
governments.  
< Table 5.3 about here > 
In sum, this section has sought to introduce the immigration phenomenon in the Andalusian 
and the Walloon contexts. An increasingly post-industrial economy has reduced the 
competitiveness of regional industries, and shrunk the labor market opportunities for natives and 
immigrants alike. The material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appears to be a response 
to increasing economic scarcity. In the next section, I evaluate the extent to which the material 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is tied to scarcity in the labor market and the welfare 
state.  
 
5.3. Competition for jobs or welfare?  
I begin my analysis with data from the survey question: “Do you think that immigrants take away 
jobs or create new jobs?”. As I have done with other survey questions above, I break down the 
original 0-10 scale into three main categories, in order to capture robust attitudinal differences: a) 
take away jobs (0-4), indifferent (5), or create new jobs (6-10). Table 5.4 (Perception of immigrants 
as job competitors in Belgium, 2002) shows that already in 2002, 51% of the population in 
Wallonia viewed immigrants as job competitors. This percentage contrasts to the cases of Brussels 
(37%) and Flanders (38%), where the majority of respondents perceived immigrants as neither job 
competitors nor job creators.    
< Table 5.4 about here > 
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Evidence from Andalusia indicates a different trend. Table 5.5 (Perception of immigrants 
as job competitors in Spain, 2002) shows that, in 2002, only 31% of Andalusians thought that 
immigrants were taking away their jobs. Citizens in Catalonia and Madrid exhibited slightly higher 
percentages, 33% and 36% respectively. Most Andalusians (41%) responded that immigrants were 
actually creating jobs, and complementing the native labor force. These attitudes are not surprising 
if we take into consideration that Spain was growing somewhere between 3-4% every year in the 
early 2000s (OCED 2012). Indeed, the positive perception of immigration at that time should be 
viewed as a sign of citizens’ knowledge of immigrants’ economic contribution. In contrast to these 
data, evidence from the mid-2000s onwards illustrates the impact of the economic crisis, and 
citizens’ increasing identification of immigrants with labor market competitors.    
< Table 5.5 about here > 
Data from the Observatorio Permanente Andaluz [Andalusian Permanent Observatory] 
provide evidence of what Andalusians consider the most positive and negative effects of 
immigration throughout the 2005-2010 period. Figure 5.2 (Positive effects of immigration in 
Andalusia, 2005-2010) shows that 40% of Andalusians used to view ‘labor supply’ as the main 
positive contribution of immigration in 2005 and 2008, but only 25% agreed with this statement 
in 2010. At the same time, 25% of Andalusians thought that there were ‘few or no positive aspects’ 
associated with immigration in 2008, and this percentage increased to more the 35% by 2010.  
These attitudinal shifts underlie the significance of macro-economic processes in the fluctuation 
of public attitudes.  
< Figure 5.2 about here > 
Figure 5.3 (Negative effects of immigration in Andalucía, 2005-2010) shows that before 
the economic crisis 35% (2005) and 40% (2008) of the population saw ‘public safety’ as the most 
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important negative consequence of immigration. This percentage decreased to 25% by 2010. In 
parallel, while only 30% of the population used to view immigrants as ‘labor market competitors’ 
in 2005 and 2008, this percentage increased to 45% by 2010. These attitudinal shifts confirm 
previous studies stressing the magnitude of macro-economic variables (Semyonov et al. 2006; 
Sides and Citrin 2007) and indicate that a segment of the Andalusian population views immigrants 
as labor market competitors.   
< Figure 5.3 about here > 
Andalusians that only completed primary studies are those most likely to perceive 
immigrants as job competitors (Figure 5.4: ‘Immigrants take away our jobs’ by level of education, 
2010). Citizens that have completed secondary studies exhibit slightly less hostile attitudes than 
those that only completed primary studies, and those that have completed a college degree mostly 
disagree with this statement altogether. These results confirm extant research on the explanatory 
power of human capital (See section 2.1.2, in Chapter 2). As education has a positive effect on 
citizens’ perception of immigration, the perception of immigrants as labor market competitors is 
especially prevalent among the low-educated.      
< Figure 5.4 about here > 
In addition to citizens’ perception of immigrants as labor market competitors, I find that 
mechanisms of economic redistribution exacerbate inter-ethnic contention. A Sociology Professor 
explains the dual manifestation of economic scarcity:    
“Whatever they [immigrants] do is wrong; if they work, they steal our jobs, but if they 
don’t, they steal our social benefits”.  
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A former politician explains that inter-ethnic contention in the labor market and the welfare state 
is expected to emerge in the most economically-deprived areas:  
“People who live in neighborhoods with a high density of immigration have seen that 
public services have collapsed, because the government has not invested enough 
resources.”23  
Data from the European Social Survey show that citizens’ perception of immigrants as undeserving 
recipients of benefits is most salient in Andalusia and Wallonia. Again, I have re-coded the original 
0-10 scale into a three-category ordinal variable; respondents whose scores fall between 0 and 4 
perceive immigrants as ‘free riders’, 5 ‘undecided’, and scores between 6 and 10 view immigrants 
as ‘contributors’. Tables 5.6 (Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Spanish 
welfare state, 2008) and 5.7 (Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Belgian 
welfare state, 2008) illustrate that citizens’ perception of immigrants’ welfare state contribution 
overlaps with their perception of a material threat. In both cases, I obtain statistically significant 
chi squares. In Spain, 58% of Andalusians perceived immigrants as undeserving welfare state 
recipients. This percentage is higher than Catalonia’s (53%) and Madrid (42%), and it is likely to 
increase as the current economic crisis prevails. Similarly, in Belgium, 56% of Walloons view 
immigrants as welfare free-riders. This percentage is the second highest in the country, following 
Flanders (59%), and higher than Brussels (45%). The high percentage of Flemish viewing 
immigrants as welfare state freeloaders requires further analysis.  
< Tables 5.6 and 5.7 about here > 
                                                          
23 Original quote in Spanish: “La gente que vive en los barrios con mas inmigración ha visto que los servicios 
públicos se han colapsado, porque el gobierno no ha invertido lo suficiente”.  
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There are also significant within-country attitudinal differences in how citizens’ perceive 
the relationship between welfare state generosity and international migration at the macro level. 
Tables 5.8 (Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Spain, 2008) 
and 5.9 (Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Belgium, 2008) 
illustrate to what extent Belgian and Spanish citizens believe that immigration responds to a 
welfare state magnet (Borjas 1994). Over 75% of Andalusians either agree or strongly agree with 
the notion that the welfare state system drives international migration. Between 60 and 65% of 
citizens in Catalonia and Madrid either agree or strongly agree with this idea. In Belgium, I observe 
the same pattern; more than 70% of Walloons either agree or strongly agree with the idea that 
welfare benefits encourage immigration, while these percentages are slightly lower in Brussels 
(57%) and Flanders (53%).  
< Tables 5.8 and 5.9 about here > 
What remains to be resolved is: How to make compatible the principles of international 
migration with those of the welfare state? For some scholars, this is an unattainable task (Freeman 
1986). Others argue that the main challenge comes from the negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity 
on public support toward economic redistribution (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Eger 2010; Fox 
2004; 2012). The main problem of this discussion is that it relies upon an inaccurate assumption: 
immigrants receive more than what they contribute. Evidence from several studies provide data 
that directly contradicts this claim, and show that immigrants put in much more than what they 
take out from the welfare state (Bommes and Geddes 2000; Moreno-Fuentes and Bruquetas-
Callejo 2011). In the conclusion, I come back to this gap between citizens’ perceptions and the 
socio-economic reality to propose new policy aimed at informing the native citizenry about 
immigrants’ contribution to the national economy.  
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Overall, my findings indicate that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 
is tied to native-immigrant competition for scarce resources in the labor market and the welfare 
state. This evidence offers complementary insights to the economic competition literature by 
revealing the significance of economic redistribution mechanisms. Moreover, it brings to the fore 
the tension between the economic and the human rights’ premises of immigration regulations. 
Immigrants’ access to scarce resources challenges the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion that 
characterize the modern nation-state (Benhabib 2004; Sassen 1999; 2006; Wimmer 2002). As the 
economic recession continues, the percentage of low-income households is expected to increase 
across Belgian and Spanish regions. Andalusia and Wallonia are the regions where I expect the 
scarcity for both jobs and welfare to be most prominent. In parallel to the main drives of anti-
immigrant sentiment as a material threat, I identify regional processes contributing to the 
containment of inter-ethnic contention.  
 
5.4. Containing Anti-immigrant Sentiment 
This section takes a step back to present the contextual processes that contribute to the containment 
of anti-immigrant sentiment in Andalusia and Wallonia. These processes are less obvious, because 
their effects are overshadowed by the native-immigrant competition for economic resources. In 
Wallonia, I observe that the nature of guest-workers’ labor market participation and the low 
electoral success of the radical right have contributed to the containment of citizens’ hostility. In 
Andalusia, I argue that the devastating effects of the current economic crisis have motivated out-
migration flows, and these, in turn, have de-problematized immigration. As the country’s shrinking 
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economy has turned into a greater priority than all other socio-economic concerns, citizens have 
maintained a constant degree of anti-immigrant sentiment in spite of increasing scarcity.   
While the European Social Survey indicates that Walloons perceive immigration as a 
material threat to a greater extent than Belgians in any other region, immigration experts do not 
view inter-ethnic contention as a problem. According to a Sociology Professor:  
“Even if they [Belgians] are skeptical of immigration in both regions, when people think 
about the negative perception of immigration in Belgium, they think of Flanders”.  
Contemporary manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appear to be a product of the gap 
between citizens’ perceptions and the Walloon socio-economic reality. As a Political Science 
Professor explains:   
“Everyone is on the same boat. There are no jobs [in Wallonia], and if immigrants come 
for labor reasons, they are not a threat because there aren’t jobs.” 
Experts associate the low problematization of immigration in Wallonia with the nature of guest-
workers’ labor market participation and the low mobilization of the radical right. Most guest-
workers were originally employed in the Walloon mines and industries, which facilitated the 
identification between natives and immigrants. A Sociology Professor explains:  
“In the mines, everyone is black”.  
Then, he elaborates:  
“The trade unions played a role in reassuring that all miners were members, to create 
networks of solidarity”.  
This phenomenon was not exclusive to Walloon case. A Political Science Professor explains the 
significance of this claim in the province of Limburg (Flanders):  
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“In Flanders, the only area with high immigration and low support for the radical right is 
Limburg, and this is because of its mining industry.” 
When I ask him to clarify in what way was the mining industry discouraged citizens’ hostility, he 
explained:  
“They shared real life common experiences, they were all working class.”  
These insights stress the importance of immigrants’ labor market participation in the strengthening 
of social cohesion. As most scholarship relating anti-immigrant sentiment to economic 
competition has stressed the significance of labor market status, future research could benefit from 
taking into consideration the labor market sectors where immigrants work.  
The weak political mobilization of the radical right; Front National has also contributed to 
the low problematization of immigration in Wallonia, vis-à-vis Flanders. My interviewees 
emphasize the significance of three main elements explaining the limited success of the Front 
National, versus the Vlaams Belang: a) organizational strategy; b) size of the niche in the regional 
political spectrum; and c) interest of the media. First, the Vlams Belang has historically counted 
with a hierarchical organizational structure with charismatic politicians, such as Filip De Winter, 
Karel Dillen, or Frank Van Hecke (Hossay 2002; Swyngedouw 1998). According to a Sociology 
professor:      
“The Vlaams Belang has always been organized as a Stalinist party: the top decides what 
the bottom does”.  
At the same time, previous studies claim that the Front National never had a comparable 
organization, long-term vision, or charismatic leadership (Swyngedouw 1998).  
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Secondly, my interviewees shed light on the different size of the anti-immigrant niche. 
According to a Political Science Professor:  
“Anti-immigration feelings [in Wallonia] were expressed but also controlled within 
traditional parties.”  
As mainstream parties in Wallonia incorporated part of the restrictive immigration discourse into 
their program, they limited the political space of the radical right. In Flanders, however, the Vlaams 
Belang managed to capture the anti-immigrant niche as well as the votes from citizens frustrated 
with the political system (Hossay 2002). A Political Science Professor explains:  
“Traditional parties did not recognize the effects of immigration or globalization. They 
[Vlaams Belang] targeted voters with skeptical views toward immigration and the political 
system. They viewed political parties as part of the problem of contemporary society, not 
the solution.” 
The wide niche of the Flemish radical right facilitated access to increasing electoral support and 
Parliamentary representation. Due to the narrow niche of the Front National, they never managed 
to accomplish similar goals.  
Third, due to its limited electoral appeal, the media has not paid much attention to Front 
National. This has inevitably affected their visibility. A Sociology Professor clarifies:    
“The Front National can meet and deliver as many speeches as they want, but the media 
won’t report it”.  
Later, she continues:    
“There is no politicization of anti-immigrant sentiment, by either political parties or the 
media, in the Francophone side”.  
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In sum, evidence from Wallonia indicates that both the nature of immigrants’ labor market 
incorporation and the low mobilization of the radical right have contributed to the containment of 
anti-immigrant sentiment.  
Spain presents a distinctive process of hostility containment, tied to the consequences of 
the international economic crisis. Immigrants have been disproportionately affected by the crisis, 
due to their overrepresentation in low-skilled sectors and seasonal industries (Donaire 2008). 
Between 2008 and 2009, the unemployment rate among immigrants practically doubled, from 18.7 
to 30.6 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). Across the country, immigrants living in 
Andalusia noticed the effects of the crisis to a greater extent than their peers in other regions of the 
country, and by the end of 2009, immigrants’ unemployment reached 36.9%. As a result of 
immigrants’ exponential inactivity, a large number of them have decided to leave Spain.   
Data from Eurostat illustrate the size of these out-migration flows at the national level 
(Figure 5.5: Emigration flows by citizenship in Spain, 2002-2010). Between 2002 and 2010, 
immigrants’ out-migration has increased systematically, reaching more than 350,000 in 2010. The 
effects of the economic crisis have not motivated the out-migration of native citizens to the same 
extent. I interpret this gap as a product of two factors. First, immigrants are (or used to be) 
disproportionately employed in the most vulnerable sectors of the economy; hence, they are more 
likely to be unemployed and looking for work during the economic recession. Second, immigrants 
have much lesser access to public and private economic resources than native citizens, so they are 
likely to run out of resources much faster than native citizens. Yet, if the economic recession 
continues, I expect natives to increasingly out-migrate as well.   
< Figure 5.5 about here > 
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Figure 5.6 (Emigration from Spain by continent of origin, 2002-2010) shows that 
Europeans and Latin Americans represent the largest out-migration flows, in comparison to 
Africans and Asians. I explain the salience of European and Latin American flows as a result of: 
a) their size, relative to the total immigrant population; and b) the labor market opportunities in 
the country of origin. For citizens from other EU member-states, leaving Spain is easy; they can 
reside and work anywhere else in the EU. For Latin Americans, the recent economic development 
of most countries in the region is offering new avenues of opportunity. Africans and Asians face 
greater challenges than Europeans and Latin Americans on average, but the economic adversities 
of staying in Spain are encouraging them to out-migrate too.  
< Figure 5.6 about here > 
A partial explanation for immigrants’ out-migration comes from the performance of the 
national government, which offered s lump sum equivalent to two years of unemployment benefits 
to immigrants without a job, interested in going back to their country. Immigrants interested in this 
deal had to give up their residency rights, and the option of coming back to Spain within the next 
three years. This initiative, implemented in September of 2008, showed the extent to which the 
Spanish government viewed immigration as a functional economic variable. Countries like Czech 
Republic and Japan have joined Spain in the implementation of such measures (McCabe et al. 
2009).   
This section has presented parallel processes contributing to the containment of anti-
immigrant sentiment in Wallonia and Andalusia. In Wallonia, I have observed the centrality of 
guest-workers’ employment and the organizational characteristics of the radical right. In 
Andalusia, I have argued that the consequences of the economic crisis have reduced the salience 
of immigration by motivating immigrants’ out-migration. Due to the lack of public opinion data 
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to evaluate this hypothesis, I have relied on evidence from previous studies as well as macro-
economic and demographic indicators. As the size of the out-group declines, anti-immigrant 
sentiment is expected to become less salient. I am confident that the publication of the 2012 
European Social Survey wave will provide individual-level data to better assess the effect of the 
economic crisis on citizens’ perception of immigration.  
 
5.5. Alternative explanation: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat 
This section examines whether citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat could be 
explaining its material manifestation in Andalusia and Wallonia. Data from in-depth interviews 
suggest that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment has led to its cultural one, and 
not the other way around. The Andalusian and Walloon inclusive notions of membership 
discourage citizens from viewing immigration as a cultural threat. A politician explains the role of 
Andalusia’s multi-ethnic heritage in the definition of its regional identity:  
“Andalusia is a melting pot. Other regions define themselves as ‘not-contaminated’ from 
other cultures. In our case it’s exactly the opposite, we are contaminated, very 
contaminated, so contaminated… [we are] a melting pot, of all cultures that have lived 
here.”24 
Another politician explains:  
                                                          
24 Original quote in Spanish: “Andalucía es un crisol de culturas. Otras regiones se definen como no-contaminadas, 
respecto a otras culturas. En nuestro caso es exactamente lo contrario, estamos contaminados, muy contaminados, 
tan contaminados… somos un crisol de culturas, de todas las culturas que han vivido aquí”.  
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“Speaking of culture implies speaking of all the cultures that have lived here… I believe 
we are the positive results of the cultural mix in Andalusia.”25  
Both quotes emphasize the ties between Andalusia today and the Al-Andalus of the Umayyad 
Caliphate, where communities of Christians, Jews, and Muslims coexisted under a common 
political system (Kennedy 1996). Andalusia’s culturally diverse identity is especially significant 
when comparing it to other subnational identities in Spain, such as the Bascs and the Catalans, 
who define membership in ethnic and cultural terms (Escandell and Ceobanu 2010).   
Most importantly, Andalusians’ anti-immigrant sentiment coexists with a generalized 
understanding of immigrants as subjects entitled to rights. According to a Law Professor:  
“The dominant political discourse in Andalusia is a discourse of citizenship based on rights, 
for both citizens and immigrants.”26  
Data from the Observatorio Permanente Andaluz de las Migraciones [Permanent Observatory of 
Immigration in Andalusia] support this claim. In 2010, more than 70% of the population agreed 
that immigrants should be able to acquire citizenship, political rights, and sponsor family members. 
This degree of social consensus allows me to better assess the relationship between the economic 
and the human rights understandings of immigration in this region. Evidence of two coexisting 
narratives presenting the immigrant as: a) material threat; and b) subjects entitled to rights, 
suggests that today’s material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is not necessarily 
exclusionist. There is nothing intrinsically contentious about international migration other than the 
                                                          
25 Original quote in Spanish: “Hablar de cultura implica hablar de todas las culturas que se han vivido aquí… creo 
que somos el resultado positive de la mezcla de culturas en Andalucía.” 
26 Original quote in Spanish: “El discurso dominante en Andalucía es un discurso de ciudadanía que se basa en 
derechos, para ciudadanos y para inmigrantes”.  
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competition for scarce resources. If this hypothesis holds true, I anticipate that anti-immigrant 
sentiment will decline as the economy recovers.    
Wallonia exhibits an inclusive understanding of membership as well. Previous studies have 
already highlighted the compatibility between Wallonia’s civic notion of membership and cultural 
diversity (Billiet et al. 2003). In this research, I have observed the low problematization of 
immigrants’ culture in Wallonia’s discursive practices in the management of immigrants’ 
integration, compared to Flanders. A Sociology Professor emphasizes that the management of 
immigrants’ integration in Flanders and Wallonia use two parallel narratives without overlap:  
“In Wallonia, people use euphemistic language not to talk about origin”.  
Then, he adds:  
“There are greater cross-regional differences in the discourse than in the policy practices. 
In Flanders, politicians say: ‘We are opening a youth center in neighborhood X, to address 
the needs of the Moroccan population’. In Wallonia, they say: ‘We open a center in 
neighborhood X for everyone’, but if this neighborhood is 90% Moroccan, then, in practice, 
you are doing the same.”     
In sum, regional understandings of membership based on civic terms suggest that citizens’ 
negative perception of immigration in Andalusia and Wallonia is not based on cultural elements. 
Extant studies and data from semi-structured interviews indicate that the cultural manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment cannot explain its material manifestation. Instead, citizens’ perception 
of immigrants as job competitors or undeserving recipients of welfare could be motivating their 





This chapter has attempted to clarify the mechanisms underlying the material manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment. I have approached the object of study from the theoretical framework 
of economic competition scholarship. The cases of Andalusia and Wallonia, in parallel to Brussels, 
Catalonia, Flanders, and Madrid, show that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 
originates from the scarcity of resources in two different institutional settings: the labor market, 
and the welfare state. This research contributes to the literature by revealing the significance of the 
welfare state system and its mechanisms of economic redistribution. Data from public opinion 
surveys and semi-structured interviews indicate that most citizens in Andalusia and Wallonia view 
immigrants as labor market competitors. Moreover, there is an exceptionally high percentage of 
the native population who views the welfare state as a structural pulling factor of international 
migration flows. I emphasize the gap between citizens’ perceptions and the economic reality, in 
order to stress the need of policies informing the native population.      
Evidence of inter-ethnic contention in relation to the welfare state offers insight into the 
conflicting ideas between immigrants as labor and as subjects entitled to inalienable rights. Semi-
structured interviews have allowed me to approach the ways in which welfare state scarcity 
generates inter-ethnic contention. My interviewees argue that localities receiving the largest 
immigration flows have suffered a detriment of their public services; governmental spending has 
increased, but not in proportion to the growing population and their growing needs. This 
demographic process, combined with the state’s limited resources, has motivated native citizens 
to view immigrants as undeserving recipients of welfare.  
With these findings, I seek to motivate a state regulation of immigration and integration 




1. Knowledge of immigrants’ economic contribution: Public opinion surveys indicate that 
citizens’ perceptions are disconnected from immigrants’ actual contribution to the national 
economy. This gap is not entirely new, and previous studies have already noted the 
importance of citizens’ information (Semyonov et al. 2004; Sides and Citrin 2007). I 
believe that regions like Andalusia and Wallonia would benefit from new policy aimed at 
informing the citizenry about the extent to which immigrants contribute to the national 
economy and the welfare state.   
 
2. Invest in destination municipalities: Localities that have received the largest immigrant 
flows have not been able to maintain the quality of public services. This has been especially 
the case in Spain, which has received about five million immigrants in only three decades 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadística 2012). Due to the uneven geographical distribution of 
immigrants, I encourage the state to invest in the most important destination regions. As 
these areas will have to adjust to a new demographic reality, this governmental investment 
is expected to discourage citizens from associating international migration with the 
impoverishment of the public sector. 
 
Knowledge of how the welfare state affects multi-ethnic social cohesion is expected to have 
important policy implications for the future of European democracies. As austerity policies 
motivate European countries to revise existing mechanisms of economic redistribution, it is critical 
to clarify the rights and duties of both natives and immigrants. In this direction, examining how 
state regulations influence anti-immigrant sentiment represents a top priority.   
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The main limitation of this research concerns the generability of findings. As I have 
exclusively focused on the cases of Andalusia and Wallonia, I am unable to assess the extent to 
which my findings can inform the structure of inter-ethnic contention anywhere else. Due to these 
regions’ structurally high unemployment rates, they offer only a partial picture of how native 
citizens view immigrants’ impact on the national economy. Moreover, my data have only allowed 
me to study anti-immigrant sentiment between 2002 and 2010. This period has been marked by an 
international economic crisis that has exacerbated the scarcity of jobs and welfare. While a unique 
historical period can unveil social processes that would go otherwise unnoticed, it also implies that 
the patterns of native-immigrant contention I have observed may change when the economy 
recovers.  
Further research is required to improve the sociological understanding of anti-immigrant 
sentiment as a material threat. This study has indicated that economic competition goes beyond 
the narrow scope of the labor market, but there could be additional epicenters of economic scarcity 
that I am not aware of. Research in this line of inquiry anticipates a promising contribution to the 






ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENT AS A CULTURAL THREAT 
 
Previous studies account for the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment with path-
dependent explanations centered on the role of nationalism. Nationalism and prevailing 
understandings of membership have been found to explain why some individuals or regions are 
more hostile towards immigrants than others (Billiet et al. 2003; Escandell and Ceobanu 2010). 
This chapter begins by explaining the limitations of extant explanations and proposes an alternative 
account based on regional regulations for immigrants’ integration. Evidence from Catalonia and 
Flanders indicates that nationalism does not encourage anti-immigrant sentiment per se, but it 
raises citizens’ expectations about immigrants’ cultural assimilation. I propose to approach anti-
immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply process, by combining data from native citizens’ 
expectations and immigrants’ enrollment in integration and language classes in the six regions 
under consideration.  
 In parallel to regional regulations for immigrants’ integration, I evaluate the role of the 
radical right in the strength of citizens’ hostility. I find that the success of the Catalan Plataforma 
per Catalunya and the Flemish Vlaams Belang is an outcome of social discontent, rather than 
racism. I also find that the political mobilization of the radical right contributes to the strengthening 
of boundaries against Muslims to a greater extent than against all other immigrant groups. Next, I 
evaluate the extent to which the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia 
and Flanders could be based on citizens’ perception of immigration as a material threat. Overall, 
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this chapter contributes to prevailing theories on the role of nationalism in the variability of inter-
ethnic contention in cultural terms. 
  
6.1. Introduction  
The sociological analysis of inter-ethnic contention has traditionally been examined through the 
lenses of ethnicity and nationalism (Brubaker 2009; Calhoun 1993). Nationalism is a tricky 
explanatory variable because of its all-encompassing nature. As Calhoun explains:  
“Most variants of nationalist rhetoric claim the nation as an always-already existing basis 
for action, whether as the continuation of ancient ethnicity or as the result of historically 
specific acts of foundation.” (1993: 214).  
Analytically, nationalism is problematic because it does not permit scholars to isolate its effects. 
In the study of anti-immigrant sentiment, previous studies claim that citizens’ identification with 
nationalist ideas encourages hostility towards the out-group (see section 2.1.3, in Chapter 2). This 
chapter builds upon this literature and attempts to complement extant studies by clarifying the 
relationship between nationalism and anti-immigrant sentiment. I argue that state regulations of 
immigrants’ integration mediate this relationship contribute to the establishment of citizens’ 
expectations. I argue that anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of the gap between citizens’ 
expectations and immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream. Evidence of this gap 
encourages me to propose a discussion about how much integration is attainable and how can state 
regulations align natives’ expectations with realistic integration outcomes.      
The specific question I seek to answer in this chapter is: What drives the cultural 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders? I begin my analysis by 
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discussing the problem of immigrants’ cultural integration in these two regions. I use public 
opinion surveys and semi-structured interviews to reveal that Catalan and Flemish citizens have 
higher expectations on immigrants’ integration than their counter-parts in other regions of Belgium 
and Spain. Data from the Immigrant Citizen Survey show that immigrants in these two regions 
take many more integration and language classes to a greater extent than their peers elsewhere. 
Yet, immigrants’ efforts do not appear to meet citizens’ expectations.   
The relative success of Plataforma per Catalunya and the Vlaams Belang suggests that the 
political mobilization of the radical right has increased citizens’ perception of immigration as a 
problem. However, interviews with immigration experts indicate that the political mobilization of 
anti-immigrant sentiment has been a response, rather than a driving factor of contemporary 
attitudes. To conclude, I argue that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment appears 
to be institutionally embedded in current integration policy frameworks. I propose to address this 
problem with policy centered on the recognition and acknowledgement of immigrants’ 
contribution to Catalan and Flemish cultural and political goals.      
 
6.2. Immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Flanders 
Catalonia and Flanders are regions with above-average incomes, a structural demand of 
international labor flows, and long-standing nation-building projects. Prevailing integration 
policies in these regions are focused on immigrants’ absorption of regional cultural symbols and 
practices. According to Kymlicka:  
“[Flanders, Catalonia, and Quebec] accept immigrants as full members of the nation, as 
long as they learn the language and history of the society. They define membership in terms 
109 
 
of participation in a common culture, open to all, rather than on grounds of ethnic descent” 
(2001: 243-244, cited in Loobuyck and Jacobs 2009: 128).  
The emphasis on the cultural incorporation of immigrants is understandable when taking into 
consideration the history of both regions. Nationalism in Catalonia today is a response to the 
political repression of Catalan culture during Francisco Franco’s dictatorship (1939-1975). As 
Laitin explains:  
“Any public use of Catalan was proscribed; it was not permitted in any form in public or 
private schools. Secret police also attempted to penetrate private life, as the Francoist state 
demanded an immediate replacement of Castilian for Catalan in virtually all domains of 
life” (1989: 302).   
The democratic transition of the late 1970s led to the rise of nationalist political parties. One of the 
main goals of these parties consisted of restoring the presence of Catalan language and culture in 
all regional institutions and in the public space. The most successful one at the polls, Convergència 
i Unió [Convergence and Union], stands for defending the interests of the Catalan nation as part 
of Spain. Under the leadership of Jordi Pujol, Convergència i Unió governed the regional office, 
Generalitat de Catalunya, between 1980 and 2003. It was in this period, when the regional 
government established Catalonia’s integration policy.   
The case of Flanders is analytically distinct. From the founding of Belgium, in 1830, until 
today, the demographic majority of the country speaks Dutch and identifies itself with Flemish 
culture. Yet, for most of the nineteenth century, Belgium’s bi-lingualism was used to highlight a 
social divide between the French-speaking elite and the Dutch-speaking peasantry. Loobuyck and 
Jacobs provide insight into this phenomenon:  
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“While the Constitution of 1831 guaranteed linguistic liberty, the Flemings were denied 
any cultural and linguistic rights for a long time. Speaking French was the key for upward 
mobility” (2009: 127) 
Consequently, the emphasis on language, cultural autonomy, and regional identity play a central 
role in Flanders’ integration policy today. Similar to Catalonia, Flanders’ cultural oppression 
motivated an institutional approach to immigration centered on immigrants’ acquisition of Flemish 
culture. In both cases, nationalism motivated regional governments to regulate integration through 
a standardized process of cultural acquisition, in agreement with Kymlicka’s quote. Now, how do 
Catalan and Flemish integration policies impact immigrants’ everyday life?  
An immigrant in Catalonia wishing to renew his residence permit needs a positive 
evaluation of his integration at the municipal level. In this evaluation (expedient d’arrelament), 
the evaluator is required to assess the immigrant’s linguistic proficiency, in addition to his 
employment status, household income, number of dependents, etc. In this context, an immigrant’s 
inability to understand Catalan could affect his/her evaluation negatively. Yet, the regional 
government (Generalitat de Catalunya) has not standardized the criteria to test an immigrant’s 
linguistic proficiency. As Catalonia is a bilingual region, there is no specification about whether 
an immigrant should demonstrate his/her linguistic skills in either Catalan, Spanish, or both 
languages. A former politician explains the unsystematic practices of today’s municipal 
evaluations:   
“I know two mayors that use different parameters to evaluate immigrants’ linguistic 
abilities. One says ‘I write a favorable evaluation when an immigrant speaks Catalan’, and 
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the other one ‘I write a favorable evaluation when an immigrant speaks either Catalan or 
Spanish.’”27  
Despite the fact that evaluation parameters are not standardized, all interviewees emphasize the 
importance of learning Catalan for social mobility:   
“Speaking Catalan is a requirement for any job in the public or private sector. Hence, it is 
essential to teach Catalan to immigrants, to prevent their social exclusion.”28   
In multiple occasions, my interviewees disassociate learning Catalan from Catalonia’s nation-
building project:  
“This happens everywhere. If you [referring to me] live in the United States and do not 
speak English, your life will be very difficult. It’s the same here.”29  
Overall, the centrality of Catalan language and culture tie Catalonia’s integration policy to the 
region’s nation-building project. Yet, it appears that there is an unclear definition of goals in the 
implementation and institutionalization of these policies. The Flemish integration policy brings 
together two premises apparently incompatible: a) cultural diversity; and b) cultural integration. 
The emphasis on cultural diversity aims to facilitate the incorporation and equal opportunities of 
socio-economically deprived ethnic minorities (allochtoon) via a network of provincial integration 
centers and municipal integration services (Pelfrene et al. 2009). Due to the oppression of Flemish 
culture during the nineteenth- and early twentieth century, there is an institutional commitment to 
                                                          
27 Original quote in Catalan: “Conec dos alcaldes que fan servir paràmetres diferents per evaluar si un immigrant 
parla la llengua o no. Un diu: ‘jo faig una evaluació positiva si l’immigrant parla Català’, i l’altre: ‘jo faig una 
evaluació positiva si l’immigrant parla o Català o Castellà’”. 
28 Original quote in Catalan: “Parlar Català es un requisit per qualsevol feina al sector públic o privat. Per tant, és 
esencial ensenyar Català als immigrants per tal de prevenir la seva exclusió social”.  
29 Original quote in Catalan: “Això passa a tot arreu. Si tu vius a Estats Units i no parles anglès, la teva vida allà serà 
complicada. Aquí passa el mateix”.  
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protect and guarantee cultural minority rights. A Political Science Professor clarifies the meaning 
of this institutional approach:  
“They idea is: we cannot do to others what has been done to ourselves”.  
At the same time, the integration policy aims to “citizenize” (inburgering) immigrants. To 
accomplish this goal, the Flemish Government (Vlaamse Overheid) offers a civic integration 
program that consists of a social and career orientation course, basic Dutch as a second language, 
and counseling30. While this program is offered to all immigrants, only some of them are required 
to complete it, namely; non-European citizens, above 18 years of age, living in Flanders with a 
residence permit for more than three months. Immigrants’ failing to complete this program have 
to pay a fine ranging from 50 to 5,000 euros, but it will not affect their residence or citizenship 
acquisition, which is determined by the federal government (Jacobs and Rea 2007).   
With these two premises; diversity and integration, the regulation of cultural incorporation 
in Flanders combines assimilationist and multicultural elements. Loobuyck and Jacobs (2009) 
explain the rationale of the Flemish model:   
“We want to achieve social cohesion in which everyone’s particularity and cultural identity 
can prosper, but in which the current values, norms, and rule of our democratic state and 
the rule of law, remain the corner stone of Flemish society” (Flemish government 2004: 5, 
cited from Loobuyck and Jacobs 2009: 135).  
                                                          




In sum, this section has introduced the rationale of the policy frameworks for immigrants’ 
integration in Catalonia and Flanders. Next, I examine the role of these frameworks in citizens’ 
perception of immigration as a cultural threat.   
 
6.3. Citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration  
What does it mean to be integrated? Apparently, answers to this question vary from one region to 
another. Integration policies in Catalonia encourage citizens to equate immigrants’ successful 
integration to their proficiency in Catalan. A politician working for the regional government 
(Generalitat de Catalunya) explains:   
“Catalans understand that an immigrant is integrated when s/he speaks Catalan. When a 
citizen sees that a person from abroad has made the effort to learn the language, his/her 
brain opens.”31 
She continues:  
“Sometimes I wonder, in the rest of Spain, what are the elements that people use to judge 
whether an immigrant is integrated or not?”32  
A representative of an immigrants’ association concurs with the importance to learn the language, 
not only to become part of the mainstream but also to prevent discrimination:  
                                                          
31 Original quote in Catalan: “Els catalans entenen que un immigrant està integrat quan parla Català. Quan un català 
veu que un extranger ha fet l’esforç d’aprendre la llengua, el seu cervell s’obre.” 
32 Original quote in Catalan: “De vegades em pregunto, al reste d’Espanya, quins elements s’utilitzen per determinar 
si una persona està integrada o no?”.  
114 
 
“Immigrants notice this. They know that if they speak Catalan, they will have better 
opportunities to find employment or housing.”33  
Table 6.1 (Attitudes towards immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Spain, 2010) 
provides public opinion data about the extent to which citizens think that immigrants should 
maintain their culture, parts of it, or forget about it. The contrast between Catalan and Spanish 
respondents indicates that there are important within-country differences in citizens’ 
understanding of the integration process. Only 11% of Catalans think that immigrants should 
maintain their culture, versus a 38% of Spaniards. At the opposite end of the spectrum, 15% of 
Catalans and 9% of Spaniards claim that immigrants should forget about their culture of origin. 
The majority, in both cases, believes that immigrants should maintain the elements of their culture 
that do not bother natives. Catalans have higher expectations of immigrants’ integration than the 
rest of Spaniards. This gap adds to prevailing theories in the assimilation literature, which rely on 
the assumption that native citizens play a passive role in immigrants’ integration. Although these 
data do not distinguish Spanish citizens by region, they show that Catalans are especially 
demanding of immigrants’ cultural integration.   
< Table 6.1 about here > 
There are similar cross-regional differences in Belgium. A question from the European 
Values Study (2008) asks respondents to evaluate the extent to which immigrants should maintain 
their culture or take over the customs of the destination country. I re-code a 0-10 scale into an 
ordinal variables with three easy-to-interpret categories: (0-4) take over customs; (5) indifferent; 
(6-10) maintain distinctive customs. 75% of the citizens in Flanders believe that immigrants should 
                                                          
33 Original quote in Catalan: “Els immigrants ho noten això. Ells saben que si parlen Català, que tindran més 
oportunitats per trobar feina i pis”.  
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take over the customs of the country, versus 64% in Brussels and 71% in Wallonia (Table 6.2: 
Expectations of immigrants’ cultural integration in Belgium, 2008). Only 12% of the Flemish 
believe that immigrants should be able to maintain distinct customs and traditions, versus 23% in 
Brussels and 12% in Wallonia. These cross-regional differences provide insight into the extent to 
which the ‘citizenization’ emphasis of the Flemish integration policy takes precedence over the 
multicultural one.   
< Table 6.2 about here > 
The geographical extent of the Flemish integration policy is likely to transcend the borders 
of Flanders soon. A Political Science research fellow explains that the regional government plans 
to implement a novel program in which immigrants’ integration will begin at immigrants’ country 
of origin. He explains the implications of this policy for the national management of immigration:  
“It will be a strange situation if it is adopted, because immigration is a competence of the 
Belgian government. Once an immigrant gets accepted [by the Belgian embassy at the 
country of origin], they [representatives at the Belgian embassy] will say: “If you want to 
go to Flanders, this [list of requirements] is what you will have to do, but if you want to go 
to Wallonia, go ahead”. 
Recent data from the Eurobarometer (2011) provide additional evidence to evaluate citizens’ 
expectations. A survey question asked respondents how they envision the future of cross-cultural 
relations. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show that Catalans and Flemish are more skeptical populations about 
the future of multi-ethnicity than citizens in Andalusia, Brussels, Madrid, and Wallonia. Table 6.3 
(Expectations of cross-cultural relations in Belgium, 2011) indicates that 43% of the population in 
Flanders believe that they will get worse, compared to 33% of the population in Brussels and 37% 
in Wallonia. In turn, only 7% believes that they will get better, while these percentages are much 
116 
 
higher both in Brussels, with 26% or in Wallonia, with a 13%. The skepticism of the Flemish 
shows that a large percentage of the population questions the extent to which immigrants’ cultural 
integration is attainable. I argue that the gap between their expectations and immigrants’ efforts to 
enroll in integration and language classes may explain this degree of skepticism.  
< Table 6.3 about here > 
A similar pattern occurs in Spain. In Catalonia, 30% of its citizens anticipate that cross-
cultural relations will be worse in the future. In parallel, only 17.3% of the population in Madrid 
and 14.1% of the population in Andalusia believe that cross-cultural relations will deteriorate in 
the near future. At the same time, 15.9% of Catalans expect cross-cultural relations to improve, 
which is slightly more than in Andalusia (12.4%) and lower than in Madrid (21.8%). These data 
indicate that Flemish and Catalan citizens have a much more negative pre-disposition towards 
cross-cultural relations than their peers in other regions of the country.  
< Table 6.4 about here > 
Next, the question is: where do these negative expectations come from? Most of my 
interviewees point out the significance of immigrants’ integration. According to a former 
politician:  
“Immigration is not the problem, but [the problem is] the integration of the second 
generation”.   
A Sociology Professor from Flanders explains:  
“The same people who have negative attitude toward newcomers, are those who have the 
negative attitude towards integration”.  
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Not all of my interviewees concurred with the importance of integration policies. A Political 
Science Professor explains:  
“The different policies and the different perceptions go back to the history of the Flemish 
national movement. So when you say: Why is it cultural? I say, it comes from there”.  
A Sociology Professor also alludes to the significance of nationalism:  
“I don’t want to overestimate the role of these policies in the perceptions. The knowledge 
of these policies by the public is minimal. For me, there are deeper grounds”.  
Interviewees’ interpretation recalls Calhoun’s (1993) notion of nationalism as an all-encompassing 
phenomenon. While nationalism is undoubtedly an important explanatory element, it is insufficient 
to explain regional phenomenon such as the high percentage of Walloons (71%) claiming that 
immigrants should take over customs of the destination country. I view this high percentage in a 
region without a nation-building project as a sign that nationalism alone cannot explain differences 
in citizens’ expectations. Instead, I interpret Walloons’ high expectations of immigrants’ 
integration as a product of an integration policy centered on cultural assimilation, and the indirect 
effect of a manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat. Further research is 
required to assess this claim.  
An approach to immigrants’ integration as a demand-supply process provides evidence to 
explain the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders as a 
product of citizens’ expectations. So far, I have discussed the demand side of this problem, 
represented by native citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. But what about the supply-
side? To what extent do immigrants respond to citizens’ expectations? I approach immigrants’ 
interest in becoming part of the cultural mainstream with the only survey to my knowledge that 
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approaches this topic by interviewing immigrants: the Immigrant Citizen Survey. This survey 
provides evidence of immigrants’ living conditions in fifteen European cities, among which, there 
are five capitals of this study’s six research sites: Antwerp (Flanders), Barcelona (Catalonia), 
Brussels (Brussels), Madrid (Madrid), and Liège (Wallonia). Although the comparison does not 
include the case of Andalusia, I believe that data for the other five cases offers informative insights 
into within-country differences in immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream.     
Data from the Immigrant Citizen Survey indicate that immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders 
are much more enrolled in language and integration courses than their counterparts in the other 
three cities. Figure 6.1 (Have you started or completed an integration or language course?) shows 
that 40% of the immigrant population in Antwerp and Barcelona are formally enrolled in an 
integration or language course, while this percentage is much lower in Madrid (32%), Liège (23%), 
and Brussels (19%). It is not entirely surprising to observe such differences. Since a segment of 
the immigrant population in Flanders is obliged to attend integration and language classes, it is 
normal to find that they are much more enrolled than immigrants in Brussels or in Liège. What I 
find counter-intuitive is that immigrants’ integration efforts are inversely related to how citizens 
perceive their integration; in Antwerp and in Barcelona, where most immigrants are enrolled in 
language classes, citizens perceive that cross-cultural relations will get worse in the future. At the 
same time, immigrants’ low enrollment in language and integration classes in the other three cities 
does not appear to impact citizens’ perception of immigrants’ integration. I argue that the 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat emerges from this gap; between the 
high expectations of Catalans and Flemish citizens and the immigrants’ insufficiently high 
enrolment in language and integration classes.   
< Figure 6.1 about here > 
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 Immigrants’ interest in integration and/or language courses is partly driven by their 
linguistic difficulties. Figure 6.2 (Did you have a problem learning the language?) indicates that 
most immigrants with linguistic difficulties find themselves in Barcelona (57%), Liège (52%), 
Antwerp (50%), Brussels (44%), and Madrid (31%). The high percentages of Barcelona and 
Antwerp are not surprising. But I find interesting the cases of Liège and Brussels. In these two 
cases, less than half of those who are experiencing problems learning the region’s language are 
enrolled in a language class. Yet, citizens in these regions do not view immigrants’ integration as 
a problem. In Barcelona and Antwerp, immigrants’ difficulty in learning the regional language is 
driving their high enrolment in language courses. Although immigrants may not be demonstrating 
the degree of cultural integration that native citizens expect, I anticipate that their efforts and 
interest in learning Catalan and Dutch will improve their living conditions and reduce anti-
immigrant sentiment over time.  
< Figure 6.2 about here > 
In sum, this section has contributed to prevailing understandings of anti-immigrant 
sentiment as a cultural threat with a novel approach, focused on the relationship between native 
citizens’ expectations and immigrants’ efforts to become part of the mainstream. This new 
approach facilitates evaluating how citizens and immigrants relate to one another and the role of 
nationalism in the establishment of integration policy frameworks. The cultural manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment in Catalonia and Flanders appears to be a product of the gap between 
citizens’ high demands, and immigrants’ insufficiently high interest in the regional language and 
culture. Another question is whether the Catalans and the Flemish have realistic expectations about 
immigrants’ integration. The next section discusses the role of an additional factor motivating the 




6.4. Mobilization of the radical right 
Catalonia and Flanders have witnessed the relative success of the radical right, with the 
mobilization of Plataforma per Catalunya, and the Vlaams Belang respectively. This section digs 
into the historical trajectory of these two parties and use interview data to evaluate the extent to 
which they have impacted public opinion. In both cases, I find that the electoral success of the 
radical right has been a symptom of social discontent. Then, I show that these parties have shifted 
the native-immigrant boundary against one specific segment of the immigrant community: 
Muslims. Evidence from both parties’ campaigning strategies indicates that the Flemish and the 
Catalan radical right promotes Islamophobia to a greater extent than anti-immigrant sentiment.  
 Vlaams Belang represents the authoritarian wing of the Flemish nationalist movement, 
whose origins date back to WWI. Germany’s occupation of Belgium encouraged the political 
autonomy of Flanders, Flamenpolitik, and motivated the founding of the Flemish Nationalist 
Union in the early 1930s (Mielants 2006). Vlaams Belang (originally Vlaams Blok) emerged as an 
independent party in 1979, with the goals of creating an independent Flemish state, and reducing 
international migration to zero. One of my interviewees explains the importance of the party’s 
history for its legitimacy:  
“The Vlaams Belang emerged from the Flemish movement, flirted with the extreme-right, 
and then radicalized itself into its current form. Yet, the original relationship with the 
Flemish nationalist ideas gave this party a degree of credibility and legitimacy that would 
not have had otherwise.”  
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The significance of the Vlaams Belang today comes from its relative electoral success (see 
Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain) and impact on state regulations for 
immigration and immigrants’ integration (see section 4.2. in Chapter 4). This section approaches 
the role of the Vlaams Belang in citizens’ perception of immigration as a cultural threat.  
 Plataforma per Catalunya emerged in 2001, and in spite of the party’s name, it has no ties 
to the Catalan nationalist movement or Catalonia’s nation-building project. Its leader, Josep 
Anglada, used to be a member of Fuerza Nueva; a Fascist party that disappeared soon after the 
democratic transition of the early 1980s. In over a decade since its foundation, the representation 
of Plataforma per Catalunya has grown significantly, especially at the local level. It has 
participated in three municipal elections in which it has increased its political representation 
exponentially; from 1 municipal representative in 2003, to 9 in 2007, and 39 in 2011 (see Appendix 
C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain). However, it has not yet gathered sufficient votes to 
have Parliamentary representation at the regional level (Parlament de Catalunya). Due to the 
increasing electoral support of the radical right in Catalonia, I have asked my interviewees to assess 
its role in the strength of today’s anti-immigrant sentiment.   
My analysis leads to two common denominators: a) the radical right vote is a symptom of 
social discontent; and b) the discourse of the Vlaams Belang and Plataforma per Catalunya is 
islamophobic, not anti-immigrant. Extant studies signal that those most likely to vote the Vlaams 
Belang are the working class and the unemployed (Oesch 2008; Rink et al. 2009). These 
associations suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment is not a racial problem, but an economic one. 
A Political Science Professor illustrates this hypothesis in the context of Spain’s economic crisis:  
“We have a problem, which is a terrible economic crisis with a very high unemployment 
rate. Unemployment generates tremendous frustration, which is very difficult to bare from 
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a psychological point of view. When you have been unemployed for some time, a year, 
sitting at home in front of the TV, go out for a walk, and see immigrants working, then you 
think about voting Plataforma [per Catalunya]”34.   
Then, he continues:  
“I think that the votes of Plataforma per Catalunya come from this population, not from 
proper racists”35.  
This reflection disassociates racism from most citizens’ everyday life and agrees with previous 
studies claiming that the radical right vote is not an ideological one, but a vote of discontent (Billiet 
and De Witte 1995).  
A Sociology Professor argues that the radical right has not generated anti-immigrant 
sentiment, based on evidence from his own research:  
“In our study, we used the General Survey data throughout the 1990s, and found that anti-
immigrant sentiment increases the role of the Vlaams Belang, but then, this vote does not 
increase anti-immigrant sentiment any further”  
It appears that the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment in the public opinion can explain the 
success of the Flemish radical right, but not the other way around.  
Another Sociology Professor interprets the popularity of the radical right differently. For 
him, the role of the radical right has consisted of legitimizing a latent public sentiment:  
                                                          
34 Original quote in Catalan: “Tenim un problema, que es una crisi económica terrible, i amb una taxa d’atur 
elevadissima. L’atur genera una frustracio tremenda, que costa molt de suportar des d’un punt de vista psicologic. 
Quan portes un any a l’atur, quan portes un any assegut al sofá davant de la tele, surts a donar un tomb, i veus que hi 
han immigrants treballant, llavors et planteges votar a Plataforma.”  
 





“I don’t think that there is anything new. Anti-immigrant sentiment was latent, and the 
political mobilization of certain actors has made it acceptable to oppose immigration” 
In sum, evidence from interviews suggest that political parties of the radical right have voiced an 
element of social contention that preexisted their mobilization, but they have not produced inter-
ethnic contention as such.  
The second common denominator I observe concerns the Islamophobic nature of these 
parties’ narrative. In both regions, I observe that the radical right’s opposition to integration 
focuses on Muslims. The Vlaams Belang’s website provides illustrative images of the party’s anti-
Muslim discourse. Figure 6.1 (History of Belgium, 2011) portrays the history of Belgium as a 
sequence of expulsions; of the Spaniards, the French, the Dutch, and the Germans, and lastly, by 
the Muslims. Figure 6.2 (Planting Mosques, 2011) depicts two Muslim men; one of them plants 
minarets, while the second one sweeps away churches and cathedrals. 
< Figures 6.1 and 6.2 about here > 
An even more clear association comes from a sign of a Vlaams Belang demonstration, with 
the motto: “De Islam kann uw Vrijheid schaden… stop immigrantie” [Islam can damage your 
freedom… stop immigrants] (Figure 3: Demonstration of the Vlaams Belang, 2009). This motto is 
interesting because: a) presents Islam as a religion against individual freedom; and b) as a category 
that encompasses all immigrants. Immigration, equated to Islam, is identified with a phenomenon 
that challenges individual freedom.  
< Figure 6.3 about here > 
I observe the same rhetoric strategy in Catalonia. Figure 4 (Pamphlet of Plataforma per 
Catalunya, 2003) shows a woman wearing a burka under the motto: Prou! [Enough!]. Opposing 
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immigration is equivalent to opposing Muslim culture. More recently, during the electoral 
campaign of the 2011 local elections, Plataforma per Catalunya used a video that juxtaposed an 
image of Catalonia in 2011, represented by three girls jumping rope, to an imaginary Catalonia in 
2025 in which the same three girls are replaced by three women wearing burkas36. Both instances 
indicate that the radical right in these two regions is re-establishing the old native-immigrant 
boundary for a new one between Muslims and all other immigrant groups.  
Overall, this section has sought to determine the role of the radical right in the manifestation 
of anti-immigrant sentiment. There is little doubt that the mainstream narrative of the Flemish and 
the Catalan radical right is primarily a discourse against Muslims, not against all immigrant groups. 
I argue that Islamophobia is likely to influence the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment by shifting the native-immigrant boundary. This new boundary de-problematizes 
immigration from non-Muslim countries; from Europe, Latin America, or East Asia, and 
problematizes it when it concerns Muslim populations. It also provides support to previous studies 
on the nature of ethnic boundaries in Europe (Zolberg and Woon 1999).  
 
6.5. Alternative explanation: Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat 
The material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment offers an alternative explanation for its 
cultural manifestation. As previous studies and this study’s Chapter 5 show, economic scarcity has 
motivated native citizens to view immigrants as a material threat. I use data from the European 
Social Survey to evaluate the extent to which this hypothesis holds in Catalonia and Flanders. To 
accomplish this goal, I analyze the distribution of the material manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment across three main income groups. In both cases, I find: a) citizens from low income 
                                                          
36 This video is available online, at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKr9yxDDqr0 
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households are much more likely to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment than their peers in middle- 
or high-income groups; and b) most respondents in both regions are indifferent towards 
immigrants’ economic contribution.     
 Table 6.5 (Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Flanders, 2002-
2010) shows that most Flemish are indifferent towards immigrants’ economic impact. Across all 
income groups, the largest number of respondents neither view immigrants’ participation in the 
economy as a negative or a positive phenomenon. However, the working class exhibits the highest 
percentage of anti-immigrant sentiment (39%), versus the middle class (31%) and the upper-
middle class (23%). There is the opposite association between income groups and positive attitudes 
toward immigration; the upper-middle class exhibits the highest percentage of favorable attitudes 
(23%), versus the middle class (17%), and the working class (15%). Consistent results in the 
relationship between attitudes and income indicate that, in Catalonia and Flanders, citizens’ 
perception of immigration as a material threat could be explaining the cultural manifestation of 
anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the working class only. Nevertheless, the high percentage of 
indifferent respondents suggest that the economic rationale is insufficient to explain anti-
immigrant sentiment in Flanders.  
< Table 6.5 about here > 
Evidence from Catalonia exhibits a similar pattern. Table 6.6 (Anti-immigrant sentiment 
as a material threat by income in Catalonia, 2002-2010) shows that most respondents are 
indifferent towards immigration’s economic impact. This insight reveals the extent to which the 
material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is less prevalent in Catalonia and Flanders than 
in regions like Andalusia and Wallonia. Having said that, respondents from the lowest income 
group are more likely to exhibit a material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment (28%) than 
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their middle class (23%) and upper-middle class (17%) counterparts. In the case of Catalonia, I 
observe that the role of income is more significant in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment than in 
influencing positive attitudes toward immigration. 30% of working class respondents view 
immigration positively, which is almost as much as their middle and upper-middle class peers, 
which amount to 33% each.  
< Table 6.6 about here > 
Data from Catalonia and Flanders suggest that the material manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment could be explaining its cultural manifestation among the working class. Yet, the 
perception of immigration as a material threat does not offer a comprehensive explanation for 
today’s attitudinal outcomes in Catalonia and Flanders.  
Overall, this section provides evidence of the relative significance of anti-immigrant 
sentiment as a material threat in Catalonia and Flanders. Data from five waves of the European 
Social Survey show that the potential effect of this alternative explanation only concerns the 
working class. In both regions, the economically-underprivileged are more likely to hold negative 
attitudes toward immigration than their middle- and upper-middle class counterparts. Yet, most 
respondents in both regions show indifferent attitudes towards immigrants’ economic impact.  
 
6.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to contribute to the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment 
by stressing the significance of integration policy frameworks, and citizens’ expectations of 
immigrants’ integration. While previous studies claim that citizens’ perception of immigration as 
a cultural threat is a product of nationalism, my research indicates the significance of policies 
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regulating immigrants’ integration and their effects on citizens’ expectations. Citizens in regions 
with active regulations of immigrants’ integration have higher expectations than those in regions 
without such regulations.   
 My analysis has begun with a description of the Catalan and the Flemish integration 
models, both of them characterized by an institutional approach centered on language acquisition. 
I combined data from the Eurobarometer, the European Values Survey, and the Immigrant Citizen 
Survey to explain the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a demand-supply 
process. On the demand-side, I have shown that Catalan and Flemish citizens have higher 
expectations of immigrants’ integration than their peers in other regions, and are more negative 
about the evolvement of cross-cultural relations in the near future. These findings indicate that 
citizens in these regions will be more skeptical towards cultural diversity than their peers 
elsewhere, regardless of what immigrants do or where they come from. On the supply-side, I 
indicate that immigrants in Catalonia and Flanders are the most committed to take integration and 
language classes. Yet, immigrants’ interest in the regional culture does not meet the expectations 
of the Catalan and the Flemish.  
 This evidence brings up a new set of questions: how much integration can an immigrant 
realistically accomplish? And in what time frame? It appears that native citizens’ idea of 
integration is not necessarily realistic. Moving forward, I encourage scholars to think about the 
extent to which integration is attainable, in order to bring realism into citizens’ expectations, and 
in turn, reduce anti-immigrant sentiment.   
In parallel to this demand-supply process, I examine the role of the radical right. Evidence 
from both previous studies and interviews suggest that the political mobilization of the radical 
right has generated a platform to voice citizens’ discontent, but it appears to be a consequence of 
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social discontent, rather than a cause of anti-immigrant sentiment. I also observe that the 
campaigning efforts of Plataforma per Catalunya and Vlaams Belang may have contributed to the 
perception of cultural threat by shifting the native-immigrant boundary into a Christian-Muslim 
one. Evidence from the radical right’s approach to immigration and cultural diversity shows that 
these organizations promote Islamophobia to a greater extent than anti-immigrant sentiment.  
My findings encourage me to propose three main policy suggestions:  
1. Emphasize the positive impact of immigration to the Catalan and Flemish nation-
building project.  
2. Reduce citizens’ expectations from ideal to realistic attainable outcomes.  
3. Inform the native citizenry about the extent of immigrants’ efforts to become part of 
the mainstream by taking language and integration classes.   
In sum, this chapter has sought to reveal the processes underlying the manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat. In contrast to previous studies, which relate this 
perception to regional nation-building projects, I argue that regional regulations for immigrants’ 
integration play an active role in shaping citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ integration. Yet, 
further research is required to analyze the feedback processes between the characteristics of the 
institutional environment and public attitudes over time. Moreover, scholars need to examine the 
extent to which evidence from Catalonia and Flanders can be generalized to other regions. I 
anticipate that the processes I have found in Catalonia and Flanders may help explain not only the 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment in regions with nation-building projects, such as 
Quebec, but also destination countries with active integration policy frameworks centered on 







International migration represents a structural component of European societies. In 2010, the 
International Organization for Migration estimated that there were 72.1 million international 
migrants in Europe, representing 8.7% of its population37. These numbers do not include 
naturalized citizens with an immigrant background or their offspring. Cultural diversity has 
motivated a significant segment of the native population to view immigration as a threat. 
Additionally, the mobilization of the radical right is perceived by many as a sign of an emerging 
and generalized discontent. As geographical mobility prevails, anti-immigrant sentiment is 
unlikely to decline in the near future. In this dissertation, I have sought to improve the sociological 
understanding of this phenomenon.   
 
7.1. Summary of findings 
My research challenges three prevailing assumptions about the nature of anti-immigrant sentiment: 
a) that it is a product of individual-level variables; b) that it is evenly distributed within countries; 
and c) that it is manifested in a single form. The reminder of this section explains how I have 
challenged each of these assumptions with evidence from three empirical chapters.  
The significance of individual-level variables. This research reveals the institutional 
embeddedness of public attitudes toward immigration. While extant studies combine individual 




and contextual variables to predict cross-national differences in anti-immigrant sentiment, I argue 
and show that state regulations and institutions are essential to explain the emergence of anti-
immigrant sentiment. Three empirical chapters show the role of different regulations and 
institutions in the strength of anti-immigrant sentiment and its manifestation in a cultural or 
material form.  
The within-country variability of attitudes. My analysis begins with the observation that 
the variability of public attitudes toward immigration is greater across regions than across 
countries. This observation challenges prevailing formulations of anti-immigrant sentiment in the 
literature, which have traditionally used countries as units of analysis. Since most cross-national 
public opinion surveys (European Social Survey, the Eurobarometer, or the European Values 
Study) have regional-level data, I have combined them with interviews, ethnographic fieldwork, 
and socio-economic and policy indicators to explore and explain the within-country variability of 
anti-immigrant sentiment in six regions of two different countries.  
The nature of anti-immigrant sentiment. My analysis shows that some regions exhibit low 
manifestations of anti-immigrant sentiment (Brussels and Madrid), others manifest anti-immigrant 
sentiment as a threat to citizens’ socio-economic standards (Andalusia and Wallonia), and others 
present anti-immigrant sentiment as a threat to citizens’ cultural symbols and practices (Catalonia 
and Flanders). The analytical distinction between different manifestations of anti-immigrant 
sentiment allowed me to examine three parallel patterns of inter-ethnic relations in Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5, and Chapter 6.  
Chapter 4 explains the role of demographic and political variables in the low manifestation 
of anti-immigrant sentiment. I use evidence from Brussels and Madrid to indicate two parallel 
mechanisms at play. In Brussels, I observe that low anti-immigrant sentiment is a product of its 
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residents’ liberal values, high immigration, and high percentage of immigrants from other EU 
member states. Natives’ out-migration flows and the continuous in-flows of immigrants from both 
EU and non-EU countries have exacerbated within-country attitudinal differences. I argue that 
theses internal and international flows underlie today’s low manifestation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  
In Madrid, I observe that the low manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment responds to a 
top-down process, motivated by state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement and political 
parties’ interest in chasing the immigrant vote. Spain’s 1998 Civil Code and the European Union’s 
1992 Maastricht Treaty have facilitated the political enfranchisement of European and Latin 
American immigrants to a greater extent than their African and Asian peers. Ethnographic 
fieldwork during the 2011 local elections revealed that the distribution of immigrants’ 
enfranchisement encouraged political parties to use two parallel immigration discourses. In 
Madrid, political parties responded to a highly enfranchised European and Latin American 
community with a pro-immigration discourse that blurred the boundaries between immigrants and 
natives. At the same time, in Catalonia, where there is a higher presence of non-enfranchised 
Africans and Asians, the same political party used a restrictive approach to immigration that 
facilitated the acquisition of natives’ votes across the political spectrum.  
 In Chapter 5, I explain the material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a product 
of economic scarcity in the labor market and the welfare state. While extant scholarship views 
native-immigrant labor market competition as the epicenter of inter-ethnic contention, I reveal the 
significance of the welfare state and the mechanisms of economic redistribution. The material 
manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment is concentrated in Andalusia and Wallonia, regions with 
below-average incomes, above-average unemployment rates, and scarcer welfare benefits than in 
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the rest of Belgium and Spain. I show that Andalusians and Walloons not only perceive immigrants 
as potential job competitors but also as undeserving recipients of welfare. Moreover, most citizens 
in both regions view welfare state generosity as a pulling factor of international migration flows.  
As most European countries are revising the structure of their welfare state, it would be 
ideal if anti-immigrant sentiment scholars could re-evaluate the role of economic variables in the 
structure of inter-ethnic relations. While the advancing economic crisis anticipates the continuing 
material manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, I expect shifting patterns of inter-ethnic 
contention in the near future. While conflict between immigrants and natives may remain steady 
or even decrease, I anticipate a rising conflict between ethnic minorities and the ethnic majority. 
Previous studies have already indicated similar dynamics of inter-ethnic contention in other 
European countries (Dancygier 2010).  
 Chapter 6 explains the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a result of 
integration policies centered on immigrants’ acquisition of new cultural practices. In contrast to 
previous studies, which view nationalism as a path-dependent explanation for the salience of anti-
immigrant sentiment in regions with longstanding nation-building projects, I argue that 
nationalism influences anti-immigrant sentiment by shaping the philosophies of integration that 
underlie integration policies. By emphasizing the role of regional integration policies, rather than 
nationalism, I facilitate the theoretical explanation of anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat 
and its fluctuation over time.  
I show that these integration policy frameworks shape citizens’ expectations of 
immigrants’ integration. For native citizens in Catalonia and Flanders, immigrants’ proficiency in 
Catalan and Dutch is the main element to assess their integration. Negative attitudes toward 
immigrants’ integration motivate anti-immigrant sentiment as a cultural threat. As immigrants 
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become increasingly proficient in Catalan and Dutch, I expect anti-immigrant sentiment to decline. 
I do not anticipate that the cultural manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment will prevail in the 
long term, since the second generation will be educated in a public school system where the 
regional language is the lingua franca, and guarantees the cultural integration of immigrants’ 
offspring.  
 
7.2. Research implications 
The main implications of this research concern the role of state regulations in citizens’ perception 
of immigration. My findings contribute to prevailing theories on anti-immigrant sentiment by 
showing the significance of state regulations, political parties, and institutions. In Chapter 4, I show 
that state regulations of immigrants’ enfranchisement affect how political parties frame the 
immigration phenomenon. In Chapter 5, I indicate the significance of welfare state policy for 
citizens’ perception of immigrants as undeserving recipients of benefits. In Chapter 6, I reveal the 
relationship between integration policy frameworks and citizens’ expectations of immigrants’ 
integration. Findings from three empirical chapters complement previous studies by clarifying how 
state regulations shape citizens’ perception of immigration.   
 My findings add to the scholarship on state regulations by indicating the impact of these 
regulations on political parties and public opinion. These insights contribute to a literature that has 
been primarily concerned with the role of policy on immigrants’ living conditions. In Chapter 4, I 
indicate that state regulations motivate political parties to use a dual immigration discourse that 
responds to the geographical distribution of enfranchised immigrants. This means that state 
regulations determining immigrants’ access to political rights influence the alignment of political 
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parties on the immigration issue. Immigrants’ increasing enfranchisement is expected to reduce 
anti-immigrant sentiment and motivate political parties to take into consideration immigrants’ 
interests and chase their vote. 
Chapters 5 shows the significance of the welfare state on public opinion attitudes. The 
Belgian and the Spanish welfare state were originally independent from international migration, 
but increasing immigration and economic scarcity have changed their role and meaning. This 
chapter reveals the association between mechanisms of economic redistribution and anti-
immigrant sentiment, yet further research is required to determine how to re-define the welfare 
state and conceptualize immigration as one of its strengths. In Chapter 6, I contribute to the 
literature by showing that integration policies affect the ways in which citizens view immigrants 
and evaluate their integration. With these findings, it would be ideal if scholars interested in the 
role of state regulations could evaluate their effects on native citizens and immigrants alike.  
Evidence of the institutional embeddedness of attitudes motivates new lines of scholarship. 
For example, previous studies argue that an unemployed citizen is more likely to perceive 
immigration negatively than his employed peer. In this study, I recommend that scholars reduce 
the scope of error by examining whether such individual finds him/herself in a region like 
Andalusia or Madrid. The goal of this approach is to predict the strength and manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment through the examination of structural conditions. This dissertation has taken 
a first step in this direction.  
My findings encourage me to propose three policy suggestions that can potentially reduce 




1. Recognize immigrants’ membership: Empirical chapters allude to patterns of exclusion 
from the political field, the labor market, and the cultural mainstream. The cases of Brussels 
and Madrid, however, indicate that the recognition of immigrants as part of the electorate 
has reduced the salience of anti-immigrant sentiment. Based on this Chapter, I believe that 
policies emphasizing immigrants’ sense of belonging in the labor market, the welfare state, 
the education system, or even the dominant culture, are expected to improve inter-ethnic 
relations.  
 
2. Inform the native citizenry: Throughout the dissertation, I shed light on the gap between 
citizens’ perceptions and reality. This gap is especially wide in the context of the welfare 
state; a large percentage of the population views immigrants as greater recipients than 
contributors to the welfare state, even though several studies indicate that immigrants put 
in much more than what they take out. Evidence of these two parallel realities stress the 
need of implementing new policies to inform the native citizenry about immigration and 
the extent to which immigrants contribute to the national economy, and beyond.  
 
3. Revise integration expectations: Policies in regions like Catalonia and Flanders define 
immigrants’ integration as a unidirectional process: They have to become like Us. As 
immigration represents a structural part of all European societies in demographic, 
economic, and political terms, I believe that unidirectional approaches to integration tend 
to generate unattainable expectations. I propose to change prevailing integration policies 
into a framework of civic principles and a common language. Instead of approaching 
immigrants as outsiders that need to be incorporated into an apparently homogeneous 
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culture, I believe that state regulations should require all residents to communicate in the 
official language and adhere to civic principles. A functional and bidirectional approach to 
integration has more potential to strengthen social cohesion than current policies.      
 
7.3. Limitations and Future Research 
This study’s main limitations are those that traditionally characterize case study research and 
studies examining the relationship between the institutional environment and public opinion: a) 
the generability of findings; and b) determining causality. The analysis of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in three Belgian and three Spanish regions is not representative of inter-ethnic relations 
anywhere else. The socio-demographic, economic, and political particularities of these two 
countries and the six research sites generate unique institutional assemblages that limit the 
explanatory power of findings. Moving forward, I plan to evaluate the extent to which the 
processes I examine in the empirical chapters hold in other regions and countries.   
This study has not attempted to determine direct causality between a concrete policy and a 
specific manifestation of anti-immigrant sentiment, but to reveal the institutional embeddedness 
of public attitudes toward immigration and their cross-regional variability. As longitudinal data 
becomes available, I plan to trace the extent to which public opinion affects policies, and how 
policies, in turn, shape public opinion. Longitudinal data will also facilitate estimating the role of 
political parties in the manifestation of public opinion outcomes, as both potential mobilizers of 
public sentiment and proponents of new policy. 
The development of this research motivates me to continue this line of inquiry in three 




1. Gender and anti-immigrant sentiment: In Chapter 3, I have observed that women are 
more likely than men to exhibit anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat, but not 
as a cultural threat. To my knowledge, this pattern cannot be explained with extant 
scholarship on anti-immigrant sentiment or gender relations. Moving forward, I plan to 
examine whether the variability of attitudes by gender that I observe in Belgium and 
Spain is present in other countries, and, if yes, examine its emergence and prevalence 
over time in light of prevailing theories in the gender studies and public opinion 
literatures.    
 
2. Political parties and immigrants’ enfranchisement: In Chapter 4, I have shown that 
immigrants’ enfranchisement motivates political parties to deliver pro-immigration 
discourses that blur the native-immigrant boundary. I am interested in examining hos 
political parties respond to immigrants’ access to political rights using a large-n 
research design. I find it especially important to compare the performance of parties 
across the left-right axis. Findings from this research are expected to inform the 
literatures on anti-immigrant sentiment, political party alignment, and issue framing.   
 
3. Citizens’ expectations: Chapter 6 indicates that the cultural manifestation of anti-
immigrant sentiment is partly driven by the uneven distribution of citizens’ 
expectations. Catalans and Flemish think that immigrants’ should incorporate elements 
of the regional culture to a greater extent than their counter-parts in the rest of Belgium 
and Spain. This insight suggests an examination of immigrants’ integration from the 
138 
 
point of view of native citizens’ expectations. What do natives expect from 
immigrants? How realistic are these expectations? To what extent do they vary across 
immigrant groups? I anticipate that these findings will contribute to the assimilation 
literature, by revealing the active role of native citizens in the process of immigrants’ 
integration.    
 
Overall, the study of inter-ethnic relations is a top priority for social scientists. In this research, I 
have sought to reveal the institutional embeddedness of anti-immigrant sentiment in Belgium and 
Spain. Multi-ethnic social cohesion is essential to the future of key institutions of the modern 
nation-state; from the quality of its democracy to the support of economic redistribution 
mechanisms. Hence, research in this line of inquiry is expected to benefit scholars across the social 
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Structure of the historical-comparative method 




Sentiment Region:  Material  Cultural  
 
Belgium 
      
     Brussels      X 
     Flanders    X   
     Wallonia  X     
Spain       
     Andalusia  X     
     Catalonia    X   
     Madrid 
 
     X 
 



































     Belgium  Spain 
Variable Description Min Max  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Independent variables: Micro level 
        




 Female 0 1  .51   .50  
Human capital Education 1 7  3.90 3.2  3.10 2.25 
Income Working class 0 1  .22   .41  
 Middle class 0 1  .30   .32  
 Upper-middle 
class 
0 1  .49   .27  
         
Independent variables: Macro level 
 
        
Belgian regions Brussels 0 1  .10     
 Flanders 0 1  .64     
 Wallonia 0 1  .26     
Spanish regions Andalusia 0 1     .40  
 Catalonia 0 1     .35  
 Madrid 0 1     .25  




2004 0 1  .19   .13  
 2006 0 1  .21   .17  
 2008 0 1  .21   .25  
 2010 0 1  .20   .27  
          
Dependent variables:           
Material threat Good 0 1  .30   .33  
 Neutral 0 1  .50   .45  
 Bad 0 1  .20   .22  
Cultural threat Good 0 1  .42   .45  
 Neutral 0 1  .41   .39  















Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V. Coefficients of ordered logit models, 
controlling for respondents’ age, gender, education, income, and year fixed effects. The 
reference category for both dependent variables is: Good. p ≤ 0.10 *p ≤ 0.05; ** p ≤ 0.01; *** 















    
     Catalonia -.374 *** -.303 *** 
     Andalusia -.443 *** .082  
     Madrid (ref.) .-  .-  
 
Belgium 
    
     Flanders -.255 ** -.517 *** 
     Wallonia -.410 *** -.340 *** 
     Brussels (ref.) 
 







Structural characteristics of the six research sites 
 
Sources: Demographics come from Spain’s Anuario Estadístico 2009, and Belgium’s National Statistics. 
Naturalization data come from the European Union Democracy Observatory on Citizenship. Data for unemployment 
rates come from Eurostat, accessed on November 12th 2012, integration models and notions of membership are 
based on Adams (2011) for Belgium, and Aja et al. (2006) for Spain. Data for nation-building projects come from 
Kymlicka (1997), and data for ethno-nationalist parties from Hossay (2002) for Belgium and Gagnon and Keating 
(2012) for Spain.    
Notes: (a) Naturalization data covers the citizenship acquisitions between 1989 and 2007 Belgium, and those 














































Flanders 4 215,801  3.5  Active Ethnic Yes.  Since 1979. 
Wallonia 14 171,133  7.9  Laissez-faire Civic No.  Since 1985. 
Andalusia 8 21,436  27.8  Laissez-faire Civic No.  No. 
Catalonia 15 67,417  16.9  Active Cultural Yes.  Since 2001. 
Madrid 
 





Introduction Exploratory research indicates the cross-regional variation of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in your country (show Tables 3.3-3.6).   
 
Demographics - How has the diversity of immigration affected cross-regional 
differences in anti-immigrant sentiment? 
- Is anti-immigrant sentiment directed towards immigrants or Muslims? 
- What has been the role of the media? And 9/11? 
- What other immigrant communities have been subjected to strong 
anti-immigrant sentiments?  
 
Economics - What is the degree of native-foreigner competition? 
- What makes part of the citizenry to conceive immigrants as 
competitors for either jobs or welfare state benefits? 
- Do you think that specific labor market sectors and their degree of 
in/formality could affect anti-immigrant sentiment? If yes, how? 
 
Politics - How do political actors influence how citizens perceive immigrants? 
- What would the political field look like if immigrants could vote? 
- Do you think that changing immigrants’ voting rights could affect 
how citizens perceive them? 
 
Culture - What integrates an immigrant? 
- What is the role of nationalism in the rise of anti-immigrant 
sentiment? 
- How can nationalism, particularly in regions with nation-building 
projects, be compatible with cultural diversity? 
 














Immigrant population in Alcalá de Henares and Badalona, 2010 
  







   
219,786 
Spanish citizens  160,879   187,166 
Immigrants  42,807   32,620 
% immigrants  21.6%   14.8% 
 
Continent of origin : 





   
4,471 
      European Union  28,331   3,052 
      Europe (non-EU)  1,815   1,419 
Africa  4,194   6,957 
South America  7,131   9,112 
Asia  1,328   12,078 
 
Largest nationalities : 









 Poland 3,108  Morocco 5,697 
 Bulgaria 2,415  China 
 
3,680 
















Cross-regional differences in citizens’ political values in Belgium, 2010 
 






   
Flanders Brussels Wallonia 
 
Left Count  260 45 176  481 
 % within Belgian regions  25.0 41.3 35.8  29.3 
Undecided Count  419 30 181  630 
 % within Belgian regions  40.2 27.5 36.8  38.3 
Right Count  363 34 135  532 
 % within Belgian regions  34.8 31.2 27.4  32.4 
Total Count  1042 109 492  1643 
 % within Belgian regions  100.0 100 100  100.0 
        



















Cross-regional differences in political values, Spain, 2010 
 






    
Catalonia Andalusia Madrid 
 
Left  Count  115 171 102  388 
  % within Spanish regions  50.7 45.7 36.2  43.9 
Undecided  Count  68 137 101  306 
  % within Spanish regions  30.0 36.6 35.8  34.7 
Right  Count  44 66 79  189 
  % within Spanish regions  19.4 17.6 28.0  21.4 
Total  Count  227 374 282  883 
  % within Spanish regions  100 100 100  100 
         







































   
372,284 
   
10,951,266 
Brussels region 766,744  221,482 20  130,862 12  1,119,088 
Flemish region 5,878,652  268,848 4  159,138 3  6,306,638 
Walloon region 
 
3,186,614  256,642 7  82,284 2  3,525,540 
Source: Directorate General Statistics and Economic Information, available at: statbel.fgov.be, accessed on 


















Demographic composition of immigration in Spain, 2012 
 
    

























    
Andalusia 597,243  44.72 32.20 17.79 4.06 1.23 
Catalonia 1,061,079  21.62 32.33 23.95 9.84 12.26 
Madrid 
 
880,613  30.59 43.98 10.71 6.35 8.37 







Immigrants’ political participation in Belgium and Spain, 2010 
Source: Migrant Integration Policy Index, www.mipex.eu, accessed in April 2012. 










Right to vote in national elections.  0  0 
Right to vote in regional elections.  0  0 
Right to vote in local elections.  50  50 
Right to stand for elections at local level.  0  50 







Right to association.  100  100 
Membership of and participation in political parties.  100  100 







Implication of foreign residents at national level (average).  20  50 
Implication of foreign residents at regional level (average).  60  50 
Implication of foreign residents at capital city level (average).  30  50 







Active policy of information by national level (or regional in federal states).  50  0 
Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on national level.  100  50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on regional level.  100  50 
Public funding or support of immigrant organizations on local level in capital city.  100  50 
















Demographic composition of neighborhoods in Brussels, 1988-2005 












































First crown  -8.7 -10.5 -14.2  1,6 0,9 -0,8  1,4 3,6 5,5 
Second crown 
 
 -10.5 -5.4 -8.0  1,5 2,2 2,1  0,5 1,2 2,0 
Source: Deboseere et al (2009) Table 2: Average annual migration balance per 1,000 inhabitants according 













Foreign-born populations in Belgium, in thousands, 1947-1991 
 























Morocco  -  39  39  105  139 
France  66  61  87  104  102 
Netherlands  64  50  61  66  81 
Turkey  -  -  21  64  79 
Spain  3  16  68  58  48 
Germany  14  15  23  28  33 
United Kingdom  10  10  15  23  26 
Portugal  -  1  7  11  25 
Greece  1  10  22  21  20 
United States  -  -  -  11  13 
Rep. Congo  -  3  5  8  12 
Algeria  -  -  7  11  9 













% of total pop. 
 
 4.3  4.9  7.2  8.9  9.0 
Source: Lesthaeghe (2000: 5), Table 1.2. Size of the total foreign population in Belgium and the 

























Belgium       
Brussels  15.6  12.5  35.6 
Flanders  3.8  8.2  19.9 
Wallonia  9.1  10.3  29.4 
 
Spain 
      
Andalusia  29.4  35.4  39.8 
Catalonia  15.8  22.8  37.4 
Madrid 
 
 14.6  24.5  24.7 
Source: For Belgium, Conseil Supérier de l’Emploi [Council of Labor], Rapport 2012, 
<www.emploi.belgique.be> For Spain, Encuesta de Poblacion Activa [Survey of Active 



















Labor Market Mobility in Belgium and Spain, 2007 










Immediate access to employment.  0  50 
Access to private sector.  100  100 
Access to public sector.  50  100 
Immediate access to self-employment.  0  50 
Access to self-employment.  50  100 
 





Access to public employment services.  100  100 
Equality of access to education and vocational training, including study grants.  50  100 








































Equal access to social security.  0  100 
Equal working conditions.  100  100 
Active policy of information on rights of migrant workers by national level (or 









































    
Belgian regions 
  






















































































    
Spanish regions 
  






































































Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Spanish welfare state, 2008 
 
    
Spanish regions 
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Immigrants are greater recipients than contributors to the Belgian welfare state, 2008 
 
    
Belgian regions 
  





























































%  100 100 100  100 





















Source: European Social Survey, wave IV (2008). Pearson Χ (8) = 65.0, p-value .000 
 
  
    
Spanish regions 
  

































 %  41.1 40.9 54.6  44.2 
 





























































Social benefits encourage people from other countries to come live in Belgium, 2008 
    
Belgian regions 
  

































 %  41.2 38.7 36.6  40.0 
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Attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural integration in Catalonia and Spain, 2010 
 











Immigrants should only keep cultural elements 




















Source: Actitudes hacia la inmigración (III), 2009, and Percepció dels catalans i catalanes sobre la 













Expectations of immigrants’ cultural integration in Belgium, 2008 
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Belgian regions 
  














































































































Source: Eurobarometer (2011), Pearson Χ (6) = 26, p-value =.000 














    
Spanish regions 
  




























































































Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Flanders, 2002-2010 
 
    
Income groups 
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Anti-immigrant sentiment as a material threat by income in Catalonia, 2002-2010 
 
    
Income groups 
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 Figure 1.1 























Map of Belgium’s regions and provinces 
 
Flanders:  
1. West Flanders 
2. East Flanders 
3. Antwerp 



















Map of Spain’s regions and provinces 
 
 
Comunidad de Madrid: 
1. Madrid  
 
Andalusia: 
























Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10 
 



























Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Belgium, 2002-10 
 
































Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010 
 































Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ economic contribution in Spain, 2002-2010 
 



































Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10 
 




























Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Belgium, 2002-10 
 
























Negative attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-2010 
 























Positive attitudes toward immigrants’ cultural impact in Spain, 2002-2010 
 































Total citizenship acquisitions, Belgium, 1988-2007 
 









































































































Citizenship acquisitions by country of origin in Belgium, 2003-2007 
 

























Citizenship acquisition by country of origin in Spain, 1995-2008 
 
 
Source: EUDO – Citizenship statistics. European University Institute. 
  



























Source: Partido Popular in Alcalá de Henares, Madrid, <http://www.ppdealcala.es/> 

























































Migration flows between three Belgian regions, 2006 
 
 



















Percentage of low-income households by region, 2002-2010 
 
 























































































































Source: Observatorio Permanente Andaluz de las Migraciones, Estudio OPIA (2010), accessed on January 




























Emigration flows by citizenship in Spain, 2002-2010 
 
 
 Source: Sassen, S. (2013), based on Eurostat, table: Emigration by sex, age group, and citizenship, code: 
























Emigration from Spain by continent of origin, 2002-2010 
 
 
Source: Sassen, S. (2013), based on Eurostat, table: Emigration by sex, age group, and citizenship, code: 















2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010








Have you started or completed an integration or language course? 
 
 





























































History of Belgium, 2011 
 
Source: Archives of the Vlaams Belang website: http://www.vlaamsbelang.be/, accessed 














Planting mosques, 2011 
 
 

















Demonstration of the Vlaams Belang, 2008 
 
 













Pamphlet of Plataforma per Catalunya, 2003 
 
 
Source: Archives of the Plataforma per Catalunya website: 













Material threat: Would you say that it is generally 
bad or good for [country]’s economy that people 
come to live here from other countries?   
  
Scale 0-10  
0 = bad for the economy 
10 = good for the economy 
 
Cultural threat: Would you say that [country]’s 
cultural life is generally undermined or enriched 
by people coming here from other countries?  
  
Scale 0-10  
0 = cultural life undermined 






Human capital: What is your level of education? 
  
Scale 1-7 
1 = Less than lower secondary 
2 = Lower secondary 
3 = Lower tier upper secondary 
4 = Upper tier upper secondary 
5 = Advanced vocational, sub-degree 
6 = Lower tertiary education, BA level 
7 = Higher tertiary education, MA level 
 
Income: What letter describes your household’s 
total income, after tax and compulsory 
deductions, from all sources?  
  
Scale 1-10(b) 
1 = J 
2 = R 
3 = C 
4 = M 
5 = F 
6 = S 
7 = K 
8 = P 
9 = D 
10 = H 
   
 
Source: European Social Survey, waves I-V. 
Notes:  (a) Additionally, my ordered logit models included respondents’ age, gender, region, and survey year.  
(b) Letters represent ten different income categories, which have changed every survey year. For a specific 










Appendix B: Descriptive statistics of interviewees 
 




Professors     
      Sociology  6  5 
      Political Science  6  4 
      Economics  4  4 
      Law  2  3 
Politicians   2  4 













Appendix C: Electoral results in Belgium and Spain 
 
















1995  2/75  15/124 
1999  4/75  20/124 
2004  6/89  32/124 
2009 
 
 3/89  21/124 
 
 










     
2003  1  0 
2007  9  - 
2010  -  0 
2011 
 
 39  - 
 
